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ABSTRACT

THREAT ANALYSIS, COUNTERMEASURES AND
DESIGN STRATEGIES FOR SECURE COMPUTATION
IN NANOMETER CMOS REGIME
SEPTEMBER 2015
RAGHAVAN KUMAR
B.E., ANNA UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI, INDIA
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Wayne P. Burleson

Advancements in CMOS technologies have led to an era of Internet Of Things
(IOT), where the devices have the ability to communicate with each other apart
from their computational power. As more and more sensitive data is processed by
embedded devices, the trend towards lightweight and efficient cryptographic primitives has gained significant momentum. Achieving a perfect security in silicon is
extremely difficult, as the traditional cryptographic implementations are vulnerable
to various active and passive attacks. There is also a threat in the form of “hardware
Trojans” inserted into the supply chain by the untrusted third-party manufacturers
for economic incentives. Apart from the threats in various forms, some of the embedded security applications such as random number generators (RNGs) suffer from
the impacts of process variations and noise in nanometer CMOS. Despite their dis-
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advantages, the random and unique nature of process variations can be exploited for
generating unique identifiers and can be of tremendous use in embedded security.
In this dissertation, we explore techniques for precise fault-injection in cryptographic hardware based on voltage/temperature manipulation and hardware Trojan
insertion. We demonstrate the effectiveness of these techniques by mounting fault attacks on state-of-the-art ciphers. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are novel
cryptographic primitives for extracting secret keys from complex manufacturing variations in integrated circuits (ICs). We explore the vulnerabilities of some of the popular “strong” PUF architectures to modeling attacks using Machine Learning (ML)
algorithms. The attacks use silicon data from a test chip manufactured in IBM 32nm
silicon-on-insulator (SOI) technology. Attack results demonstrate that the majority
of “strong” PUF architectures can be predicted to very high accuracies using limited
training data. We also explore the techniques to exploit unreliable data from “strong”
PUF architectures and effectively use them to improve the prediction accuracies of
modeling attacks. Motivated by the vulnerabilities of existing PUF architectures,
we present a novel modeling attack resistant PUF architecture based on non-linear
computing elements. Post-silicon validation results are used to demonstrate the effectiveness of the non-linear PUF architecture against modeling and fault-injection
attacks. Apart from the techniques to improve the security of PUF circuits, we also
present novel solutions to improve the performance of PUF circuits from the perspectives of IC fabrication and system/protocol design. Finally, we present a statistical
benchmark suite to evaluate PUFs in conceptualization phase and also to enable
fine-grained security assessments for varying PUF parameters. Data compressibility
analyses for validating the statistical benchmark suite are also presented.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1

Hardware Security and Vulnerabilities

The role of embedded systems in day-to-day life has improved significantly in the
last decade and this trend will likely continue in the forthcoming days. Some major
embedded systems include smartphones, tablets, payment systems, smart cards and
medical devices. The trend of ubiquitous computing has therefore seen a great scope
of improvement and has led to an era of Internet of Things (IoT), where the devices
have communication ability in addition to computation power. However, because of
their ubiquitous nature, they also bring out security and privacy issues as they pose
an ideal target for attackers. In particular, protection of sensitive data stored on the
devices has brought forth an alarming issue and demands cryptographic protection.
Majority of the embedded systems pose tight constraints on area and energy
because of their low cost. So, the trend towards lightweight cryptographic primitives
is becoming extremely popular in the design market. Most of the primitives based on
classical cryptography are based on the concept of a secret binary key embedded on
the device. However, they pose some serious security vulnerabilities especially against
physical attacks (invasive, non-invasive and side-channels) and software attacks. The
fact that the key has to be stored in a non-volatile memory further aggravates the
problem.
As explained above, cryptographic hardware blocks in safety and security critical
systems increasingly constitute a target for attackers. Fault-based attacks [6, 10, 12]
aim at determining the secret key or other protected data by actively manipulating
1

the system during operation and thus compromising the system integrity. Such approaches fall into the category of active side-channel cryptanalysis, in order to distinguish them from passive techniques that derive the secret information from measured
operational parameters such as power consumption or timing [40, 63]. A number of
fault-based attacks have been proposed in the recent years and were successful in
breaking state-of-the-art ciphers using one or a small number of faults [29, 34, 37, 56].
Consequently, current and emerging cryptographic circuits must be capable of withstanding such attacks. In order to design appropriate countermeasures, it is important
to understand the attacks, their limits, and the criteria for their success.
The attacks from the latest generation mentioned above require a very high precision on the fault injection. One part of this requirement is spatial resolution: the fault
must show up in the desired locations (memory cells, registers or logic gates) while
not affecting other locations. The second relevant property is the temporal resolution:
the fault must be present in a given point of time (e. g., after the end of a specific
round of encryption) and absent at other times. For example, the one-fault-injectionattack on AES-128 [56] identifies a set of secret key candidates which is sufficiently
small for practical brute-force search under the condition that the fault affects one
or multiple bits of one byte of the cipher state after round 8. If multiple bytes of
this state or bytes during rounds other than 8 are affected by the fault injection, the
mathematical analysis will loose validity and the correct secret key will no longer be
found.
The physical techniques to inject faults can be broadly divided into low-cost, lowprecision and high-cost, high-precision approaches [6]. Here, the term “cost” refers
to the necessary equipment as well as to the qualification of its operator. Low-cost,
low-precision fault-injection methods include operating the device under a reduced
power supply (underfeeding), tampering with the clock signal (introducing a glitch),
overheating the device, irradiating it with X-rays, ion beams, white or ultraviolet
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light and may or may not involve de-packaging the circuit in order to expose the
active areas of its transistor. These techniques typically do not achieve good spatial
and temporal resolutions at the same time. They are suited for attacks such as
manipulating the round counter of a cipher in order to reduce the number of rounds
applied during encryption, or manipulating the program counter of a microprocessor
in order to jump over certain instructions. Methods with high or very high spatial and
temporal resolution include laser irradiation, precise application of electromagnetic
pulses1 , and the use of focused-ion beam.
In this work, we suggest two techniques for fault injection that do not require
elaborate equipment while providing sufficient precision for attacks of the latest generation. The first technique is based on careful selection of the parameters under
which the circuit is operated: power supply voltage Vdd and temperature T . We
search for Vdd /T combinations which lead to injection of faults that satisfy the requirements for the cryptanalysis. In contrast, earlier approaches produced faults of
low precision and predictability and were not suited for latest-generation attacks. We
demonstrate this technique, called V /T fault injection, using a complex two-stage
attack on two recent lightweight block ciphers.
The second fault-injection technique employs hardware Trojans to facilitate fault
injection. Hardware Trojans [87] are malicious modifications of a circuit unintended
by its designer; they can be applied by the untrusted manufacturer or a third-party
intellectual property block provider. Here, we introduce a new class of hardware
Trojans, called MAnufacturing Process LEvel, or MAPLE Trojans. These Trojans are
applied to individual logic gates of the circuit and are activated non-deterministically,
with a probability (called (triggering factor ) being sufficiently high to conduct fault-
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EM techniques are quoted in [6] under the low-cost category. However, recent results suggest
that they can be used for high-precision attacks [93].
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based cryptanalysis, but sufficiently low to make their detection extremely challenging
or even impossible in practice.
We evaluate both fault-injection methods using the same settings and compare
them with each other and with previously introduced fault-injection techniques. In
particular, we demonstrate that both methods are applicable for successful fault-based
cryptanalysis of state-of-the-art ciphers. We discuss in-depth the effectiveness of
known countermeasures against the proposed fault-injection methods and outline the
key differences to earlier threats. In particular, we show that the post-manufacturing
detection methods that traditionally have been considered as a remedy against hardware Trojans are of little use against MAPLE Trojans. While we have no indication
of actual circuits having been manipulated in this way, the theoretical existence of
the threats outlined by our work suggests the need to re-think protection of safetyand security-relevant hardware components.
The vulnerabilities of existing cryptographic hardware blocks have been one of
the major driving forces behind the search of novel, efficient and secure cryptographic
primitives. Moreover, the ever-shrinking transistor sizes has resulted in tiny embedded devices with computing and networking power. Some examples include radiofrequency identifiers, smart cards, PDAs, etc. As these devices store and process
sensitive data, they demand efficient and lightweight cryptographic protection. The
traditional cryptographic implementations are based on a digital secret key stored in
the device. As some of these embedded devices are extremely resource constrained,
storing a secret key in a non-volatile memory might be extremely expensive. Motivated by these drawbacks, Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed in the literature as an efficient way of generating unique and secret identifiers
from the complex and unpredictable nature of silicon.
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1.2

Exploiting Process Variations in Security

The semiconductor industry has been continuously driven by Moore’s law, which
states that the number of transistors in an integrated circuit doubles approximately
every two years. The trend is shown in Figure 1.1. Technology scaling has been the
dominant force behind Moore’s law. However, aggressive technology scaling is also
impacted by variations from process, voltage, temperature and aging to certain extent,
also known as PVTA variations. Significant effort is spent by designers to combat the
variations, especially in complex systems consisting of billions of transistors. Apart
from these variations, the semiconductor industry is also facing non-certainties in the
form of scaling limits. It has been predicted that the technology scaling can continue
up to around 7nm, below which the number of transistors in the channel region will
not be sufficient to generate enough drain current. Researchers are exploring various
post-CMOS devices like nano-wires, graphene, carbon nanotubes, etc.
Managing and mitigating process variations in integrated circuits have been extensively explored, especially in sub-nm design era. Random dopant fluctuation (RDF)
is one of the major sources of process variations. RDF results in a variation in the
number of dopant atoms in the channel region. This in turn changes the threshold
voltage of a transistor. Due to the impact of process variations, logic gates suffer from
delay variations. Process variations also impact the performance of memory elements
such as Static Random Access Memory (SRAM). As the amount of process variations
increase with reducing transistor sizes, significant effort is spent on managing them.
However, there are also possibilities to utilize increasing process variations in a constructive fashion. Such techniques are gaining popularity in semiconductor industry,
where the process variations are used to generate unique signatures in integrated circuits [66, 80]. These circuits are often referred to as Physically Unclonable Functions
(PUFs). The concept of PUFs were first introduced in [86].
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Figure 1.1. Moore’s law [68]

A PUF is a partially disordered system that maps a set of external inputs also
known as challenges C to a response R. A challenge associated with its response is
known as a challenge-response pair (CRP). In silicon PUFs, the mapping function is
decided by process variations arising during the manufacturing process. The manufacturing process is extremely complicated especially in sub-45 nm design space and
is hard to control even by the manufacturer. This ensures that a manufacturer cannot
produce an identical tuple of ICs with the same layout. This behavior is exploited
in the design of PUF circuits. PUFs can be employed in several security related
applications and the scope is often limited by the number of responses that can be
6

generated. PUFs can be broadly classified into “strong” and “weak” PUFs based
on the number of independent responses that it can generate. Please note that the
terms “strong” and “weak” do not have any reference to the security level of a PUF.
A strong PUF can produce a large number of responses (Ri ) for different inputs Ci
and can be used in security protocols, key establishment and device authentication.
A classical example for a strong PUF is an arbiter PUF [86]. A weak PUF, on the
other hand, has a reduced response space and produce only a single response in the
worst case scenario. So, the response(s) must be kept secure from the external world
and must never be shared with a third party. The weak PUFs can be used in classical
crypto-systems for deriving the secret key. One of the typical examples for a weak
PUF is an SRAM PUF [30, 31].
As PUFs find strong potential for deployment in security systems, they must satisfy some properties. Some of the security properties of a strong PUF as described
in [78] are: (i) Cloning a strong PUF is highly impossible. (ii) Entire CRP collection
by an attacker within a short amount of time is impossible. (iii) A subset of CRPs
should not leak any information to predict the response of a challenge outside the
subset. These properties have been exploited in the literature for the development of
various security protocols based on PUFs. Some examples include device identification [86], key exchange [73], oblivious transfer [76] etc. The commercial applications
employing PUF circuits require that any two responses from two different PUF instances of the same type should have a significant difference. This property of PUFs
is referred to as uniqueness. To ensure stable authentication, PUFs are expected to
produce the same response for a challenge under any operating condition, which is
measured in terms of reliability. Finally, a PUF should be unpredictable such that an
attacker possessing a subset of CRP pairs should be unable to predict the response for
a challenge outside that subset. More details on performance metrics of PUF circuits
can be found in chapter 2.
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Although PUFs seem to be a promising alternative to classical cryptography,
they must overcome some concerns to be trusted fully secure. One such concern is
the robustness of PUF circuits. A PUF is expected to produce the same response
whenever queried with a particular challenge. However, due to the presence of on-chip
substrate noise, temperature and voltage fluctuations, some of the responses become
highly unreliable. Several circuit and system level schemes to improve the reliability
of PUF circuits have been proposed in the literature. Prominent examples include
error-correction schemes [92], feedback-supply control [45, 49, 89], helper data [14],
fuzzy extractors [19], etc. Another major concern for PUFs is their vulnerability to
modeling attacks. Moreover, unreliable challenge-response pairs can also be used to
improve the performance of modeling attacks. The unreliable challenge-response pairs
can leak some side-channel information to extract more data-dependent information
from PUF circuits. So, unreliability and security vulnerabilities of PUF circuits are
closely related to each other and must be addressed in order to consider them fully
secure.
In this work, we study the vulnerabilities of some popular “strong” PUF architectures to various attacks using simulated and silicon data. The PUF circuits were
implemented in IBM 32nm Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI) technology and validated using
post-silicon measurements. In particular, we study the vulnerabilities of PUF circuits
to modeling attacks using Machine Learning (ML) algorithms. The ML algorithms
construct a model based on the challenge-response training set. The performance of
modeling attacks depends on the robustness of the challenge-response pairs. If there
are some unreliable challenge-response pairs in the training set, the learning phase of
the ML algorithms is severely impacted and limited prediction accuracies are achieved.
To that extent, we propose a hybrid attack that exploits the data-dependent information present in unreliable challenge-response pair and uses it constructively to push
the prediction accuracies achieved by ML algorithms. Motivated by the vulnera-
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bilities of existing PUF circuits, we also present a modeling attack resistant PUF
architecture using non-linear current mirrors. The post-silicon validation results of
the proposed non-linear PUF architecture are also presented. Finally, a statistical
benchmark suite to evaluate and enable fine-grained security assessments of PUF
architectures is presented.

1.3

Contributions and Organization

The major contributions of this dissertation include:
1. Techniques to extract secret keys from cryptographic hardware through the use
of hardware Trojans and precise voltage and temperature manipulation.
2. Techniques to attack delay-based PUF designs using modeling attacks.
3. Methodologies for exploiting side-channel information to improve the performance of modeling attacks.
4. Design and post-silicon validation of a modeling attack resistant PUF design in
32nm SOI process.
5. Design strategies to improve the performance of PUF circuits.
6. Statistical benchmark suite for analysis of PUF architectures.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In chapter 2, some background information on various sources of process variations is presented. We also
discuss the different performance metrics used to characterize PUF circuits. In chapter 3, we present the different techniques to extract the secret key from cryptographic
blocks. Different techniques include voltage and temperature manipulation and hardware Trojan insertion. We also present the performance of fault-injection techniques
by using them to extract the secret key from state-of-the-art ciphers. Some of the
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countermeasures against fault-injection attacks are also presented. Chapter 4 focuses
on modeling and hybrid attacks on popular delay-based PUF designs. Simulation
and silicon data from PUF circuits are used to validate the performance of modeling
and hybrid attacks. In chapter 5, we present the design and post-silicon measurements of a novel modeling attack resistant PUF design based on non-linear current
mirrors. The performance of the proposed PUF is compared against the best-in-class
current-based PUF architecture and the results are presented. Chapter 6 discuss the
different design strategies to improve the performance metrics of PUF circuits. The
different strategies include fabrication-aware design of PUF circuits and a PUF based
protocol to improve the authentication capabilities of security systems. In chapter 7,
we present the architecture of the 32nm test chip known as sugarloaf and the postsilicon validation setup. Finally, chapter 8 discusses the statistical benchmark suite
and data compressibility analysis of PUFs.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND

Some background information related to PUFs are presented in this chapter.
Along with some background information, the methodology to compute the performance metrics of a PUF circuit are also presented. The methodology presented is the
basis for all performance metrics computation described in the document.

2.1

Sources of CMOS Process Variations

The sources of process variations in ICs are summarized in this section. Some
of the sources of variations are shown in Figure 2.1. From the perspective of PUF
circuits, the sources of variations can be either desirable or undesirable. The desirable
source of variations refers to process manufacturing variations (PMV) as identified
in [39]. The environmental variations and aging are undesirable for PUF circuits.

2.1.1

Manufacturing Process and Variations

The IC manufacturing process consists of several steps [57]: patterning, etching,
doping, film deposition and planarization. A monochromatic light source is focused
via a set of optical lenses on a mask containing the desired pattern to be printed
onto the silicon wafer. After the wafer is exposed, some parts are etched out through
a chemical process and then the surface is planarized using Chemical Mechanical
Polishing (CMP) [57]. This process is repeated several times over for printing the
patterns. Moreover, diffusion/ion implantation is used to dope certain regions of
the wafer. Each of these steps cannot be repeated faithfully from wafer to wafer
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Figure 2.1. Sources of variations in ICs

or even from die to die within the same wafer. Owing to lens material limitations,
the wavelength of the light source has not scaled down below 193nm, though the
transistor dimensions have scaled down to 22nm. This is also a significant contributor
to variations in structures printed on the wafer. Variations occur due to imperfections
in:
• Light source - exposure intensity (dose)
• Lens system - aberration
• Mask
• Etching process - Line Edge Roughness (LER)
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• Doping process
• CMP process
• Alignment - defocus
• Optical Proximity Effects
These imperfections result in variations in physical parameters that lead to variations in electrical parameters like threshold voltage and current. This in turn affects
timing, power consumption, etc. These variations can be random or systematic [57].
Systematic variations should be suppressed as they affect the uniqueness of PUFs. On
the other hand, random variations are unpredictable and improve the performance of
a PUF.
2.1.1.1

Systematic Variations

Systematic component of process variations includes variations in lithography system, nature of layout and CMP [11]. By performing a detailed analysis of the layout,
the systematic sources of variations can be predicted in advance and accounted in
design step. If the layout is not available for analysis, the variations can be assigned
statistically [11].
2.1.1.2

Random Variations

Random variations refer to non-deterministic sources of variations. Some of the
random variations include random dopant fluctuations (RDF), line edge roughness
(LER) and oxide thickness variations. The random variations are often modeled using
random variables for design and analysis purposes.
2.1.2

Environmental Variations and Aging

Environmental variations are detrimental to PUF circuits. Some of the common
environmental sources of variations include power supply noise, temperature fluc13

tuations and external noise. These variations must be minimized to improve the
reliability of PUF circuits.
Aging is a slow process and it reduces the frequency of operation of circuits by
slowing them down. Circuits are also subjected to increased power consumption and
functional errors due to aging [90].

2.2

PUF Terminologies and Performance Metrics

The terminologies and performance metrics used in the field to evaluate PUF
devices are briefly summarized in the following sections.

2.2.1

Challenge-Response pairs (CRP)

As the name suggests, PUF circuits can be envisioned as a function mapping a set
of inputs to outputs. However, as identified in [58], PUF circuits do not implement
a true function as they can produce different outputs for an input under different
operating conditions. The inputs to a PUF circuit are known as challenges and
outputs are referred to as responses. A challenge associated with its corresponding
response is known as a Challenge-Response pair (CRP). In an application scenario,
responses of a PUF circuit are collected and stored in a database. This process is
generally known as enrollment. Under verification or authentication process, the
PUF circuit is queried with a challenge from the database. The response is then
compared against the one stored in the database. If the responses match, the device
is authenticated.

2.2.2

Performance Metrics

There are different important metrics used to analyze a PUF circuit, namely
uniqueness, reliability, unpredictability, uniformity and bit-aliasing probability [60].
The performance metrics are defined in different measurement dimensions as shown
in Figure 2.2. The different measurement dimensions are time, device and space.
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Figure 2.2. PUF Performance metrics and dimensions

Uniqueness and bit-aliasing probability are measured across different devices. Reliability is measured across time and uniformity and unpredictability are measured
across space.

2.2.2.1

Uniqueness

PUF devices are primarily used to generate unique signatures for device authentication. In this application, it is desirable to have a large difference between responses
from any two PUF instances. Here, the two PUF instances may be from the same
wafer or different wafers. A typical measure used to analyze uniqueness is known as
inter-distance and is given by [39, 60]:
j=k
i=k−1
X X
2
HD(Ri , Rj )
x 100%.
dinter (C) =
k(k − 1) i=1 j=i+1
m

(2.1)

In equation 2.1, HD(Ri , Rj ) is the Hamming distance between two responses Ri
and Rj of m bits long for a particular challenge C and k is the number of PUF
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instances under consideration. The desired inter-distance is 50%. By carefully looking
at equation 2.1, one can correspond the inter-distance dinter (C) to the mean of the
Hamming distance distribution obtained over k chips for a challenge C. It is also
useful to obtain the standard deviation of Hamming distance distribution given by
σinter (C), which measures the extent of deviation in Hamming distance from the
desired inter-distance. Lower σinter (C) is preferable for PUF design. As uniqueness
is measured across devices, it is denoted in the device axis in Figure 2.2.
While designing a PUF circuit, inter-distance is often measured through circuit
simulations. A common practice is to perform Monte Carlo simulations over a large
population of PUF instances. Though there is no single concrete number for the
number of PUF instances to be considered for simulation purposes, it is safe to assume
around 1000 samples to obtain a good estimate of uniqueness. In simulations, care
must be taken to efficiently model various sources of manufacturing variations in
CMOS circuits, as they directly translate into uniqueness. During the simulations,
manufacturing variations are modeled using a gaussian distribution. In such cases,
mean and standard deviation of the gaussian distribution under consideration must
correspond to either inter-die or inter-wafer variations’ statistics.

2.2.2.2

Reliability

A challenge applied to a PUF operating on an integrated circuit will not necessarily produce the same response under different operating conditions as the circuit is
subject to environmental variations. The robustness of PUF’s responses is measured
in terms of reliability. Reliability of a PUF refers to its ability to produce the same
response for a particular challenge under varying operating conditions. Reliability
can be measured by looking at the average number of flipped bits in responses for the
same challenge under different operating conditions. A common measure of reliability
is intra-distance given by [24, 39, 60]:
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s

dintra (C) =

0
)
1 X HD(Ri , Ri,j
x 100%.
s j=1
m

(2.2)

In equation 2.2, Ri is the response of a PUF to challenge C under nominal conditions, s is the number of samples of response Ri obtained at different operating
0
conditions, Ri,j
corresponds to j th sample of response Ri for challenge C and m is the

number of bits in the response. Intra-distance is expected to be 0% for ideal PUFs,
which corresponds to 100% reliability. The terms intra-distance (dintra ) and reliability
have been used interchangeably further in this chapter. Given dintra , reliability can
always be computed (100 − dintra (%)).
2.2.2.3

Unpredictability

Responses from a PUF circuit must be unpredictable in order to ensure that the
signatures/keys are safe from adversaries possessing information about the responses
to different challenges from the same device. One of the measures of unpredictability
is the amount of randomness in responses from the same PUF device. This can be
evaluated using NIST tests [24, 58]. Silicon PUFs produce unique responses based
on intrinsic process variations, that are very difficult to clone or duplicate by the
manufacturer. However, by measuring responses from a PUF device for a subset of
challenges, it is possible to create a model that can mimic the PUF under consideration. Several modeling attacks on PUF circuits have been proposed in the literature [32, 51, 53, 54, 62, 78]. The type of modeling attack depends on the PUF circuit.
A successful modeling attack on a PUF implementation may not be effective for other
PUF implementations. Modeling attacks can be made harder by employing some control logic surrounding the PUF block, that prevents direct read-out of its responses.
One such technique is to use a secure one-way hash over PUF responses. However,
if PUF responses are noisy and have significant intra-distance, this technique will
require some sort of error-correction on PUF responses prior to hashing [92].
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2.2.2.4

Uniformity

Uniformity is a measure of the proportion of ’0’s and ’1’s in a PUF’s k bit response.
In other words, the number of challenges that produce ’0’s and ’1’s must be equal in
an ideal scenario. Uniformity of a PUF is evaluated using,
k

(Uniformity)i =

1X
ri,j x 100%
k j=1

(2.3)

where ri,j is the j th bit of a k bit response from chip i. As uniformity is measured
across the k-bit response, it is denoted in the space axis in Figure 2.2.

2.2.2.5

Bit-aliasing probability

If bit-aliasing happens in a PUF circuit, then different chips may produce nearly
identical responses. Bit-aliasing of the i-th bit in PUF response is given by,
n

1X
ri,j x 100%
(Bit-aliasing)j =
n i=1

(2.4)

where ri,j is the j-th bit of a k bit response from chip i. As bit-aliasing is measured
across n devices, it is denoted in the device axis in Figure 2.2.

2.3

PUF Design Flow

This section focuses on a generalized design flow adopted for any type of PUF
instantiation using standard CMOS gates. PUF design flow includes two broad steps,
namely
• Pre-fabrication phase and
• Post-fabrication phase
We describe pre-fabrication phase in section 2.3.1 and post-fabrication phase in
section 2.3.2.
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Figure 2.3. PUF design flow
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2.3.1

Pre-fabrication phase

Any PUF design flow is built upon traditional ASIC design flow, with some specific steps for variation modeling and statistical verification. A complete PUF design
flow is shown in Figure 2.3. As shown in Figure 2.3, PUF design starts from the
architecture specification by defining general design goals and performance requirements. This is followed by a register-transfer level (RTL) design for the PUF circuit
under consideration using Verilog and/or VHDL. Together with design for testing
(DFT) techniques, a logic synthesis procedure is performed upon the developed RTL
code to generate a gate-level netlist along with sub-circuit modules to describe the
transistor-level netlist. A PUF-specific design process of introducing device variation
models is important to enable statistical verification of PUF metrics such as uniqueness and reliability. If this verification fails, i.e., the performance metrics target of
the PUF under consideration is not met, then the process to this step should be repeated with modifications to improve the PUF metrics. Upon statistical verification
failure, a common place in the design process to inspect is the standard cell library.
Often, the standard cell libraries are optimized to tolerate process variations. In such
cases, standard cell libraries specific for PUF design process must be built. If the
verification process succeeds, the design process continues further to physical design
phase including floor-planning, placement and routing and layout-versus-schematic
verification. Once the physical model of PUF circuit is available, the more realistic
device and variation models with extracted parasitics can be used for post-layout
statistical verification. If this final verification fails, either the layout or the original
design has to be modified. A successful verification at this phase should result in the
delivery of GDSII files for fabrication.
To introduce variations to a specific device parameter during the verification
phase, Monte Carlo (MC) based approach can be used to instantiate random values
from a normal distribution or from a post-silicon parameter variation profile available
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through chip measurements. Each MC iteration produces one PUF instance. Usually, a large number of PUF instances (MC iterations) are required for uniqueness
validation process. Supply voltage and temperature fluctuations are assigned over
the netlist with extracted parasitic capacitances and simulations are performed for
reliability and security/unpredictability analysis. Note that the focus of verification
should be the post-layout stage and sufficient number of MC iterations should be
performed, while the verification of pre-layout netlist can have reduced number of
MC iterations.

2.3.2

Post-fabrication phase

Once the pre-fabrication phase is complete, the generated GDS files are sent for
fabrication. The fabricated PUF circuit must be tested for exact real time perforSET	
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mance analysis. The challenges for the PUF circuit under consideration can be generated using an external equipment or generated inside the chip using a pseudo-random
number generator like Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR), as shown in Figure 2.4.
Although an arbiter PUF circuit is shown, any “strong” PUF implementation can be
used. LFSR will start generating pseudo-random challenges, when set signal is pulled
high. Usually post-silicon validation of PUF is done by storing the waveform of responses along with challenges. The CRPs are then extracted from the waveform
files. The CRP extraction methods for pre-silicon and post-silicon validation are almost similar in nature. The only minor concern is that pre-silicon waveforms have
accurate time reference and post-silicon measurements may have some time uncertainties due to clock jitter and external noise. Hence, automatic data synchronization
must be employed to use the same CRP extraction method for pre- and post-silicon
validations.
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CHAPTER 3
PARAMETRIC FAULT INJECTION ATTACKS ON
CRYPTOGRAPHIC HARDWARE

In this chapter, we present the techniques to extract secret keys from cryptographic
blocks. The first technique is based on voltage and temperature manipulation such
that precise faults are injected. By carefully manipulating the Vdd and T values, precise faults up to single bit precision can be injected1 . This technique is referred to
as V /T injection further in the document. The second technique is based on harware
Trojans insertion to facilitate transient fault injection. The proposed hardware Trojans, also known as MAPLE (MAnufacturing Process LEvel) Trojans, are based on
manipulating the electrical characteristics of logic gates, such that non-deterministic
fault injection is achieved2 . The triggering probability of MAPLE Trojans is sufficiently low to mask their detectability. The techniques are validated and compared
using the same settings to enable fair comparison. In particular, we demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed techniques by employing them to break state-of-the-art
ciphers.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides
background on fault-injection techniques and hardware Trojans. The V /T injection
and the MAPLE Trojan-based injection are described in detail in Sections 3.2 and
3.3, respectively. Attacks on several cryptographic circuits using both fault-injection
techniques are reported in Section 3.4.
1

This work was published in [48]

2

This work was published in [47]
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Table 3.1. Comparison of Fault-injection Techniques

New High-pr. Low-precision

Method
Effort

Properties
No. of
attempts

Foundry-side
attacker

Light sensors,
shielding

Vdd manipulation
Clock manipulation
Overheating
X-rays, ion beam
White / UV light

Low
Low
Low
Medium
Medium

Small
Small
Medium
Small
Large

No
No
No
No
No

No
No
No
Limited
Yes

Yes
No
Potentially
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
No
No
No

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Limited
Limited
Somewhat
Limited
Yes

Laser
Electromagnetic
Focused ion beam

High
High
Very high

Small
Small
Small

No
No
No

Yes
Somewhat
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

No
No
No

Yes
Yes
If functional

Limited
Limited
Limited

No
Yes

No
No

Unlikely
Unlikely

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

V /T manipulation
Trojan-assisted

3.1

Low-medium
Large
Low
Medium-large

Countermeasures
Voltage
Fixed
Concurrent
drop sensors
Vdd
error-detection

Frequent key
regeneration

Background

This section presents an overview on fault injection techniques3 in order to relate
them to the methods introduced in this chapter. Moreover, since one of the techniques
is based on hardware Trojans, we also provide background information on this class
of threats to hardware security in Section 3.1.2.

3.1.1

Fault Injection Techniques

Methods to inject faults into digital circuits with the aim of fault-based cryptanalysis are summarized in Table 3.1. Low-cost techniques [4, 6] include manipulation of
power-supply voltage Vdd , manipulation of the clock signal and overheating of the
device. All these techniques do not require elaborate equipment or a cooperating
attacker at the foundry which manufactures the circuit. They are usually effective in
introducing faults quickly but are not very good in controlling the location and the
time of the injected faults.
Since the techniques in this chapter involve Vdd manipulation, we discuss earlier
related approaches in more detail. Voltage manipulation based attacks can involve
either introducing a well-timed glitch into the power supply or under-powering the
device. Glitch based fault injection alters the state of the latches or flip-flops, thereby
3

It is important to distinguish malicious fault injections for cryptanalysis from fault-injection
campaigns run on circuit models in order to study their resilience to transient faults [3, 55], which
are not focused in this chapter.
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affecting the control and data path logic of the circuit. A successful attack on a RSA
implementation using this technique was proposed in [81], and a similar attack on
AES implemented in an SRAM-based FPGA was demonstrated in [15]. In underpowering attacks, the propagation delays of some combinational gates may increase
and lead to timing errors. This can cause a flip-flop to capture the erroneous value.
One such attack to break a smart card implementation of AES was shown in [82]. All
these attacks do not require high precision.
Two further low-precision techniques from Table 3.1 use X-rays/ion beam or illuminating by strong ultraviolet or white light. These approaches require some equipment and may necessitate de-processing of the circuit. The expected time until first
errors show up depends on the energy of the used source, but tends to be rather long
for light-based methods.
High-precision methods that can target individual circuit structures are laser
light, electromagnetic emissions and focused ion beam. They generally require deprocessing of the circuit, expensive or very expensive equipment and skilled operators.
Furthermore, identifying the circuit structure for fault injection requires either knowledge about the circuit layout and the correspondence of layout locations to specific
variables in the cryptographic algorithm, or the ability to derive such correspondence
by reverse engineering.
The techniques introduced in this chapter, are associated with high precision
and low effort. V /T manipulation, explained in Section 3.2, requires some effort
to determine the voltage and the temperature which are optimal for fault injection,
and also some equipment to accurately control the temperature. The Trojan-assisted
technique from Section 3.3 of this chapter relies, as the sole technique in Table 3.1,
on a cooperating attacker involved in the manufacturing process. However, once the
manipulated circuit has been produced, fault injection is easy. Both techniques are
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probabilistic: not every run of the circuit will result in a fault, and not all injected
faults are exploitable for cryptanalysis.
The rightmost five columns of Table 3.1 summarize relevant countermeasures
against malicious fault injections and their effectiveness. One class of countermeasures aims at preventing access to critical circuit structures or identifying attempts
to open the package to gain such access. These methods are effective against optical fault injection and may be effective against further methods (X-rays, ion beam,
EM) if they require de-packaging, but not against manipulation of voltage, clock frequency or temperature. Voltage droop sensors detect significant deviations of Vdd
at the sensed node(s) from their nominal values. They will identify direct and substantial manipulation of power supply voltage and should be rather effective against
methods that induce parasitic currents, including X-rays, ion beams, white/UV/laser
light, EM, and, to some extent, overheating. The proposed injection methods do alter
Vdd , but the extent of manipulation is limited (within 10–20% of the nominal value).
While it is possible to deploy sensors that will detect such small deviations, they will
frequently trigger false alarms because these values are regularly observed in normal
operation (in absence of any fault injection) due to power-supply noise [74].
If the circuit is equipped with circuitry that fixes Vdd at its specified value and
prevents its change, all fault-injections involving voltage, including the proposed techniques, are thwarted. It may be possible to circumvent this protection, but this will
necessitate opening the package. Concurrent error-detection (by duplication and comparison or by employing error-detecting codes) is generally effective against faults due
to arbitrary causes, including malicious fault injections. However, the cost of these
schemes is often prohibitive (100% and more in area and power consumption) and
not all faults are detected. Using focused ion beam, it is possible to deactivate the
error-detecting circuitry.
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The final countermeasure in Table 3.1 is on protocol level: the key is frequently
exchanged. This approach is effective against fault injections which require a large
number of clock cycles, including the proposed techniques. Successful cryptanalysis
may require multiple exploitable fault injections with the same secret key, and the
key may loose validity before enough exploitable faults have been injected. Note that
key regeneration does not detect an attack but only prevents it. In general, frequent
regeneration and secure distribution of secret keys is associated with costs and may
be difficult to perform when the attacker has physical access to the device, as assumed
in fault-based attack scenario.
Note that all countermeasures mentioned in Table 3.1 can, in principle, be circumvented by the attacker with some degree of efforts. It is obvious from the table that
V /T manipulation and Trojan-assisted fault injection have a countermeasure profile
which is completely different compared to earlier fault-injection methods and may
require countermeasures which have typically not been employed in the past.
Table 3.2. Detection of Hardware Trojans

3.1.2

Type

Functional
testing

Side-channel
analysis

Optical
inspection

Small Trojan
Large Trojan
Dopant-level

Easy
Difficult
Medium

Difficult
Easy
Very difficult

Medium
Easy
Very difficult

MAPLE Trojan

Impossible

Very difficult

Very difficult

Hardware Trojans

The term “hardware Trojans” subsumes diverse techniques ranging from manipulation of the circuit by the foundry to threats in intellectual-property blocks from
third-party providers or in CAD tools used to design the circuit. Since the MAPLE
Trojans used in this work belong to the class of foundry-side manipulations, we restrict the discussion in this section to such threats; more details can be found in [87].
In general, the third-party manufacturer modifies the circuit such that it can develop
undesired behavior, including:
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• Denial of service (deactivating or producing constant or random outputs).
• Changing the circuit function.
• Establish a hidden side-channel.
The MAPLE Trojans used in this work have been designed for active fault-based
cryptanalysis. We are not aware of earlier hardware Trojans created or used for this
purpose.
A hardware Trojan consists of two parts: trigger, which activates the Trojan,
and payload, which performs the undesired action. The Trojan may be triggered
by an external event (such as the application of a specific input combination to the
circuit inputs or setting Vdd to a particular value) or by an internal event (such as a
counter reaching a pre-defined value or transistor wear-out of some degree [21]). Most
hardware Trojans assume a cooperative attack model : one attacker (called foundryside attacker in this chapter) is located within the foundry and manipulates the
manufacturing process, and the second attacker triggers the Trojan payload in a
manufactured circuit that is used in application.
Since hardware Trojans are present in the manufactured circuit, it is generally
possible to identify them by testing. Three basic strategies are known for Trojan
detection [69]:
• Functional testing [16] checks if the function implemented by the circuit corresponds to the specification by applying input vectors using either an external
tester or on-chip built-in self-test blocks.
• Side-channel analysis [87] determines parameters such as timing or power consumption of the potentially affected circuit and compares them with expected
values for a Trojan-free circuit.
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• Optical inspection [33] is a destructive technique consisting of mapping the
individual active and metal layers of the de-packaged circuit and checking them
against the original circuit layout.
Table 3.2 summarizes the general detection properties of these methods for conventional Trojans, MAPLE Trojans introduced in this chapter, and related dopant-level
Trojans [9].
It turns out that the complexity (and thus the size) of the Trojan is key to choosing
the optimal detection method. A large Trojan might have a complex triggering condition which could be difficult to find, and therefore it may not be feasible to activate
the Trojan during functional testing and observe its effects. On the other hand, the
large circuitry will have impact on the circuit’s delay and power consumption and will
likely be identified by side-channel analysis. In contrast, the triggering condition of
a small Trojan must be simple because it is implemented with only a few logic gates.
As a consequence, it is feasible to check all such simple conditions during functional
test such as to detect the Trojan. Side-channel analysis will be less effective as the
few logic gates have a smaller contribution to the overall delay or power consumption
and will probably be dominated by random variations. Finally, the optical analysis
will, in theory, find both small and large Trojans, but it is obviously easier to find
Trojans that are associated with more added or changed logic gates and/or affect
more circuit locations.
A very recent Trojan insertion technique, which inspired our MAPLE Trojans,
modifies the logic function of a logic gate by exchanging the dopant polarity of transistors within the gate [9]. This modification corresponds to a stuck-at fault of a
multiplicity equal to the number of manipulated logic gates and is detectable by
functional testing. Note that the attack on the random number generated reported
in [9] was not detected because it was tested by a built-in test self block and the
expected signature was manipulated. This circumvention would not be possible in
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the usual tester-based scenario. Dopant-level Trojans may create side-channel effects
and could be detected by side-channel analysis, but if only few logic gates are affected, the test equipment must have a very high sensitivity. Detecting the Trojans
from [9] by optical inspection is not impossible but very difficult because no logic
is added and removed and the modifications only involve layers transparent to most
analytical methods. Recent work indicates that dopant-level Trojans can be detected
using optical reverse-engineering at a very high cost that is almost 16 times higher
than the detection of metal layers by optical detection [85].
The MAPLE Trojans inherit poor detectability of dopant-level Trojans by sidechannel analysis and optical inspection and avoid detection by functional testing due
to their dependency on Vdd and non-deterministic nature. This will be explained in
detail in Section 3.3.5.

3.2

V /T Fault Injection

Fault injection into cryptographic hardware can have one of the following three
consequences. First, the fault may have no visible effect on the circuit outputs, either
because the injection was not strong enough or because it did not propagate to the
output. We call this situation fault-free (FF). Second, the fault may be exploitable
(EX), that is, correspond to the requirements of the considered attack scenario. Third,
it may not correspond to these requirements; we call such a fault not exploitable (NE).
For example, the attack on the LED-64 block cipher considered in this work
requires fault injection in one of the 16 four-bit nibbles of the state at a certain point
of time within round 30. A fault that flips one, two, three or all four bits of one such
nibble while leaving the other nibbles untouched is exploitable, while faults flipping
bits in multiple nibbles or at different time points are not. The other cipher considered
here, PRINCE, has two types of exploitable faults: one restricted to a single nibble
in round 9 and the other restricted to a single nibble in round 8. Cryptanalysis takes
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the ciphertext C calculated by the fault-free circuit from plaintext P using secret key
k, and the fault-affected ciphertext C 0 calculated from the same P and k but by the
circuit to which the fault injection was applied. If the injected fault was exploitable,
cryptanalysis will either derive the key k from C and C 0 or restrict the number of
key candidates. This is done by constructing a system of equations and solving them
after k. If the injected fault was not exploitable, the equations will be inconsistent
and in most cases have no solution.
The idea of V /T manipulation is to operate a circuit under reduced power-supply
voltage Vdd and/or elevated temperature T . Running multiple encryptions under
such out-of-spec parameters will lead to bit-flips at different circuit locations. These
bit-flips are random to some extent, because they are aggravated by local noise.
In general, the further Vdd and T are from their nominal values, the higher is the
probability of fault injection at any location in the circuit. If the parameter are close
to nominal, most encryptions will be from class FF. If the parameters are very far
from nominal, many locations will tend to flip, and the injected faults will be from
class NE. The aim of our technique is to find Vdd /T combinations under which EX
faults occur with a sufficient rate for practical cryptanalysis.
It is important to stress that the fault injection is not based on increasing the
delay of paths within the circuit and inducing a delay fault at the circuit outputs or
flip-flops. While this mechanism is possible, it is extremely prone to process variations
and not well-controllable. We assume that the circuit is run at a sufficiently low clock
frequency for all gates to switch and that the faults are due to noise-induced bit-flips
at individual gates.
In order to find the Vdd /T combination suited for injection of EX faults, we perform
an analysis in two steps. The first step is an electrical-level simulation analysis of a
circuit model which offers the access to all internal nodes. For several values of T , the
power-supply voltage is swept between a small and a large value with small intervals.
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For each combination, several encryptions are run and the number of FF, EX and NE
faults are determined by leveraging the access to the circuit structures. For example,
the attacks considered here require single-nibble fault injection; this is checked by
simply looking up the value stored in the registers. Starting the voltage sweep with
a value close to nominal Vdd , most encryptions will be FF, then slowly reducing the
power-supply voltage, the number of FF encryptions will decrease and more faults
will be EX (restricted to a single nibble) or NE. At some point, the voltage will be
so low that multiple nibbles will be affected in nearly all cases and faults will become
NE. The Vdd /T combination which lead to the highest proportion of EX faults is then
recorded.
While the first step of the procedure assumes a simulation model of the circuit,
the actual fault-based cryptanalysis is applied to a specific manufactured instance
of the circuit. Because of manufacturing process variability, the Vdd /T combination
obtained for the simulation model with nominal parameters may not be the best for
that instance. Therefore, in the second step, the characterization is continued for the
actual manufactured circuit instance. The voltage is swept around the values obtained
during the simulation-based first step. A key difference with the first step is the lack
of access to internal structures of a physical circuit. For this reason, the classification
of a fault is performed as follows. Any obtained ciphertext C 0 is first compared with
the fault-free ciphertext C; if they match, the encryption is categorized as FF. Then,
cryptanalysis using C and C 0 is attempted. If it yields no solution, an NE fault is
assumed, otherwise an EX fault is assumed. Strictly speaking, an NE fault might
result in an equation system with an (incorrect) solution and therefore be wrongly
categorized as EX, but such situations are rare.
Once the Vdd /T combination has been determined, the actual attack is performed.
Note that some cryptographic functions, including the LED-64 cipher, require only
one EX fault injection for a successful attack. In such a situation, several encryp-
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tions are performed and cryptanalysis is attempted after each of them; once it is
successful, the key is determined and the protection is broken. Other attacks, such
as the attack on PRINCE, necessitate multiple fault injections using the same secret key. Again, several encryptions are performed and the fault-affected ciphertexts
corresponding to EX faults are stored. Once a sufficient number of them has been
collected, cryptanalysis can be invoked and will yield the secret key.
To give more insights on the characterization procedure, the ciphers PRINCE and
LED described in Section 3.4 were designed in 45nm CMOS technology and the impact
of voltage sweep on the device was observed. Voltage was varied in steps of 2mV,
although more fine tuning is possible [5]. To increase the probability of noise-induced
fault injection, temperature T was also varied. The percentage of correct and faulty
computations under different Vdd and T values are shown in Fig 3.1. The probability
of correct and faulty computations converge to 50% at some Vdd for a given T . Below
this point, multiple faults are injected into the circuit and may be non-exploitable.
The exact numbers for exploitable faults along with the stimuli values are presented
in Section 3.4. As the cryptanalysis framework for LED-64 and PRINCE requires
fault injection in a single nibble, Vdd and T values over which a fault is injected into
a single nibble were evaluated. The distributions of single nibble fault injection as a
function of Vdd and T are shown in Fig 3.2. Note that the single nibble faults shown in
Fig 3.2 include the fault injections happening throughout the cipher circuit. However,
only the faults injected in certain rounds are exploitable (details in Section 3.4). So,
the percentage of exploitable faults will be lower than the bounds shown in Fig 3.2.
The exploitable faults’ statistics are presented in Sections 3.4.1.5 and 3.4.2.5.

3.3

MAPLE Trojan-based Fault Injection

This section presents MAnufacturing Process LEvel (MAPLE) techniques for
hardware Trojan insertion in an IC to facilitate fault-injection attacks. MAPLE
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Figure 3.1. Percentage of correct and faulty computations as a function of Vdd and
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Trojans are based on altering a logic gate’s electrical characteristics by modifying
the doping concentration or dopant area within a transistor of the attacked logic
gate. Inspired by dopant-level Trojans [9], MAPLE Trojans do not modify the metal,
polysilicon and active areas and therefore are extremely hard to detect by optical
inspection [9, 33]. However, the major difference of MAPLE Trojans from dopantlevel Trojans is their probabilistic activation: the fault is injected with rather low
probability (which makes it hard to detect by functional testing but is still sufficient
for cryptanalysis) whereas the Trojans from [9] induced deterministic, stuck-at like
behaviour. As MAPLE Trojans are inserted in either manufacturing process or layout
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levels and involve changes in electrical characteristics, they fall under the category of
parametric Trojans [87].

3.3.1

TrojanConc: Doping Concentration Manipulation

This technique focuses on altering the Vin /T -Vout /T characteristic also known
as Voltage Transfer Characteristic (VTC) of the target logic gate by reduction of
substrate doping concentration in one or more transistors. The doping concentrations
play a vital role in determining the threshold voltage of a transistor (Vth ) as identified
by Equation 3.1,

VthNMOS

√
2si qNa 2φb
= 2φb +
+ Vfb ,
Cox

(3.1)

where φb is the bulk potential, si is the permittivity of silicon, Na is the doping
concentration of the carriers in the substrate, Ni is the intrinsic carrier concentration
of undoped substrate and Cox is the gate oxide capacitance. The bulk potential φb is
given by,

φb =

kT Na
ln ,
q
Ni

(3.2)

where k is the Boltzman’s constant, T is the temperature and q is the electronic
charge. At ambient room temperature (T = 298 K), the value of

kT
q

is around 25 mV.

MAPLE Trojans exploit the dependence of threshold voltage on carrier concentration Na , which is clearly observed in Equation 3.1. By reducing Na , the threshold
voltage Vth of an nMOS transistor is increased. In a pMOS transistor, Vth is reduced
by increasing doping concentration. Therefore, the malicious foundry can create a
Trojan gate, e.g., a Trojan inverter with a manipulated VTC as shown in Fig 3.3 by
changing Na . The MAPLE Trojan shown in Fig 3.3 highlights the change in doping
concentration for only nMOS transistors, even though doping concentrations can be
altered in both the transistors.
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The VTC of a Trojan inverter along with the VTC of a normal inverter is shown
in Fig 3.5, where the doping concentration was varied by a factor of 10±3 . Note that
the transistor becomes stronger and induce a shift in the switching voltage Vm (the
input voltage for which the output voltage of the gate is around 0.5 V) because the
threshold voltages Vth were reduced by doping concentration manipulation based on
Equation 3.1. This type of gate modification is referred to as the MAPLE Trojan
TrojanConc. Due to the modified VTC of the Trojan inverter, there could exist input
voltage points greater than 0.5 V such that the output voltage is still above 0.5 V.
This forces the logic gate driven by the Trojan inverter to observe an input ’1’ rather
than ’0’ and the driven gate’s output will flip unless its side-input is controlling.

Insertion effort
The doping concentration manipulation per se is a regular part of many manufacturing processes. Controlling Na is exploited by (trusted and untrusted) foundries
to create transistors with different threshold voltage levels, such as low-Vth , high-Vth ,
or ultra high-Vth etc. For this purpose, different exposure time to the carrier beam is
used for different logic gates within the same circuit. This in turn requires a different
mask for each concentration level to be used within the circuit. Inserting a TrojanConc Trojan is equivalent to introducing an additional concentration level, which
however is far outside the regular process specification. As a consequence, the efforts
amount to preparing additional masks and introducing a new process step which
does not exist for Trojan-free circuits. This effort can be considered substantial and
is visible at many levels within the foundry, yet technically the insertion is feasible.

3.3.2

TrojanArea: Dopant Area Manipulation

The transistor’s strength can be altered by manipulating the doped area under the
active area of a transistor. This concept was exploited in [9] for introducing a hidden
side-channel inside an AES implementation. The MAPLE Trojan TrojanArea utilizes
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Figure 3.3. Cross-sectional view of (a) original inverter and (b) Trojan inverter
using doping concentration manipulation

dopant area manipulation to create spots where transient faults are injected into a
circuit. By reducing the dopant area within the active area, a Trojan inverter with
a VTC shown in Fig 3.5 is created. The layouts of the normal and Trojan inverters
are shown in Fig 3.4. The fundamental principle is the VTC drift towards the weak
transistor.
Since process variations are increasingly dominant in sub-45nm design space, the
effect of inserting TrojanArea must exceed the effect of variability. Based on simulations using 45 nm CMOS inverter from the standard cell library with Wp = 540 nm
and Wn = 360 nm, it was estimated that a reduction of 30% in dopant area of the
nMOS transistor pushes the switching threshold Vm by around 0.2 V. The results of a
comparative analysis of this drift with changes due to process variations are shown in
Fig 3.6. For process variation simulations, threshold voltage distribution with 3σ =
150 mV was assumed as in ITRS specifications [1]. Consequently, the vast majority of
transient faults will be induced by the Trojan gates in their specific locations selected
to benefit fault-based cryptanalysis, and not by random variability which manifests
itself everywhere in the circuit.
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Insertion effort
The dopant-area manipulation can be done both at the layout level (by a malicious
designer in charge of the low-level optimization of the circuit) and by a malicious
foundry. If the manipulation is carried out by the designer and the foundry in charge
of producing the circuit is trusted, it may validate the layout before manufacturing
it. However, the transistors in standard cells are often upsized for lower propagation
delays, and a reduction in strength of one or two transistors making up the circuit
will likely go unnoticed, as long as the design meets the DRC and LVS specifications.
If the circuit layout has no Trojans and the adversary is within the foundry, he
just manually modifies the specification of the mask used to define the manipulated
area. Masks are routinely modified compared with the original layout data for the
sake of optimal proximity correction and other yield-enhancing post-processing steps.
As a consequence, even if a deviation is discovered, it is improbable to raise concerns.
In contrast to TrojanConc which requires major modifications of the whole manufacturing process, only small changes in the mask definitions are needed for the insertion
of TrojanArea. Therefore, their insertion effort is considerably lower.

3.3.3

Trojan Activation

In order to activate the Trojans such that transient faults can be injected, the input
voltage has to be close to the switching threshold Vm . This can be done by slightly
reducing the supply voltage Vdd . If the supply voltage is slightly reduced and is noisy
enough, the Trojan inverter will flip its output, when the supply voltage crosses Vm . In
order to ensure that only the Trojan inverter flips its output, Vm of the Trojan inverter
must be pushed far away from the nominal Vm . As the activation of MAPLE Trojans
is based on noisy supply voltage, the switching behaviour is completely probabilistic.
We define the term trigger factor, which denotes the probability of Trojan activation.
To measure the trigger factor, the supply voltage was modeled using a Gaussian
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Figure 3.4. Layout of (a) original inverter and (b) Trojan inverter using dopant area
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distribution with 3σ deviation of ±10% of the mean Vdd , that is typically observed
in power grids. The Trojan inverters (T rojanConc and T rojanArea) were designed
with the VTC’s shown in Fig 3.5 and were analysed under noisy Vdd . The trigger
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factor of the Trojan inverters are shown in Fig 3.7. The trigger factor is sufficiently
low (< 10−6 ) for 10% reduction in Vdd and increases with decreasing Vdd .
The activation of MAPLE Trojans is fundamentally different from Dopant-level
Trojans proposed in [9]. The dopant-level manipulation from [9] manifests itself as
a “stuck-at” fault and based on the manipulated dopant polarities, they can exhibit
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a stuck-at-0 or stuck-at-1. In contrast, MAPLE Trojans are activated stochastically,
with very low probability determined by the amount of manipulation (dopant-area or
concentration). Such a stochastic nature renders MAPLE Trojans nearly undetectable
while still allowing precise fault injections.

3.3.4

Threat Model

Like other hardware Trojans, MAPLE Trojans are exploited by two adversaries:
the foundry-side attacker who manipulates the manufacturing process and the operationtime attacker who uses the maliciously manufactured circuits in field. These adversaries will usually not be the same persons. The foundry-side attacker could sell the
information about Trojans to a potential attacker, who then can extract the secret
key from the cryptographic circuit. MAPLE Trojans can also be used for introducing
“back-doors” by criminal organizations or authorities.
The complexity of inserting Trojans TrojanConc and TrojanArea by the foundryside attacker has already been discussed in the end of the respective Sections 3.3.1
and 3.3.2. Once the Trojan-affected circuit is fabricated, mounting the attack requires minimal effort. The Trojans are activated by reducing Vdd as explained in
Section 3.3.3. Exploitable faults are injected with low probability which depends on
the supply voltage level. Therefore, the attacker must be able to control Vdd of the
circuit and to invoke multiple runs of the same encryption. Both capabilities do not
require sophisticated equipment.
As is usual in cryptanalysis, the considerations in this article assume Kerckhoff’s
principle “the enemy knows the system”: the foundry-side attacker knows the location of circuit structures where injected faults are exploitable. This implies that
the foundry can track locations in the layout and mask data to registers and logic
gates of the behavioural and/or gate-level circuit description. If the foundry does not
have this information, reverse-engineering is required to obtain it before performing
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the manipulation. While the designer may complicate reverse-engineering, he cannot
prevent it if the attacker devotes to it sufficient time and resources.

3.3.5

Countermeasures and Detection

Countermeasures against various types of fault injection have already been summarized in Table 3.1. Light sensors and shielding do not identify MAPLE Trojans
because the circuit is not depackaged. Voltage sensors are ineffective because, as
discussed above, Vdd reduction is limited and cannot be reliable distinguished from
power-supply noise. However, preventing the attacker from setting the desired Vdd
would render the fault-injection efforts very high. Concurrent error-detection is, in
general, effective against injected faults but it does not guarantee detection with certainty and is rather expensive. Regenerating the secret key with rate that exceeds
trigger factor will effectively thwart the attack, even though the attack will not be
identified. Note, however, that even if the system designer anticipates the possibility
of such attacks and would like to counteract by enforcing frequent key exchange, he
does not know the Trojan trigger factor and cannot select an adequate regeneration
rate.
Since MAPLE Trojans modify the manufactured circuit, they can be, in principle, detected during post-manufacturing testing. As already has been indicated in
Table 3.2, all known methods for such testing are ineffective against MAPLE Trojans,
as detailed below:

3.3.5.1

Functional testing

When testing under nominal Vdd , MAPLE Trojans have extremely low or even
negligible triggering factor (< 10−7 ) and hence are not activated and cannot be detected. It is possible to apply the test at reduced voltage [20]. If Vdd is reduced
slightly, MAPLE Trojans can be invoked, but still with a low trigger factor (e. g.,
10−6 for voltage reduction of 10%). Recall that this is adequate for the operation-
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time attacker who knows about the inserted Trojan and can repeat the encryption
100,000 times or more until the desired fault has been injected. In contrast, the test
engineer does not know with certainty whether a Trojan is present at all, where it
is located, how it is activated, and what triggering factor it has. Repeating all the
tests 100,000 times or more does not appear economically feasible. Moreover, if no
deviation is observed, the Trojan may still be inserted but have a higher triggering
factor than the test engineer anticipated. Finally, a detected fault is transient and
not repeatable and may be easily confused with a failure of the test equipment or an
effect of radiation or electrical noise.
One way to significantly increase the triggering factor is to reduce Vdd by a large
amount (e. g., by 30-40%). However, this will result in timing errors and failures
observed at the circuit outputs which cannot be distinguished from the effect of a
MAPLE Trojan. Under significantly reduced Vdd , the Trojan induced faults are highly
masked by the faults due to timing errors, although the trigger factor of Trojans is
significantly high at such voltage levels.

3.3.5.2

Side-channel analysis

As the manipulated gates have different electrical characteristics, their power consumption profiles will be different from regular gate versions. This implies that they
can be, in principle, detected by power side-channel analysis such as IDDQ testing.
If the manipulated gate is considered in isolation, its measured current-consumption
profile will clearly show the difference to the Trojan-free gate. However, in a real
circuit, the number of manipulated gates is very low. For example, our attack on
PRINCE involves manipulating six inverters out of ∼8,000 gates within the PRINCE
block, which in turn will be embedded in an even larger circuit. The currents drawn
elsewhere on the chip will effectively mask the contribution of the manipulated gates
in presence of process variations.
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Figure 3.8. Supply drawn current for PRINCE

To illustrate the low detectability of MAPLE Trojans by IDDQ testing, the current
drawn from the supply during ten random encryptions by the PRINCE circuit from
Section 3.4.2.2 is shown in Fig 3.8. The peak in the current profile shows the latching
of key and plaintext into registers. The Trojans inserted into PRINCE are activated
between the time duration 8.7 and 8.75 ns. This duration is magnified and shown in
Fig 3.9. From ten encryptions, four different patterns were chosen that corresponds
to the transitions possible for the normal and manipulated inverters (0→1 and 1→0).
The relative difference between the current profiles for the corresponding transitions
is minimal and will likely be masked by IDDQ drawn by other circuit structures.
3.3.5.3

Optical Inspection

The manipulations performed during MAPLE Trojan injection keep all metal,
polysilicon and active-area structures, which are recognizable during optical inspection, unaltered. The modified structures require high-effort analysis methods which
will are difficult to apply in all suspicious locations of the circuit. As a consequence,
MAPLE Trojans are nearly immune to optical reverse-engineering [33]. A very recent
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Figure 3.9. Supply drawn currents for the original and Trojan inverters

work has demonstrated optical detection of Dopant-level Trojans [85]. This technique
can work for TrojanArea, as it is similar to Dopant-level Trojans, albeit at an enormous as demonstrated in [85]. However, T rojanConc will still be immune to optical
detection, as all the structures including dopants remain intact.

3.4

Results

Both fault-injection techniques, the V /T manipulation and the Trojan-assisted
approach, have been applied to recent attacks on two state-of-the-art lightweight
block ciphers: LED-64 (for which one fault-injection is sufficient in most cases) and
PRINCE (for which the attack consists of two stages and both stages typically require
2-3 fault injections). In the following, the algorithms, their circuit implementations
used for fault-injections and the execution of the attack are presented for both ciphers.
The usage of V /T and Trojan-assisted fault injection for executing the attacks and
the results of the cryptanalysis are discussed afterwards.
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3.4.1

LED-64

3.4.1.1

General Layout

LED-644 [26] bears parallels to the well-known AES block cipher, but has been
optimized for a resource-efficient hardware implementation and the layout is shown
in Fig 3.10. The state S of the cipher consists of 64 bits organized in 4-bit nibbles
s0 , . . . , s15 , which can be written as a 4 × 4 matrix. Each si is identified with an
element of F16 ∼
= F2 [x]/hx4 + x + 1i.
k

4 rounds

k

4 rounds

k

k

4 rounds

P

k
C

AddConstants

SubCells
S
S
S
S

4 cells

4 cells

S
S
S
S

S
S
S
S

ShiftRows

MixColumnsSerial

S
S
S
S

element of F16

Figure 3.10. Layout of LED-64

The encryption consists in applying 32 rounds to the 64-bit plaintext P . Each
round consists of four operations:
• AddConstants (AC): perform an XOR operation of the state with a roundspecific constant. All constant entries in the two rightmost columns of the
matrix are equal to 0.
• SubCells (SC): apply a non-linear mapping SBox to each nibble of the state: si
is mapped to SBox[si ].
4

The LED-128 version, which uses two independent 64-bit keys instead of one and has 48 instead
of 32 rounds, is not considered in this article.
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• ShiftRows (SR): leave the first row of the state matrix untouched and shift the
second, the third and the fourth row by one, two and three positions circularly
to the left.
• MixColumnsSerial (MCS): multiply the state (over F16 ) by a MDS matrix M .
The constant of the individual rounds, the SBox mapping and the matrix M can be
found in the LED specification [26]. The LED-64 secret key k consists of 64 bits,
which are also organized in 4-bit nibbles and arranged in a 4 × 4 matrix. After every
four rounds, the key is XORed with the state. The ciphertext is the circuit state after
round 32 and the last XOR operation with k.

3.4.1.2

Circuit implementation

For fault injection attacks, the LED-64 cipher was implemented in 45nm CMOS
technology using the Nangate open cell library. The cipher produces an output in 32
clock cycles, where each cycle corresponds to one round of encryption. The gate count
detail is presented in Table 3.5. The performance numbers are highly competitive with
the original circuit reported in [26].

3.4.1.3

Fault-based cryptanalysis

The cryptanalysis of LED-64 assumes that a fault has been injected in the beginning of round 30, such that three full rounds and one XOR operation with the
secret key k are performed (Fig 3.11, before the ciphertext is output. The fault must
involve an arbitrary number of bits within one four-bit nibble but not across multiple
nibbles. Recall that such a fault is called exploitable (EX) while faults not satisfying
this condition are not exploitable (NE). For illustration, we will consider faults in
the first nibble s0 but very similar procedures apply for faults in other 15 nibbles
s1 , . . . , s15 . If the affected nibble is not known, cryptanalysis is repeated up to 16
times assuming different nibbles. The attacker uses the ciphertext C 0 observed at
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the output of the fault-affected cipher and the fault-free ciphertext C for analysis. C
must be obtained using the same secret key k as C 0 , otherwise, if the key has been
exchanged between the observation of C and C 0 , the analysis will fail. The plaintext
P may or may not be known to the attacker but is not used for cryptanalysis.
While the states S of the fault-free and S 0 of the fault-affected cipher at the end of
round 29 (before the fault injection) are not known, they must be identical: S⊕S 0 = 0.
If the fault injected in the beginning of round 30 is exploitable, S and S 0 must differ
in the top-left entry by an (unknown) value f , as shown in Fig 3.11. The subsequent
mathematical analysis reasons about the difference S ⊕ S 0 after the fault injection.
Adding identical constants to both S and S 0 (AC) does change S ⊕ S 0 . Applying
non-linear SBoxes (SC) to unknown state nibbles will change the difference of nibbles
s0 and s00 from f to f 0 := SBox[s0 ] ⊕ SBox[s00 ], which depends on specific values of
s0 and s00 , and therefore cannot be predicted. However, all other nibble pairs with
si = s0i remain identical after the application of the SBox to each of them. The SR
operation does not change the first row of the matrix which contains the difference.
The matrix multiplication (MCS) is a linear operation which spreads the difference
f 0 over the leftmost column of the state matrix as shown in Fig 3.11.
Similar reasoning can be applied to round 31: AC does not change the difference;
SC replaces the differences in the leftmost column by unknown values a, b, c and d;
SR moves the differences horizontally and MCS spreads them over the whole matrix.
The AC operation of round 32 does not modify these differences.
The matrix obtained after the AC operation of round 32 is used for construction
of fault equations with the secret key and a, b, c and d as unknown variables. To
construct these equations, we notice that the state of the fault-affected cipher before
the final XOR operation with the secret key k is C 0 ⊕k. Consequently, the state of the
fault-affected cipher after AC of round 32 is SC−1 (SR−1 (MCS−1 (C 0 ⊕ k))). Similarly,
the state of the fault-free cipher after AC of round 32 is SC−1 (SR−1 (MCS−1 (C ⊕ k))).

49

The XOR of these two expressions must equal the state difference matrix calculated in
Fig 3.11. This is illustrated in Fig 3.12. While we are not describing the equations here
in detail, they are used to obtain filtering rules which restrict the set of key candidates
(keyspace) from 264 down to values for which brute-force search is practical. Details
are found in [34].

3.4.1.4

Parametric fault injection
NE unsuccessful

FF yes
no

C’
Fault injection

C = C’

analyze(C, C’)
EX successful

Fault−free execution

secret key

Brute−force
search

C
Restricted keyspace

Figure 3.13. Overview of attack on LED-64 using fault injection

The theoretical attack framework from [34] assumed that the injected fault is
exploitable. This assumption does not always hold when using parametric fault injections: some fault injection attempts may not result in a faulty output at all (FF),
and some may result in NE faults. Fig 3.13 shows how the attack is performed using
parametric fault injection. After the fault injection, the obtained C 0 is compared
with the fault-free C to identify the FF case. After that, the cryptanalysis procedure
outlined in the last section and called analyze(C, C 0 ) is attempted. If it is successful,
the restricted keyspace is calculated and brute-force search, i. e., simulation of each
key candidate from the keyspace is performed until one candidate leads to ciphertext
C. Otherwise, the system of fault equations will be inconsistent and have no solution;
the keyspace will be empty. In this case, the fault was NE and the fault injection
must be repeated.
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If the restricted keyspace is too large for brute-force search, it is possible to use an
additional EX fault to obtain further fault equations, which together with the original
equations define a much smaller keyspace. In our experiments, we use a second EX
fault injection when the restricted keyspace had more than 223 elements after the first
EX injection.

3.4.1.5

V /T fault injection results

Based on the V /T fault injection mechanism explained in Section 3.2, the exploitable faults were injected into the circuit after the characterization phase, where
Vdd and T intervals for single nibble fault injection are determined. Similar to the
experiment for PRINCE described in Fig 3.2, the intervals for LED-64 were determined where single-nibble faults were injected. These intervals were 865 – 890 mV for
Vdd and 25 – 40 ◦ C for T . The probability of single nibble fault injection decreases
for temperatures higher than 40 ◦ C, as the faults start spreading to multiple nibbles.
Based on simulations over 10,000 random datasets (P and k), the percentage of exploitable faults was estimated to be around 0.4%. The impact of process variations
on the supply voltage interval was also analysed over 40 different instances of LED64 circuit. Monte Carlo simulations were performed to obtain different instances of
the circuit. Although offsets in the mean Vdd for single-nibble fault injection were
observed, the Vdd interval was similar for all the instances. The best percentages of
exploitable faults for eight different instances along with the mean Vdd of the supply
voltage interval are shown in Table 3.3. Average statistics are shown in Table 3.5 for
comparison with Trojan-based fault injection and with PRINCE.

3.4.1.6

Trojan fault injection results

In order to inject faults into round 30, as required by the cryptanalysis, the round
constants of that round, implemented by inverters, were targeted for MAPLE Trojan
insertion. The round constant for round 30 is 2E, and the inverters corresponding
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to E were replaced with Trojan inverters. The average trigger factor of the Trojan
inverters over 40 instances of LED-64 circuit is shown in Fig 3.18. For this analysis,
TrojanArea with 30% reduction in dopant area was used. Note that the trigger
factor is proportional to ∆Vm and TrojanConc with similar ∆Vm can be synthesized.
Reducing Vdd increases the trigger factor but not necessarily the percentage of EX
faults. This percentage will decrease beyond a certain Vdd , as timing induced faults
start to dominate the influence of Trojans, as shown in Fig 3.19. The best-case
percentages of EX faults for Trojan induced fault injection are shown in Table 3.5.
Table 3.3. Best-case V /T Fault Injection percentages for eight random instances of
LED-64

Vdd
T
FF
EX
NE

3.4.1.7

1

2

3

0.872
40
82.44
0.36
17.2

0.87
40
82.45
0.35
17.2

0.874
40
82.32
0.38
17.3

Instance
4
5
0.87
40
82.6
0.4
17

0.868
40
82.52
0.38
17.1

6

7

8

0.874
40
82.36
0.34
17.3

0.876
40
82.73
0.37
16.9

0.87
40
82.82
0.38
16.8

Cryptanalysis results

To validate our methods, we generated a data set of 50, 000 instances, each consisting of 25 tuples (P, C, C 0 ), with P , C and C 0 denoting plaintext, fault-free ciphertext
and fault-affected ciphertext, respectively. All tuples of a particular instance were
encrypted with the same key. The faulty ciphertexts C 0 were obtained through the
fault injection methods introduced earlier. We applied our cryptanalysis method from
Section 3.4.1.3 on the above tuples. We used the threshold τ = 223 for the following
optimization. If the keyspace restricted after one EX fault injection was smaller than
τ , we applied brute-force search directly. Otherwise, we injected a second fault to
further restrict the keyspace. Note that increasing τ would reduce the number of
required fault injections but increase the run-time of the analysis procedure.
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For each of the 50, 000 instances we were able to successfully reconstruct the secret
key using an average of 1.62 tuples (out of 25 available). This corresponds to the
need for 1.62 EX fault injections on average. The combined time required to run the
analysis on the pairs (C, C 0 ) of a particular instance, followed by an exhaustive search
over the reduced key space was 10.21 seconds on average. The sizes of the keyspaces
after one and two fault injections were 223.34 and 22.27 on average. Fig 3.14 shows the
distribution of keyspace sizes after 1 and 2 fault injections, respectively. Note that
the largest size was approximately 229 , which is still easy to manage with a bruteforce
search on modern hardware, and thus would allow to execute the attack with a single
fault injection. However, as already mentioned above, the overall run-time for the
analysis of one instance would be a lot higher than 10.21 seconds, unless advanced
tricks like parallelization are used, and the analysis of 50, 000 instances would have
required a lot more time. This was the main reason why we chose a threshold of
τ = 223 , and traded a little increase in the amount of fault injections for a highly
reduced run-time.
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Figure 3.14. LED-64 analysis results
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3.4.2
3.4.2.1

PRINCE
General Layout

PRINCE [13] is a 64-bit block cipher with a 128-bit secret key. As in LED, the
64-bit cipher state is organized in 4-bit nibbles. Before an encryption (or decryption)
is executed, the secret key K = k0 k k1 is extended to 192 bit k0 k k1 k k2 with
k2 = (k0 ≫ 1) ⊕ (k0  63). The subkeys k0 and k2 are used for input- and outputwhitening. The key k1 is solely used in the core of PRINCE, which is a 12-round
block cipher. Fig 3.15 gives an overview.
RC0

RC1
R1

P
k0 k1

RC5
...

k1
S

R5

RC6
S
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k1

S-1

R-16

RC10
...
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Figure 3.15. Layout of PRINCE
−1
Each round Ri and Ri+5
with i ∈ {1, . . . , 5} consists of a key addition (XOR with

k1 ), an S-layer (application of a 4-bit non-linear SBox to each nibble of the state), a
linear layer (multiplication of the state represented by a 64-bit row vector by a 64×64
matrix M , and the addition (XOR) of a round constant RCj , with j ∈ {0, . . . , 11}.
−1
Rounds Ri and Ri+5
are separated by a middle layer, which consists of two S-layers,

where SBoxes S and S −1 are applied, interleaved with the multiplication of a matrix
M 0 . The particular operations can be found in the specification of PRINCE [13].
However, we quote the round constants in Table 3.4 because their values are important
for Trojan-assisted fault injection.

54

Table 3.4. The PRINCE round constants

3.4.2.2

i

RCi

i

RCi

0
2
4
6
8
10

0000000000000000
a4093822299f31d0
452821e638d01377
7ef84f78fd955cb1
c882d32f25323c54
d3b5a399ca0c2399

1
3
5
7
9
11

13198a2e03707344
082efa98ec4e6c89
be5466cf34e90c6c
85840851f1ac43aa
64a51195e0e3610d
c0ac29b7c97c50dd

Circuit implementation

Similar to LED-64, the PRINCE cipher was implemented using Nangate open
cell library (45 nm). We implemented both combinational and sequential versions of
PRINCE, as the fault injection statistics depend highly on the type of implementation. The combinational version produces a ciphertext in one clock cycle, whereas
the sequential version produces a ciphertext in 10 clock cycles. However, the clock
frequency of sequential version is substantially higher than the combinatorial version.
The area numbers for the implementations can be found in Table 3.5.

3.4.2.3

Fault-based cryptanalysis

The attack on PRINCE [35] is done in two stages, where each stage is conceptually
similar to the attack on LED from Section 3.4.1.3. We omit the mathematical details
of the attack and only briefly sketch the properties that are relevant for fault injection.
Again, C denotes the fault-free and C 0 the fault-affected ciphertext observed by the
attacker. In stage 0, the faults are injected into round 9 and the constructed fault
equations are used to restrict the number of candidates for the expression (k1 ⊕k2 ). In
general, the restriction yielded by one fault injection is insufficient and multiple EX
fault injections are required. Similar to LED, a fault injection is EX if it only affects
one 4-bit nibble of the cipher state in round 9. We employ an adaptive approach:
define a threshold τ0 and continue injecting faults until the size of the restricted
keyspace for (k1 ⊕ k2 ) falls below τ0 .
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Figure 3.16. Overview of attack on PRINCE using 2 EX fault injections in stage 0
and 3 EX injections in stage 1 with τ0 = 212 and τ1 = 216 .

In stage 1 of the attack, the faults are injected into round 8 and the objective is
to restrict the number of candidates for k1 . Assuming that the fault was EX (again,
this means only one 4-bit nibble of the state was involved), the following procedure
is applied. For each (k1 ⊕ k2 ) candidate from the keyspace calculated in stage 0, the
−1
states of the fault-affected and the fault-free ciphers after round R10
are calculated

as C 0 ⊕ (k1 ⊕ k2 ) ⊕ RC11 and C ⊕ (k1 ⊕ k2 ) ⊕ RC11 , respectively. These values are used
instead of C 0 and C for the same cryptanalysis as in stage 0. Since only one (k1 ⊕ k2 )
candidate from stage 0 is correct, the cryptanalysis in stage 1 has to be repeated up
to τ0 times before a keyspace restriction is obtained. Like in stage 0, the achieved
restriction may not allow brute-force search. For this reason, another threshold τ1 is
defined and fault injection are repeated until the number of candidates for k1 is less
than τ1 . Once the keyspace has been restricted, the complete key is reconstructed
from k1 and (k1 ⊕ k2 ) for each candidate and a brute-force search is applied.

56

3.4.2.4

Parametric fault injection

Like in LED analysis, not all injected faults are exploitable; some (in practice,
the majority) of fault injections result in FF and NE outcomes. Fig 3.16 shows how
one particular two-stage attack scenario is conducted. In stage 0, faults are injected
in round 9 until one of them is EX (the calculation of the fault-free ciphertext C
and its comparison with C 0 are omitted from the figure). Assume that the resulting
keyspace has 227 candidates for (k1 ⊕k2 ), which exceeds the stage-0 threshold τ0 = 212 ;
consequently, a second fault injection is required. It is repeated until cryptanalysis
analyze(C, C 0 ) is successful. Assume that the improved restriction is 28 , which is
below τ0 ; then, stage 0 is finished. Note that it used two EX faults but possibly many
more fault-injection attempts which resulted in FF and NE faults.
Stage 1 starts with fault injection in round 8. In order to check whether the
fault was exploitable, the cryptanalysis has to deliver a consistent system of fault
equations. This in turn necessitates trying (k1 ⊕ k2 ) candidates from stage 0 in order
to invoke analyze(C ⊕(k1 ⊕k2 )⊕RC11 , C 0 ⊕(k1 ⊕k2 )⊕RC11 ). If none of 28 candidates
for (k1 ⊕ k2 ) leads to a consistent cryptanalysis, the fault must have been NE and
the fault injection must be repeated. Assume that the first successful cryptanalysis
yielded 230 > τ2 candidates for k1 . The same procedure is repeated for the fourth
fault injection (second in stage 1) in order to further restrict the keyspace. Assume
that 218 candidates are obtained, which is still above τ1 . The fifth EX fault injection
is then needed, which results in 29 candidates. Since this value is now below the
threshold, they can be simulated. Note that (k1 ⊕ k2 ) is known at this point.
3.4.2.5

V /T fault injection results

The supply voltage and temperature intervals for single nibble fault injection in
PRINCE are shown in Fig 3.2. Like in LED-64, the fault injection statistics were
observed over 40 instances of PRINCE circuit. The percentage of exploitable faults
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over the voltage and temperature intervals are shown in Table 3.5. The percentage
of exploitable faults in sequential version of PRINCE is almost 10× higher than the
combinatorial version. This is because of the fact that the sequential version has
a time reference for fault injection (8th and 9th clock cycles) as required by the
cryptanalysis framework, whereas the combinational version does not have a time
reference. As in LED-64, we report the best-case percentages of exploitable faults in
Table 3.5.

3.4.2.6

Trojan fault injection results

The MAPLE Trojans were inserted into the round constants in the rounds 8 and
9, which are depicted in Table 3.4. Both of these rounds include a nibble of value d,
which has been picked for Trojan manipulation because it is implemented using three
inverters and thus maximizes the probability of a fault. TrojanArea insertion into
this nibble is shown in Fig 3.17. Three inverters, shown in black, are manipulated by
changing the dopant area, whereas all other inverters remain regular. If any of these
three inverters, any pair of these inverters or all three inverters flip, the resulting fault
is confined to one nibble and therefore exploitable.
Note that the faults in round 9 are used for stage 0 of the cryptanalysis. For
stage 1 of the cryptanalysis, faults must be injected into round 8. In the sequential
version of the circuit, the three inverters are manipulated and the fault injection is
controlled by reducing Vdd during cycle 9 (for stage 0 of the attack) or cycle 8 (for
stage 1 of the attack) while nominal voltage is applied during other cycles. In the
combinational version, three inverters from round 9 and another three inverters from
round 8 are manipulated. Unfortunately (from the attacker’s point of view) this gives
raise to simultaneous excitation of faults in rounds 8 and 9. These faults violate the
assumptions of the cryptanalysis procedure and are not exploitable.
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Figure 3.17. Schematics of PRINCE MAPLE Trojans
The average trigger factor of the Trojans inserted into 40 instances of PRINCE
is shown in Fig 3.18. The trigger factor of the Trojans in PRINCE is lower than in
LED-64, as the Trojans inserted into rounds 8 and 9 are vulnerable to simultaneous
triggering and result in NE faults. Such triggering actions were discarded from cryptanalysis. As in LED-64, the trigger factor does not directly correspond to exploitable
faults and the percentage of EX starts decreasing beyond a certain Vdd . The behavior
is shown in Fig 3.19 and the best case percentages for EX is shown in Table 3.5.

3.4.2.7

Cryptanalysis results

In this part we report on the experimental results of the differential fault analysis
of PRINCE. We analysed 10, 000 instances, each consisting of a data set of 50 triples
(C, C 0 , C 00 ) where C denotes the correct and C 0 and C 00 the faulty ciphertexts of stage
0 and 1, respectively. The ciphertexts were generated from plaintexts and keys chosen
uniformly at random, but the key remained fixed for each set of 50 triples. Table 3.6
summarizes the results of the attack and shows that on average between 4 and 5
faults are necessary to successfully reconstruct the 128-bit key.
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Percentage of Trojan induced exploitable faults in LED-64 and

We set the thresholds for the multi-stage fault attack to rather low values: 212 for
stage 0 and 216 for stage 1. In general, higher thresholds lead to less required fault
injections but increase the complexity of subsequent post-processing. In our case,
fault injections using Trojans or V /T manipulation are relatively easy to perform;
therefore we opted for lower values and observed approximately one more required
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Table 3.5. Summary of Fault-injection Attacks

V /T

Type
Gate Equivalent
Clock frequency
Cycles/encryption
Exploitable faults

Trojan

Fault effect distrib.

Circuit

Algorithm

LED-64

PRINCE

Sequential
2256
100MHz
32
Single nibble,
round 30

Combinational Sequential
8,320
8,540
150 MHz
1.7 GHz
1
10
Single nibble,
round 8/9

Fault-free
Exploitable
Not exploitable
Fault-free
Exploitable
Not exploitable

82.6%
0.4%
17.0%
72.86%
9.6%
17.54%

49.8%
0.03%
50.17%
31.0%
0.2%
68.8%

84.8%
0.2%
15.0%
73.9%
1.1%
25.0%

Table 3.6. Overview on the number of required faults
Stage

Min

Max

Avg

Median

0
1

2
2

3
11

2.06
2.84

2.0
3.0

fault on average, compared to [35]. The run time of the cryptanalysis was around 13

rate

rate

seconds.
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Figure 3.20. PRINCE analysis results for stages 0 (upper) and 1 (lower)
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We also analysed the distributions of the number of remaining keys after one and
two fault injections and compared them to the theoretical results. The distributions
are shown in Fig 3.20. The upper graph shows the results for stage 0 and the lower
graph for stage 1. The x-axis denotes the base-2 logarithms of the number of key
candidates and the y-axis shows the (rounded) rate how often a particular number
of key candidates occurred. There are cases where much more faults (up to 11) are
required, but 2 faults were the minimum for every instance. As every exploitable
fault requires a reasonable number (104 − 106 ) of fault injections, a complete attack
using 4 – 5 exploitable faults is feasible.
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CHAPTER 4
MODELING ATTACKS ON PHYSICALLY
UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS

In the previous chapter, we presented techniques for precise fault-injections into
cryptographic blocks for extracting secret keys from the faulty ciphertexts using differential cryptanalysis. One of the major concerns surrounding cryptographic blocks
is that the key is digitally stored and processed within the chip. Apart from fault
injection attacks, the secret key can also be extracted by employing side-channel
attacks. For example, by exploiting the data-dependent power information or electromagnetic radiation emanating from the device under attack, the secret key can
be extracted. Moreover, the digital secrets are often stored in a non-volatile memory and they can be extremely expensive for resource constrained platforms such as
RFID, FPGA etc. [86]. These constraints have served as one of the main motivations
towards the development of Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), which offer an
inexpensive way to generate unique signatures in runtime. Although initially assumed
to be tolerant to various attacks, recent works have suggested otherwise.
Numerous attacks on PUFs have been reported in the literature. Most of the
attacks are specific to the PUF architecture being targeted, while some of them are
generic. Some of the popular attacks include modeling, side-channel, fault attacks,etc.
Among this group, the most prominent one is the modeling attack with the help of
a Machine Learning (ML) algorithm. ML attacks are more specific to strong PUFs,
as the weak PUFs have very few CRPs and hence the CRPs won’t be available for
external access. The collection of various modeling attacks on some of the popular
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implementations of strong PUFs can be found in [78, 79]. Attacks on generalized
Arbiter, Feed-Forward, XOR Arbiter PUF constructions were first reported in [78].
Recently, attacks on PUFs using unreliable response bits have been demonstrated
[17,18]. The attacks use the inherent instability in PUF responses due to device noise
in [18] and the instabilities arising from voltage and temperature fluctuations in [17].
A similar work on breaking controlled Arbiter PUFs using fault- and power-side channels was reported in [8]. As the output of the Arbiter PUF is not directly available in
controlled Arbiter PUFs (outputs are hashed), statistical methods employing correlation were used in [8]. Rührmair et al. have proposed a combined machine learning
and side-channel attack for XOR Arbiter PUFs in [59].
In this chapter, we explore the vulnerabilities of some of the popular “strong” PUF
architectures. In particular, the delay-based PUF designs are chosen as the target, as
they are extremely popular because of their simplistic implementation complexities.
Majority of the delay-based PUF designs can be implemented using simple logic
gates and are ideal for integration into modern day embedded systems. For analyzing
the vulnerabilities, the attacks are performed over the data collected from post-silicon
measurements of the test chip sugarloaf using the methodology described in chapter 7.
The vulnerabilities of delay-based PUFs are analyzed using simple or standalone
machine learning algorithms (ML) using stable CRPs. However, the performance of
standalone ML algorithms degrade under the presence of error-inflicted CRPs in the
training set. To that extent, we propose a technique that exploits the unreliable or
unstable CRPs in the training set and extracts some data-dependent information in
the form of side-channels. The side-channel information is used in conjunction with
a machine learning algorithm in order to improve the prediction accuracies of ML
attacks. As the side-channel information is used along with a ML algorithm, they
are also referred to as hybrid attacks further in the document. First, we describe
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the architectures of the PUF targets followed by a brief description of the employed
machine learning algorithms.

4.1

PUF Targets

As explained above, the delay-based PUFs were chosen as the attack target.
Two popular delay-based PUF constructions, namely arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs were analyzed for their vulnerabilities to standalone and hybrid attacks.
The delay-based PUFs exploit the impact of process variations on the propagation
delays of logic gates to generate unique signatures. The architectures of arbiter and
feed-forward arbiter PUFs are explained in the next subsections.

4.1.1

Arbiter PUFs

The concept of arbiter PUFs was introduced in [51, 52, 86]. An arbiter PUF
architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. Arbiter PUFs are based on delay variations in
logic gates arising from process manufacturing variations in integrated circuits. The
general idea is to trigger a race condition in two identically laid out paths and decide
the winner among the paths using an arbiter. From an implementation point of view,
the identical paths are built using switches or multiplexers, that accept an external
challenge bit (Ci ). The challenge bit decides whether the switch passes the input
to output or switches it, as shown in Figure 4.1(a). The switches/multiplexers are
connected in series to form a digital delay path. A switch/MUX implementation in
terms of logic gates is shown in Figure 4.1(b). When a signal (say a rising pulse) is
applied to the delay path, the signal undergoes different delays through every switch.
At the end of the delay paths, the arbiter decides which of the paths is faster based on
the instantaneous arrival times of the racing signals. If we denote the delay difference
between the arrival time of racing signals at outputs (A & B) and the input trigger
time as TA and TB respectively, then the response computation is given by equation
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4.1. A common practice is to use a set-reset (SR) latch as an arbiter by connecting
one of the racing paths to set and the other path to reset. It is important to note
that the number of CRP pairs is exponential to the number of challenge bits. So,
arbiter PUFs fall under the category of strong PUFs.
C1=0

C2=1

Cn=1

Cn-1=0

TA
A
Arbiter

0/1

B
TB

(a)
Ci

Cib

Ci
topi+1
Cib
topi
boti
Ci
boti+1
Cib

(b)

Figure 4.1. (a)Arbiter PUF architecture with n stages; (b) NAND gate based
implementation of a single MUX/switch stage. The path of propagation of two signals
topi and boti is determined by the challenge bit Ci . If Ci = 1, then topi+1 = topi and
boti+1 = boti . Else, topi+1 = boti and boti+1 = topi .

r=



0

if TA > TB


1

else

(4.1)

To increase the sensitivity of arbiter PUFs to process variations, it is better to use
minimum sized transistors in the delay stage circuits. However, the arbiter should be
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designed using up-sized transistors to tolerate process variations. The arbiter should
fairly evaluate the response based on the delay difference between the racing signals
(which can be positive or negative) and must not introduce any bias. To evaluate the
fairness in response computation, arbiters built using D-type flip-flop and SR NAND
latch were compared. D-type flip-flop arbiter in 45nm technology node has a setup
time of around 20-35 ps, that introduces a bias in response computation. However, SR
NAND latch arbiter has a bias of less than 3 ps because of its cross-coupled structure
and it enables fair arbitration. The comparison results are shown in Figure 4.2.

4.1.2

Feed-Forward Arbiter PUFs

As the arbiter PUFs were shown to be vulnerable to modeling attacks because
of its linear challenge-response behavior, non-linear PUF structures have been proposed in order to improve the PUF’s resilience [51]. One such architecture is the
feed-forward PUF. A feed-forward arbiter PUF exploits delay variations in CMOS
gates and interconnects to extract unique signatures like an arbiter PUF [51]. However, some of the challenge bits in a feed-forward PUF are determined as a result
of racing conditions at intermediate stages with the help of arbiters. The construction of a feed-forward arbiter PUF is shown in Figure 4.3. The intermediate arbiters
a1 ..am generates the additional challenge bits apart from the user specified challenge
C1 ..Cn . The challenge bits C1 ..Cn decide the path of propagation through the delay
paths whose gate-level implementation is shown in Figure 4.1(b). The path of signal
propagation is determined in the same as in an arbiter PUF. The rising pulse applied
at the input undergoes different delays as it gets propagated through the delay paths
and the total delay difference (∆tn = TA − TB ) generated is sampled at the output
with the help of an arbiter to generate the response bit r. The condition for response
generation is similar to an arbiter PUF as demonstrated in equation 4.1.
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Figure 4.2. Fairness evaluation of arbiters based on bias point for choosing 0/1
output. The bias point is given by ∆(t) = TA − TB (a) A simple D-Type flip-flop
arbiter; (b) Plot showing the bias point of d-type flip-flop arbiter for choosing 0/1
around 30 ps; (c) A simple SR-NAND latch arbiter; (d) Plot showing the bias point
of SR NAND arbiter for choosing 0/1 approximately at 0 ps

4.2

PUF Target’s Performance Analysis

It is important to analyze the performance metrics of the PUF circuits before
mounting an attack, as they play a vital role in determining the optimal prediction
accuracies. For example, if the prediction accuracy obtained from a modeling attack is
below the reliability of a PUF circuit, the attack is deemed unsuccessful. So, the per-
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Figure 4.3. Feed-forward arbiter PUF
Table 4.1. Summary of arbiter PUF’s performance metrics from statistical circuit
simulations and post-silicon measurements
Type of
analysis

# Stages

# PUF

Inter-class

Intra-class

instances

HD

HD

0.47

0.05

0.48

0.48

0.475

0.048

0.49

0.48

Uniformity

Bit aliasing
HD

Statistical

64

circuit

80

simulations

128

0.47

0.05

0.485

0.475

64

0.39

0.058

0.41

0.42

0.38

0.059

0.43

0.41

0.375

0.059

0.43

0.42

Post-silicon
measurements

80
128

200

200

formance metrics of arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs were analyzed as per the
framework described in chapter 2. The performance metrics were obtained through
statistical circuit simulations and cross-validated with post-silicon measurements. For
all the analysis, 64, 80 and 128 stage PUF circuits were used.
For performing statistical circuit simulations, HSPICE was used. Different PUF
instances were obtained through Monte carlo simulations as per the methodology
shown in Figure 4.6. For better accuracies, the netlist of the PUF circuit was obtained using the parasitic extractor tool available in Calibre suite. Threshold voltage
variations were assigned from a Gaussian distribution with 3σ deviation of 90mV (for
32nm technology). The performance metrics, namely uniqueness, reliability, uniformity and bit aliasing probability of the circuit were analyzed from circuit simulations
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Figure 4.4. Arbiter PUF’s performance metrics distribution from statistical circuit
simulations

using the IBM 32nm SOI models and the results are shown in Figure 4.4. Around
100,000 CRPs were collected from 200 PUF instances for analyzing uniqueness, uniformity and bit aliasing probability. To compute reliability, the experiments were
conducted at nominal and extreme operating conditions as described in chapter 2.
The results are tabulated in Table 4.1. It can be observed that the arbiter PUF
circuit shows excellent properties upon statistical circuit simulations and the values
obtained were close to ideal values. Similar methodology was adopted to compute
the performance metrics from post-silicon measurements and the results are shown
in Figure 4.5. Around 200 PUF instances were analyzed over 100,000 CRPs for postsilicon validation. The post-silicon validation results agree well with statistical circuit
simulation results and can be clearly seen from Table 4.1.
Similar analyses were carried out for feed-forward arbiter PUFs. However, there
are different configurations possible to implement feed-forward PUFs. Some of the
variable design parameters include the number of feed-forward loops, number of
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Figure 4.5. Arbiter PUF’s performance metrics distribution from post-silicon measurements

stages/loop, dependency between loops, etc. Assuming the loops are symmetric,
if the external challenge is k bits wide and the number of loops is l, then the total
number of delay stages is k + l and the number of stages/loop is k/l. As the variable
design parameters impact the performance of a PUF, they were analyzed through
statistical circuit simulations and post-silicon measurements. The feed-forward PUF
was implemented in such a way that the number of loops and number of stages/loop
can be altered using the configuration bits. The different configurations were analyzed
for the different performance metrics, as per the framework described in chapter 2.
Around 100,000 CRPs were collected from 200 different PUF instances for the analyses. For measuring the PUF’s reliability, the experiments were conducted at nominal
and extreme operating conditions and the number of bit-flips were observed. The
results are shown in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 and also tabulated in Table 4.2. It can
be observed that the design strategy has a significantly higher impact on reliability
than uniqueness. As expected, reliability decreases with the number of loops. So, it

71

Table 4.2. Summary of Feed-forward arbiter PUF’s performance metrics from statistical circuit simulations and post-silicon measurements
Type of

# Bits in

# Loops

# PUF

Inter-class

Intra-class

analysis

challenge (k)

(l)

instances

HD

HD

64

6

0.48

0.05

0.48

0.49

7

0.485

0.052

0.485

0.48

8

0.47

0.055

0.47

0.485

6

0.485

0.055

0.49

0.49

0.48

0.0575

0.48

0.475

Statistical

80

200

Uniformity

Bit aliasing
HD

circuit

7

simulations

8

0.47

0.059

0.49

0.48

6

0.475

0.052

0.48

0.47

7

0.48

0.056

0.47

0.48

8

0.48

0.06

0.49

0.49

6

0.42

0.074

0.42

0.41

7

0.425

0.076

0.41

0.415

8

0.415

0.08

0.415

0.42

6

0.41

0.077

0.42

0.42

128

64

Post-silicon

80

7

measurements
128

200

0.42

0.079

0.42

0.415

8

0.415

0.0881

0.425

0.42

6

0.43

0.076

0.43

0.42

7

0.425

0.079

0.435

0.43

8

0.415

0.0882

0.42

0.425

is highly necessary to choose the number of loops and number of stages/loop such
that an optimal design is achieved in terms of reliability and unpredictability. For the
PUF circuits being considered in this work (64, 80 and 128 stage PUFs), the number
of loops was set to 8 (l = 8).

4.3

Employed Modeling Attacks

We investigated the vulnerability of the PUF circuits to three attacks namely,
Logistic Regression (LR), Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Evolution Strategies
(ES). Although each one of them performed well, we describe the SVM and ES
attacks for the sake of brevity. Unless mentioned otherwise, all the experiments were
conducted on a 32-node cluster of Intel Xeon processors.

72

PUF circuit
specification

Layout and
netlist extraction

Random
challenges

Uniqueness

Process
variations

Statistical circuit
simulation

Reliability

Uniformity

Bit aliasing
probability

Unpredictability

Figure 4.6. Methodology for analyzing the performance metrics of PUF circuits

4.3.1

Support Vector Machines

SVMs are well investigated learning algorithms for data classification preferably
in binary form. Linear or Non-linear separating surfaces can be used for data classification depending on the input-output relationship. Some of the popular non-linear
kernels include high-order polynomials, radial-basis functions, etc.
As majority of the PUF circuits have linear challenge-response relationship, we
describe the linear SVMs. The main objective of a linear SVM is to find the hyperplane
that helps to classify the datasets into a binary set as shown in Figure 4.9 [27]. The
hyperplane H is given by
The hyperplane H is given by

w.x − b = ±1
where w is the normal vector to hyperplane H and
plane from the origin along w.
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b
||w||

is the offset of the hyper-
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Figure 4.7. Feed-forward arbiter PUF’s performance metrics distribution from statistical circuit simulations

The classification and prediction accuracy increases as the distance between the
planes increases. The distance between the planes also impact the amount of mispredictions. Theoretically, the maximum distance between the hyperplanes for best
classification accuracy is given by

2
||w||

[27]. One of the other factors impacting the

mispredictions is the non-linearity at the boundaries, that arise from the PUF circuits. Minimizing ||w|| is not trivial and it is a constrained optimization problem
better solved by Lagrangian multipliers [64]. For this purpose, we use the linear
kernel of Lagrangian SVMs to find the best hyperplanes [65].

4.3.2

Evolution Strategies

Evolution Strategies are algorithms that are used for black-box optimization problems and are generally successful for PUF attacks [8, 78]. They are based on creating
random models in several iterations also known as generations from a parent. The
sample models are also known as off-springs. Only the off-springs that are deemed
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Figure 4.8. Feed-forward arbiter PUF’s performance metrics distribution from postsilicon measurements

to be fit based on some fitness tests are selected and are used as parents for the next
generation. The process is repeated until the convergence point (usually set by the
user) is reached. The prediction accuracies for PUF attacks increase with the number
of generations. The major advantage of ES is that it is completely randomized and
can be parameterized [78]. ES also helps better to tackle the non-linearity from device
leakage currents because of parametric nature. For example, if a weak PUF model
is deemed to be fit in a generation, the convergence point will degrade in the next
generation and can be discarded.
For our experiments based on ES, we set (µ, λ) = (6,36) and the mutation parameter τ =

√1
n

as in [78]. However, we evaluated the performance of attacks with and

without recombination. The performance improvement with recombination (ρ < 6)
was very marginal with respect to the attack without recombination. So, we report
the attack results without recombination in this chapter.
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Figure 4.9. Data classification in Support Vector Machines

4.4

Modeling Delay-based PUFs

As described earlier in this chapter, the delay-based PUF designs are vulnerable to
modeling attacks. We base our attack as per the framework described by Daihyun Lim
in [51]. An arbiter PUF’s challenge-response relationship can be expressed through
an additive delay model. The top and bottom paths of an arbiter PUF shown in
Figure 4.1(a) can be expressed as the sum of delays of individual stages. A direct
measurement of stage delays is extremely difficult. However, they can be estimated
with the help of a machine learning algorithm by observing a subset of CRPs. Each
stage of an arbiter PUF can be expressed through two delay difference parameters as
shown in Figure 4.10, that encode the four individual delay paths of a stage shown in
Figure 4.11. The notations of individual delay components are consistent with [51].
Now, the delay parameter for Ci =1 in terms of individual delay components is shown
in the following equations.
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Figure 4.10. Delay difference parameters for (a) Ci = 0 and (b) Ci = 1
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Figure 4.11. Individual delay components of a single stage of an arbiter PUF

δtop (i) = pi + δtop (i − 1), δbot (i) = qi + δbot (i − 1)

(4.2)

∆ti = δbot (i) − δtop (i)
= (qi − pi ) + (δbot (i − 1) − δtop (i − 1))
= δt1i + ∆ti−1

(4.3)

Similarly, the delay difference parameter for Ci =0 can be expressed.

δtop (i) = si + δbot (i − 1), δbot (i) = ri + δtop (i − 1)
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(4.4)

∆ti = δbot (i) − δtop (i)
= (ri − si ) + (δtop (i − 1) − δbot (i − 1))
= δt0i − ∆ti−1

(4.5)

In equations 4.3 and 4.5, δti refers to the delay difference introduced by the unit
stage. The delay difference parameter indicates that the delay differences (δti ) are all
that are needed to model the PUF rather than the absolute delay values (pi , qi , ri , si ).
The total delay difference at the input of the arbiter denoted by ∆tn is given by
equation 4.6.

∆tn = p0 ∆t0 +

n
X

pi δti

(4.6)

i=1

In equation 4.6, (p0 , p1 ...pn ) represents the parity vector computed using equation 4.7 with pn =1.

pi =

n
Y

Cj

(4.7)

j=i+1

For computing the parity vector, the challenge bits are mapped from (0,1) to
(-1,1). The CRP relationship can be expressed as follows:

∆tn ≶ 0

(4.8)

The above described model serves as the basis for the modeling attacks. The
results from modeling attacks are presented in the next subsection.

4.5

Modeling Attack Results for Delay-based PUFs

We evaluated the delay-based PUF targets implemented in 32nm SOI for the
various ML attacks described in section 4.3. Different lengths of the PUF circuit (64,
80 and 128 stages) were analyzed in the attacks. The experiments under nominal
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conditions were repeated 5 times and the stable CRPs across the iterations were
separated and used for the attacks.
SVM based attacks were performed over 20 different PUF instances implemented
in the test chip, For SVM based attacks, we trained the classifier with a random
set of CRPs collected from the global set of CRPs (3 Million). The challenges were
mapped from (0,1) to (-1,1) as in [51] and the parity vector was constructed as
described in section 4.3 A subset of CRPs were picked in random for training the
classifier and the rest were used to evaluating the performance of the classifier. The
prediction errors as a function of the size of training CRPs for different lengths of
arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs are shown in Figures 4.12 and 4.13. We can
observe that SVM based predictor can reach an accuracy of 99% when trained with
10000 CRPs approximately for arbiter PUFs. As SVMs are not ideal for non-linear
data classification, the maximum prediction accuracy reached for feed-forward arbiter
PUFs is around 85%. Better prediction accuracies for feed-forward arbiter PUFs were
achieved with evolution strategies, as described in the following paragraphs.
We adopted a similar strategy as in SVM attacks for the ES attacks by picking
a random set of CRPs from the global pool. In the evaluation phase, the random
offsprings (count of 6) obtained from each parent were evaluated for strength based
on the number of correct response bits predicted by the model. The best-fit offspring
from the evaluation phase (the offspring with maximum response prediction rate for
the training CRP space) was then used as a parent for the next generation and the
others were discarded. The process was repeated across many generations until the
prediction accuracy got saturated. The prediction errors as a function of the number
of training CRPs are shown in Figures 4.14 and 4.15. From Figure 4.14, we can
observe that ES attacks yield a prediction accuracy of 99% for a CRP size of 7000
approximately for arbiter PUFs. In case of feed-forward arbiter PUFs, prediction
accuracies of around 98% were achieved with around 75,000 CRPs. The results of
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Figure 4.12. Prediction errors from SVM attacks on 64, 80 and 128 stage arbiter
PUFs
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Figure 4.13. Prediction errors from SVM attacks on 64, 80 and 128 stage feedforward arbiter PUFs

modeling attacks on arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs are summarized in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Similar to SVM based attacks, only stable CRPs were
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used in the attacks. However, in real time data collection, it is highly likely that some
of the CRPs are unstable. The impacts of error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction rates
for arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs are demonstrated in the next subsection.
Table 4.3. Summary of modeling attacks on arbiter PUFs using silicon data
Type of PUF

ML algorithm

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

SVM
Arbiter PUF
in 32nm tech.
ES

4.5.1

# Loops

# Training
CRPs
10,000

7,000

Prediction
accuracy (%)
98.8
98.5
98.2
98.9
98.7
98.4

Attack
time
1.2s
1.2s
1.2s
4.5s
4.5s
4.5s

Impact of Error-inflicted CRPs

The error-inflicted CRPs in the training set degrade the prediction accuracies
achieved by modeling attack algorithms. The bit-flips happen when the polarity of the
delay difference sampled by the arbiter is reversed. The bit-flips impact the training
and prediction accuracies of the modeling algorithm. The bit-flips can happen due to
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Figure 4.14. Prediction errors from ES attacks on 64, 80 and 128 stage arbiter PUFs
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Table 4.4. Summary of modeling attacks on Feed-forward arbiter PUFs using silicon
data
Type of PUF

ML algorithm
SVM

Feed-forward PUF
in 32nm tech.
ES

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

# Loops

# Training
CRPs
70,000

8
100,000

Prediction
accuracy (%)
84.5
85.2
85.8
99.1
98.8
98.4

Attack
time
7:20min
7:20min
7:20min
55:20min
1:20hrs
2:45hrs

internal and external noise sources. The internal noise often includes the substrate
and thermal noise and are intrinsic to the ICs. On the other hand, the external noise
includes the voltage and temperature fluctuations from the surrounding environment
to the test setup. The amount of bit-flips from internal and external noise sources
in delay-based PUF circuits are tabulated in Table 4.5. For observing the impact
of internal noise, the measurements were conducted at optimal conditions (0.9V and
25◦ C) for 5 times and the amount of bit-flips for the same challenges were collected.
We can observe that around 2.6% of the 3 Million CRPs are unreliable and have
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Figure 4.15. Prediction errors from ES attacks on 64, 80 and 128 stage feed-forward
arbiter PUFs
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higher chance to get flipped under the same measurement conditions. For observing
the impact of external noise, the measurements were conducted at extreme operating
conditions (1.1V and 75◦ C) and the bit-flips were collected. From table 4.5, we can
observe that around 5.8% of the total responses from arbiter PUFs are susceptible to
fluctuations in voltage and temperature conditions. In case of feed-forward arbiter
PUFs, around 8.2% of the CRPs were unstable. The amount of bit-flips are shown
for feed-forward PUF constructions with l = 8.
Table 4.5. Summary of the bit-flips measurements for delay-based PUF designs in
32nm technology
Type of PUF

Arbiter PUF

Feed-forward
Arbiter PUF

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128

Measurement

# Measured
CRPs

Intrinsic

Extrinsic
3*10ˆ6
Intrinsic

Extrinsic

# Unreliable
CRPs
78,300
78,500
79,120
175,200
178,100
179,200
81,200
81,650
80,800
263,900
264,200
264,500

% Bit-flips
2.61
2.62
2.63
5.85
5.93
5.97
2.7
2.72
2.69
8.8
8.81
8.82

The impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction accuracies for SVM and
ES based attacks for arbiter PUFs are shown in Figures 4.16 and 4.17, respectively.
Evolution strategies were able to handle the error-inflicted CRPs better than SVM,
because of their parametric nature as observed from Fig 4.17. The degradation in
prediction accuracy for 6% error-inflicted CRPs is around 4% for ES and around 11%
for SVM. The impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on SVM and ES attacks for arbiter
PUFs are summarized in Table 4.6.
Similar to arbiter PUFs, the impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on prediction rates
for feed-forward arbiter PUFs were analyzed. The results are shown in Figures 4.18
and 4.19. Although ES based attacks are highly tolerant to errors in CRPs, there is
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a slight drop in prediction accuracy (around 3%). In case of SVM based attacks, the
drop in prediction accuracy is around 13%.As the error-inflicted CRPs have a reversed
polarity in delay difference, the learning phase of the modeling attack is impacted.
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Figure 4.16. Impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction rates of SVM
attacks for arbiter PUFs
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Figure 4.17. Impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction rates of ES attacks
for arbiter PUFs
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Table 4.6. Summary of the impacts of error-inflicted CRPs on prediction rates for
arbiter PUFs
Type of
PUF

ML algorithm

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

SVM
Arbiter PUF
ES

% Error-inflicted CRPs
0
98.8
98.5
98.2
98.9
98.7
98.4

2
95.1
94.8
93.7
97.2
96.8
96.5

4
92.2
91.7
91.2
95.3
95
94.5

6
89
87.5
86
94.5
94.2
93.9

However, not all the CRPs suffer from polarity reversal. Only the challenges for
which the delay difference is lower than a threshold are susceptible. This threshold
delay difference can leak some information and can be used along with the training
set CRPs to improve the prediction accuracies. The details are described in the next
section.
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Figure 4.18. Impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction rates of SVM
attacks for Feed-forward arbiter PUFs
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Table 4.7. Summary of the impacts of error-inflicted CRPs on prediction rates for
Feed-forward arbiter PUFs
Type of
PUF

ML algorithm

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

SVM
Feed-forward
arbiter PUF
ES

4.6

# Loops

% Error-inflicted CRPs
0
84.5
85.2
85.8
99.6
98.8
98.4

8

2
81.2
78.1
77.4
97.1
96.5
96.4

4
77.5
73.4
72.3
96.6
95.9
95.7

6
73.1
70.4
69.2
95.8
95.6
95.5

Hybrid attacks on delay-based PUFs

As described earlier, the unreliable or unstable CRPs can leak some information in
order to improve the prediction accuracies of standalone modeling attacks. In case of
delay-based PUF designs, the vulnerable delay-difference data is used to improve the
accuracy of PUF models and also filter out the weak PUF models. Evolution strategies
based attacks work better with the fault-injection data because of its parametric
nature. As ES based attacks performed better with vulnerable delay-difference data
than SVM, the hybrid attacks are based on ES framework.
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Figure 4.19. Impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction rates of ES attacks
for Feed-forward arbiter PUFs
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4.6.1

Scope of Fault Injection

Among the techniques to inject faults, voltage and temperature manipulation
(V/T) is one of the most popular techniques. Altering the environmental conditions
will make the circuit to deviate from the nominal operating conditions, thereby causing a malfunction. As explained in the previous sections, PUF circuits suffer from
both intrinsic and extrinsic noises. The delay-based PUFs when operated at extreme
operating conditions (1.1V and 75◦ C) produce more unreliable CRPs than the unreliable CRPs induced by intrinsic noise. Although this is detrimental to the PUF’s
operation, some data dependent information can be extracted. One such information
is the amount of delay-difference that is sensitive to V/T variations.
To estimate the amount of threshold delay-difference (∆tmin ), Monte carlo simulations were performed over the arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUF circuits using
the 32nm SOI transistor models. Threshold voltage variations were assigned from
a Gaussian distribution with 3σ deviation of 90mV. Around 1 Million CRPs along
with the corresponding delay-difference (∆tn ) values were collected from spice simulations. For injecting faults, experiments were conducted by changing the operating
conditions (0.8 to 1V in steps of 0.05V and 25 to 75◦ C in steps of 25◦ C) and the
above mentioned data were collected. The error-prone response bits under different
operating conditions when compared to the nominal conditions (0.9V and 25◦ C) were
mapped to the corresponding delay-difference values. The CRPs for which the delaydifference was close to 0s were highly vulnerable to changes in operating conditions
and the behavior can be clearly observed from Figures 4.20 and 4.21. The Figures 4.20
and 4.21 show the error-free and error-prone CRPs for arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs respectively. As similar characteristics were observed for different PUF
sizes, the distributions for 128 stage PUF circuits are shown. It can be observed that
the error-prone CRPs have ∆tn around 5ps and 6ps for arbiter and feed-forward ar-
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Figure 4.20. Delay-difference distributions of error-free and error-inflicted CRPs
from arbiter PUFs
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Figure 4.21. Delay-difference distributions of error-free and error-inflicted CRPs
from feed-forward arbiter PUFs

biter PUFs respectively. These values (5ps and 6ps) were taken as ∆tmin for arbiter
and feed-forward arbiter PUFs.
In delay-based PUF designs, not all the error-prone CRPs are caused by fluctuating operating conditions. Some of the error-prone CRPs are caused by irregularities
in the arbiter itself. So, the error-prone CRPs with ∆tn < ∆tmin induced by the
impact of operating conditions on delay stages were seperated. The plot showing the
amount of flipped bits with ∆t < ∆t

observed under different operating condi-

n
min printer (http://www.novapdf.com)
Create PDF files without this message by purchasing
novaPDF

tions for arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs are shown in Figures 4.22 and 4.23,
respectively. It can be observed that the error-prone CRPs satisfying ∆tmin condition
are slightly lower than intra-class HD shown in Table 4.5. The amount of instable
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Figure 4.22. Amount of bit-flips with ∆tn < ∆tmin for arbiter PUFs

CRPs can be increased further by considering the CRPs with delay-difference higher
than ∆tmin by altering the operating conditions even further (> 1.1V). However, we
set the limits to around 10% of nominal Vdd , as they correspond to the typical power
supply noise observed in an IC. Moreover, some of the security ICs may be equipped
with on-chip voltage detector to avoid over- and under-powering attacks. From the
analysis shown above, it is clear that if a response bit flips, then it is most likely to
have a delay-difference less than ∆tmin . This information is used as a catalyst for
aiding modeling attacks.

4.6.2

Fault-injection assisted ES attacks

In hybrid attacks, the ES algorithm with the same parameters described in section 4.3 was used. But, the threshold ∆tmin data was used to filter out the bad PUF
models. In a simple ES attack, the filtering process is done based on the number of
correct response bits predicted by the model. However, in hybrid attacks, the filtering process is done based on the number of correct response bits and the extent to
which the PUF model adheres to the threshold model. This is done by evaluating the
correlation coefficient between a hypothesis vector and the golden model constructed
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Figure 4.23. Amount of bit-flips with ∆tn < ∆tmin for feed-forward arbiter PUFs

from the observed CRPs. The hypothesis vector (FH ) is obtained from the ES model
by evaluating the delay differences (∆tH ) for the training CRPs, especially for the
error-prone ones. It is given by,

FH =




1, if|∆tH | < ∆tmin

(4.9)



0, if|∆tH | > ∆tmin
The same process is repeated to obtain the golden vector F over the measured
CRPs from the test chip. If the response bit ri got flipped under extreme conditions,
then Fi is assigned to 1, else Fi is assigned to 0. By evaluating the correlationcoefficient between F and FH , the strength of the hypothesis vector is obtained.
The models which yield the best fit in terms of the number of correct response bits
predicted and correlation co-efficient are passed onto the next generation. Better
models were obtained by increasing the number of unstable CRPs in the training set
as shown in Figure 4.24.
Hybrid attack experiments were performed over 20 PUF instances from the test
chip. The attacks were performed using 100 sets of random CRPs picked from the
global pool (3 million) and the results were averaged. In the training set, around 7% of
90
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Figure 4.24. Impact of the number of error-inflicted CRPs on the strength of PUF
models

the CRPs were error-inflicted which were obtained from fault-injection attacks. The
performance of hybrid attacks over arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs are shown
in Figure 4.25 and 4.26 respectively. The best-case prediction accuracy achieved from
hybrid attacks is over 99% for the delay-based PUF designs. This represents a 4%
improvement in performance over the simple ES attack with error-inflicted CRPs for
arbiter and feed-forward arbiter PUFs. The major advantage with hybrid attacks is
that better prediction accuracies are achieved with almost the same number of CRPs
as in simple ES attacks. The best-case prediction accuracies from hybrid attacks
along with attack time overheads are shown in Table 4.8.
Some of the major results from modeling and hybrid attacks are summarized in
Table 4.9. In this chapter, the vulnerabilities of delay-based PUFs to modeling attacks
were clearly demonstrated. The impacts of error-inflicted CRPs on prediction rates
of machine learning algorithms were also presented. To that extent, we presented a
technique to exploit error-prone CRPs for improving the prediction accuracies of machine learning attacks under the presence of error-inflicted CRPs.The vulnerabilities
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Figure 4.25. Performance of hybrid attacks on arbiter PUFs under the presence of
6% error-inflicted CRPs
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Figure 4.26. Performance of hybrid attacks on feed-forward arbiter PUFs under the
presence of 7% error-inflicted CRPs

of existing delay-based PUF circuits impose a strong pressing need on the design of
new secure PUF architectures. To that end, we propose a secure PUF architecture
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Table 4.8. Summary of hybrid attack’s performance on arbiter and feed-forward
arbiter PUFs using silicon data
Type of PUF
Arbiter PUF
Feed-forward
Arbiter PUF

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

# Loops

# Training
CRPs

-

9,000

8

100,000

Prediction
accuracy (%)
99.5
99.25
99
99.4
98.9
98.8

Attack
time
7.5s
7.5s
7.5s
65:10min
1:30hrs
3:10hrs

that is tolerant to modeling attacks. The PUF architecture along with post-silicon
validation results are presented in the next chapter.
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Feed-forward
Arbiter PUF

Arbiter PUF

Type of PUF
SVM
ES with
stable CRPs
ES with
6% error-inflicted
CRPs
Hybrid
SVM
ES with
stable CRPs
ES with
7% error-inflicted
CRPs
Hybrid

Type of attack

8

-

# Loops

95.5
98.8

100,000

98.5
100,000

100,000

99
85.8

93.9

7,000
9,000
70,000

98.4

Prediction
accuracy (%)
98.2

7,000

10,000

# Training CRPs

Table 4.9. Summary of some major results from modeling and hybrid attacks on delay-based PUFs

CHAPTER 5
MODELING ATTACK RESISTANT PUF DESIGN BASED
ON NON-LINEAR ELEMENTS

In the previous chapter, the vulnerabilities of delay-based PUFs to modeling and
hybrid attacks were presented. Since PUF based systems offer tremedous potential
to replace traditional cryptography, they should be designed in such a way that they
are resistant to well-known attacks. To that extent, we propose a novel modeling
attack resistant PUF architecture based on non-linear computing elements 1 . As the
proposed PUF is based on current mirrors, the performance of the proposed PUF is
compared against a popular current-based PUF architecture. So, we take a closer look
at the vulnerabilities posed by current-based PUFs [61] using the data from sugarloaf
2

. Modeling and hybrid attacks are used to evaluate the security of current-based

PUF circuit.
Motivated by the vulnerabilities of existing current-based PUF circuits, we propose a secure PUF based on non-linear current mirrors, which is termed as “nlcPUF”
further in the document. A current mirror is a basic block in analog circuits, whose
function is to copy the input current in the read-node to its output node. The amount
of copied current is highly dependent on the amount of device mismatch, if minimum
sized transistors are used. The basic principle in nlcPUF design is to use a nonlinear current mirror, that shifts the input current by some amount depending on
the strength of the input current. A non-linear current mirror can be designed by
1

This work was published in [44]

2

This work using simulated data was published in [43]
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utilizing a constant current source along with a simple current mirror, in order to
introduce a threshold to the input current. The nlcPUF architecture consists of two
identical non-linear current mirror chains connected at the input to a common current
source. The currents through the unit blocks are then propagated through a current
switching element, which accepts an external challenge bit. The construction is similar to an arbiter PUF architecture. However, in an arbiter PUF, the amount of delay
introduced by a stage remains fixed for a challenge bit. In nlcPUF construction, the
amount of current introduced by a stage is dependent on the input current, which is
due to the non-linearity in the current mirror’s transfer characteristic. Post-silicon
validation of nlcPUF using 32nm CMOS SOI shows that the PUF has excellent statistical properties in terms of inter- and intra-die distances. One of the most striking
features is the low information leakage demonstrated in terms of its modeling attack
resistance. The attacks mounted on nlcPUF using SVM and ES show a significant
increase in attack resistance almost 50x higher than other strong PUF architectures.
The same holds good for hybrid attacks as well, where the error-inflicted CRPs are
exploited for improving the prediction accuracy. Before describing the architecture
and performance evaluation of nlcPUFs, we present the vulnerabilities of a popular
current-based PUF architecture against which nlcPUFs are compared.

5.1

Current-based PUFs

In this section, we provide an overview of Current-based PUFs. Current-based
PUFs were first introduced by Majzoobi et al. in 2012 [61]. The architecture of
Current-based PUF is shown in Fig 5.1. Current-based PUFs are based on the addition of process variation sensitive currents. As shown in Fig 5.1, the process variation
sensitive currents are generated by the current generation (CG) transistors. The transistors are of minimum size in order to maximize the impact of process variations. The
gate voltage of the CG transistors are controlled by a bias voltage Vg . The external
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challenge decides the set of currents to be selected and combined through the select
and combine transistors (SC). A CG transistor together with the SC transistors serve
as the building block of the PUF circuit as highlighted in Fig 5.1. When the challenge
bits controlling the SC transistors of a unit stage (C a [i], C b [i]) are at logic high, the
generated current is split in half when the transistors are matched. However, under
the presence of process variations, the current split ratio deviates from 0.5. If only
one of the challenge bits of a unit stage are at logic high, then the generated current
directly flows through the SC whose gate voltage is at logic high. Finally, if none
of the challenge bits of a unit stage are at logic high, only device leakage currents
flow through the SC transistors. If we assume the current split ratio between the SC
transistors of a unit stage as αi , βi and the leakage current as I[i]L and ’don’t care’
as X, the currents flowing through the SC transistors can be expressed in terms of
the following equation.




I[i],





I a [i] = αi I[i],







I[i]L ,




I[i],





I b [i] = βi I[i],







I[i]L ,

if C a [i] = 1 and C b [i] = 0;
if C a [i] = 1 and C b [i] = 1;

(5.1)

if C a [i] = 1 and C b [i] = X;
if C a [i] = 0 and C b [i] = 1;
if C a [i] = 1 and C b [i] = 1;

(5.2)

if C a [i] = X and C b [i] = 0;

The currents from all the stages are then combined and the total currents are
denoted as I a and I b as shown in Fig 5.1. These currents are then compared using
a sense amplifier to generate a single response bit output. The trigger signal trig is
asserted low before the challenges are spplied such that the output nodes output and
outputb are precharged to Vdd . Once the trigger signal is asserted high, the challenges
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Figure 5.1. Current-based PUF architecture [61]. C a [i] and C b [i] represents the
challenge bits of a single stage. The inputs to the sense amplifier are the currents Ia
and Ib . outputb refers to the complimentary form of the output bit.

are appled and the currents start flowing through the sense amplifier. Based on the
relative strengths of the currents I a and I b , one of the nodes starts discharging faster
and establishes a positive feedback to settle the metastability.
The current-based PUFs were evaluated against the modeling attacks presented
in section 4.3. The parametric model for current-based PUFs are presented in the
next section.

5.2

Attacks on Existing Current-based PUFs

In this section, we present the attack model and results obtained for the Currentbased PUFs described in section 5.1. The CRPs were collected from the 32 nm test
chip as discussed in chapter 7.
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5.2.1

Attack Model

The Current-based PUF shown in Figure 5.1 is based on the linear combination
of process-sensitive currents, where the combining function is decided by an external
challenge C = [(C a [1], C b [1]), (C a [2], C b [2]), ...., (C a [N ], C b [N ])], where N represents
the length of the Current-based PUF. So, for a N stage PUF, the challenge is 2N
bits wide. Moreover, the challenges are chosen such that the number of ones in the
left and right input challenges are equal. If not, the responses become biased because
of the fact that the number of currents that are combined are not balanced and the
response can be predicted before the current difference is sampled. This is achieved
if the following condition is met:
N
X

C a [i] =

i=1

N
X

C b [i].

(5.3)

i=1

Every unit stage of the Current-based PUF can be represented using four parameters, as shown in Figure 5.2. The parameters are nothing but the difference of the
currents flowing through the SC transistors of a unit stage. Based on the attacks,
we observed that the parameter where both the challenge bits of a unit stage are ’0’
(∆I[i]{0,0} ) does not impact the prediction accuracy very much. This is mainly due
to the fact that whenever both the challenge bits are ’0’, only device leakage currents
flow through the SC transistors and hence the difference becomes highly negligible.
Similar to attacks on arbiter PUFs as described in [51], it is necessary to express
the current difference (∆I[i]) as a function of the challenge bits and the total current
generated by the CG transistor. Please note that the sign of the current difference
(+ or −) is all that is required to break the PUF rather than the absolute value.
It is highly difficult to measure the amount of current split and the device leakage
current through physical measurements. However, they can be learned through ML
algorithms by collecting a subset of CRPs.
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Figure 5.2. Current difference modeling parameters for Current-based PUFs

Before expressing the current difference of a unit stage formally, let us fix the
notations. The current difference for a unit stage is denoted by ∆I[i]{C

a [i],C b [i]

},

where C a [i], C b [i] are the gate inputs of the SC transistors (challenge bits). The
device leakage current flowing through the SC transistor whose gate input is at logic
low is denoted as I[i]L . Let αi , βi represent the current split ratio of a unit stage such
that αi + βi = 1. The formal expressions for the current difference parameters are as
follows:
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∆I[i] = I a [i] − I b [i]
∆I[i]{1,1} = (αi C a [i] − βi C b [i])I[i]
∆I[i]{0,1}||{1,0} = (I[i] − I[i]L )(C a [i] − C b [i])+
I[i]L (−C a [i] + C b [i])
= (I[i] − 2I[i]L )(C a [i] − C b [i])
∆I[i]{0,0} ≈ 0
In the equations, the corresponding challenge bits can be substituted to get the
current difference. For example ∆I[i] = (αi −βi )I[i] when C a [i], C b [i] = {1, 1}. Given
the current difference parameters of the unit stage, it is possible to express the total
current difference (∆I = Ia − Ib ) as follows:
∆I =

N
X

∆I[i]{C

a [i],C b [i]}

(5.4)

i=1

So, the CRP relationship of the Current-based PUF can be expressed as,

∆I ≶ 0.

(5.5)

To be more precise, the response computation is given by

r=



1

if ∆I > 0


0

else.

(5.6)

The above described model is used in the ML attacks and the results are demonstrated in the following subsection.
5.2.2

Attack Results

We evaluated the Current-based PUF implemented in 32nm SOI for the various
ML attacks described in section 4.3. Different lengths of the PUF circuit (64, 80 and
128 stages) were analyzed in the attacks. The experiments under nominal conditions
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Figure 5.3. Prediction errors from SVM attacks for 64, 80 and 128 stage Currentbased PUFs

were repeated 5 times and the stable CRPs across the iterations were separated and
used for the attacks.
For SVM based attacks, we trained the classifier with a random set of CRPs
collected from the global set of CRPs (3 Million). The challenges were mapped from
(0,1) to (-1,1) as in [51] and used as a feature vector in SVM attacks. The prediction
errors as a function of the size of training CRPs for different lengths of Current-based
PUFs are shown in Fig 5.3. We can observe that SVM based predictor can reach an
accuracy of 98% when trained with 20,000 CRPs approximately.
We adopted a similar strategy for the ES attacks by picking a random set of
CRPs from the global pool. In the evaluation phase, the random offsprings (count of
6) obtained from each parent were evaluated for their strength based on the number
of correct response bits predicted by the model. The best-fit offspring from evaluation
phase was then used as a parent for the next generation and the others were discarded.
The process was repeated across many generations until the prediction accuracy got
saturated. The prediction errors as a function of the number of training CRPs are
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Figure 5.4. Prediction errors from ES attacks for 64, 80 and 128 stage Current-based
PUFs

shown in Figure 5.4. The results are shown for a generation count of 100. For
some chips, optimal prediction rates (∼99%) were obtained for a lower generation
count and the maximum generation count obtained from 20 chips was around 95.
So, a generation count of 100 was used for ES attacks. From Figure 5.4, we can
observe that ES attacks yield a prediction accuracy of 98% for a CRP size of 70,000
approximately. Similar to SVM attacks, only the stable responses observed over 5
different measurements under the nominal conditions were used for the attack.
The results from SVM and ES based attacks are tabulated and shown in Table 5.1.
The different attack parameters and the attack time overheads are also tabulated.
As mentioned in the paragraphs above, the attacks employed only stable responses.
However, if unreliable responses are used in attacks, the prediction accuracies degrade.
The impacts of error-inflicted CRPs on modeling attacks for Current-based PUFs are
demonstrated in the next section.
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Table 5.1. Standalone ML attack results on current-based PUFs using stable CRPs
from 32nm test chip

ML
algorithm
SVM

ES

5.2.3

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

# CRPs

# Training
CRPs

3*106

100,000

3*106

80,000

Prediction
accuracy (%)
98.8
98.4
98
98
97.7
97.3

Impact of Error-inflicted CRPs

The error-inflicted CRPs in the training set degrades the prediction accuracies
achieved by modeling attack algorithms. The bit-flips happen when the polarity of the
current difference sampled by the sense amplifier is reversed. So, the bit-flips impact
the training and prediction accuracy of the modeling algorithm. As explained in the
previous chapter, the bit-flips can happen due to internal and external noise sources.
The amount of bit-flips from internal and external noise sources in the Current-based
PUF circuits are tabulated in Table 5.2. For observing the impact of internal noise,
the measurements were conducted at optimal conditions (0.9V and 25◦ C) for 5 times
and the amount of bit-flips for the same challenges were collected. We can observe
that around 2% of the 3 Million CRPs are unreliable and have higher chance to get
flipped under the same measurement conditions. For observing the impact of external
noise, the measurements were conducted at extreme operating conditions (1.1V and
75◦ C) and the bit-flips were collected. From table 5.2, we can observe that around
7% of the total responses are susceptible to fluctuations in voltage and temperature
conditions.
The impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on the prediction accuracies for SVM
and ES based attacks are shown in Figures 5.5 and 5.6, respectively. Evolution
strategies were able to handle the error-inflicted CRPs better than SVM, because
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Table 5.2. Bit flip measurements from 32nm Current-based PUFs. Intrinsic bit
flips were observed from repeated measurements under optimal conditions, whereas
extrinsic bit flips were observed by changing the operating conditions.

Measurement

# Measured
CRPs

Intrinsic
Extrinsic

3*106

# Unreliable
responses
59,550
210,010

% Bit-flips
1.98
7

of their parametric nature as observed from Fig 5.6. The degradation in prediction
accuracy for a 6% error-inflicted CRPs is around 7% for ES and around 11% for
SVM. The impact of the error-inflicted CRPs on SVM and ES attacks are tabulated
in Table 5.3. As the error-inflicted CRPs have a reversed polarity in current difference
when compared to the original response, the learning phase of the modeling attack
is impacted. However, not all the CRPs suffer from the polarity reversal. Only the
challenges for which the current difference is lower than a threshold are susceptible.
This threshold current difference can leak some information and can be used along
with the training set CRPs to improve the prediction accuracies. The details are
described in the next subsection.
Table 5.3. Impact of error-inflicted CRPs on ML prediction rates for current-based
PUFs

ML
algorithm
SVM

ES

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128

% Error-inflicted
0
2
5
98.8 95.8 93.3
98.4 95.3 92.8
98 94.6 91.9
98 96.3 94.1
97.7 96 93.8
98.3 95.6 93.5
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Figure 5.5. Performance of SVM attacks on Current-based PUFs with error-inflicted
CRPs
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Figure 5.6. Performance of ES attacks on Current-based PUFs with error-inflicted
CRPs

5.2.4

Hybrid attacks on Current-based PUFs

Similar to delay-based PUFs, the current-based PUFs were analyzed for their vulnerabilities to fault-assisted ES attacks, also termed as hybrid attacks. The Current-
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based PUFs when operated at extreme operating conditions (1.1V and 75◦ C) produce
more unreliable CRPs. Although this is detrimental to the PUF’s operation, some
data dependent information can be extracted. One such information is the amount
of current difference that is sensitive to V/T variations.
To estimate the amount of threshold current difference, Monte carlo simulations
were performed over the Current-based PUF circuit using the 32nm SOI transistor
models. Threshold voltage variations were assigned from a Gaussian distribution with
3σ deviation of 90mV. Around 1 Million CRPs along with the corresponding current
difference values were collected from spice simulations. For injecting faults, experiments were conducted by changing the operating conditions (0.8 to 1V in steps of
0.05V and 25 to 75◦ C in steps of 25◦ C) and the above mentioned data were collected.
The error-prone response bits that flipped under different operating conditions when
compared to the nominal conditions (0.9V and 25◦ C) were mapped to the corresponding current-difference values. The CRPs for which the current-difference was close
to 0A were highly vulnerable to changes in operating conditions and the behavior
can be clearly observed from Figure 5.7. The plot in Figure 5.7 shows the error-free
and error-prone CRPs for both the supply voltage and temperature variations. As
similar characteristics were observed for different PUF sizes, the distribution for 128
stage PUF circuit is shown in Figure 5.7. The plot showing the amount of flipped
bits whose current-difference is less than 5 nA observed under different conditions
is shown in Figure 5.8. The amount of instable CRPs can be increased further by
considering the CRPs with current difference higher than 5 nA that may flip under
highly extreme conditions (> 1.1V). However, we set the limits to around 10% of
nominal Vdd , as they correspond to the typical power supply noise level. Moreover,
some of the security ICs may be equipped with on-chip voltage detector to avoid overand under-powering attacks. Hence, the limits of Vdd were set to conservative values
while mounting fault attacks. Moreover, the unreliable CRPs with current difference
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Figure 5.8. Percentage of unstable CRPs from circuit simulations whose current
difference is lower than 5 nA

less than 5 nA yielded optimum results with respect to the number of generations
required to reach the optimal prediction accuracy. If a response bit flips, then it
is most likely to have a current difference less than 5 nA. This current difference is
denoted by ∆Imin .
5.2.4.1

Performance of Hybrid attacks

The ES algorithm with the same parameters described in section 4.3 was used in
hybrid attacks. The current-difference data (∆Imin ) was used to filter out the bad
PUF models. As described in section 4.6, the PUF models were tested for their fitness
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by evaluating the correlation-coefficient between a hypothesis vector and the golden
vector obtained from measured CRPs. The hypothesis vector is obtained from the
PUF model by computing the current difference for a given challenge (∆IH ). The
hypothesis vector FH is given by,

FH =




1, if|∆IH | < ∆Imin

(5.7)



0, if|∆IH | > ∆Imin
The golden vector F is obtained using the same equation for the measured CRPs,
i.e if the response bit ri got flipped then Fi is assigned to 1, else Fi is assigned to
0. By evaluating the correlation-coefficient between F and FH , the strength of the
hypothesis vector is obtained. Higher correlation is observed for a PUF model which
is closer to the ideal PUF model (PUF circuit). The correlation-coefficient is lesser
than 1, as some of the flipped response bits are induced by instabilities in the sense
amplifier rather than the current-difference. In such cases, the hypothesis shown
in equation 5.7 is not valid and will impact the prediction accuracy. The correlation
coefficient increases with the number of unstable CRPs obtained from the PUF circuit
as shown in Figure 5.9. We show the data for 128-stage PUF and similar results were
obtained for 64- and 80 stage PUFs as well.
Hybrid attack experiments were conducted on 20 different PUF instances on the
test chips and the results were averaged over 100 random sets of training CRPs. In the
global CRP training set (3 Million), around 210,000 error-inflicted CRPs were present
as demonstrated by Table 5.2. The prediction accuracies obtained from hybrid attacks
for the PUF circuits are shown in Figure 5.10. The best-case prediction accuracy
obtained from the hybrid attack is close to 99.5%. This represents a significant
improvement in prediction rate when compared to 94% prediction accuracy obtained
from a standalone ES attack with error-inflicted CRPs. The hybrid attacks achieve
significantly higher prediction rates for almost the same number of training CRPs
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Figure 5.10. Performance of hybrid attacks with 7% error-inflicted CRPs

and a generation count. The averaged results from 20 PUF instances are summarized
in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4. Performance of hybrid attacks on current-based PUFs. The results were
averaged over 20 different PUF instances on test chip. Around, 7% of unreliable
CRPs were present in the training set used in hybrid attacks.
ML
algorithm

# Stages

# Training
CRPs

# Unreliable
CRPs

Prediction rate (%)

Hybrid
attacks

64
80
128

500,000

34,550

99.5
99.1
98.8

In the above sections, the vulnerabilities of existing Current-based PUFs to modeling and hybrid attacks were clearly demonstrated. In the next section, we present
the secure PUF architecture that is tolerant to modeling attacks.

5.3

Non-linear Current Mirror based PUF Architecture

In this section, we describe in detail the proposed secure PUF architecture using
non-linear current mirrors (nlcPUF). First, we explain the source of non-linearity
in section 5.3.1 followed by the PUF architecture in section 5.3.3. The post-silicon
validation of the performance metrics of nlcPUF are presented in section 5.3.5.

5.3.1

Source of Non-linearity in nlcPUF

The proposed PUF uses non-linear current mirrors [91] as building blocks. Current mirrors act as diodes, as the output current(Iout ) flows only for positive input
currents (Iin ). A current mirror exhibits non-linear transfer characteristics when a
constant current source is used along with the current mirror. The threshold input
current is decided by the amount of the constant current source. A simple circuit
implementation of a non-linear current mirror is shown in Figure 5.11. As described
in [91], current mirrors can be constructed in NMOS-only, PMOS-only and NMOSPMOS combinations. However, NMOS-only current mirror is used in our PUF construction due to its simplicity. The non-linear transfer characteristic of the current
mirror shown in Figure 5.11 was evaluated using circuit simulations using the IBM
32nm transistor models by setting the constant current source at 100µA. The trans111

M3

M4
IVout
out

Iin
I1

M1

M2

I2

Figure 5.11. Non-linear current mirror [91]

fer characteristic of the non-linear current mirror is shown in Figure 5.12. It can be
observed that the current mirror exhibits a breakpoint around 100µA, beyond which
a linear behavior in Iin -Iout characteristic is observed. The slope of the linear region
in Iin -Iout characteristic is determined by the relative strengths of the transistors M1
and M2 . However, due to mismatches in the transistor sizes arising from process variations, the transfer characteristics deviate from its nominal behavior. This behavior
is exploited in the proposed PUF circuit.

5.3.2

Effect of Process Variations

As described in the previous subsection, the presence of device mismatches in the
transistors M1 and M2 impacts the transfer characteristics of the current mirror. To
estimate the impact of process variations, Monte carlo simulations were performed
over the current mirror shown in Figure 5.11 using the IBM 32nm SOI transistor
models. Threshold voltage variations were assigned from a Gaussian distribution
with 3σ ≈90mV. The impact of process variations on the transfer characteristics is
shown in Figure 5.13. Although constant current sources were assumed in this analysis
(I1 =I2 =100µA), there might be some mismatches in a silicon implementation. These
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Figure 5.12. Non-linear transfer characteristic of the current mirror
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Figure 5.13. Impact of process variations on the transfer characteristic of Non-linear
current mirror

uncertainties in transfer characteristics arising from process variations are exploited
in nlcPUF construction. The details are described in the next subsection.
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5.3.3

nlcPUF Architecture

The proposed nlcPUF is based on current propagation through two identical chains
of non-linear current mirrors and is analogous in operation to an arbiter PUF [86].
Figure 5.14 shows the architecture of nlcPUF. The circuit has a multiple bit challenge
C and produces a single bit response. The challenge bits determine the current
propagation paths through a switch. The switch either passes or switches the input
currents to the outputs, whose implementation is shown in Figure 5.15(a). In our
construction, Ci = 0 switches the currents and Ci = 1 passes the currents directly to
outputs. In this way, a unique propagation path is created for each challenge C. For
evaluating the response bit, the inputs of the circuit are tied to a common current
source whose amplitude is equal to twice the breakpoint of non-linear current mirrors.
The input current is split in half and flows through the identical paths. Due to process
variations in the current mirrors, the output current of a single stage can fall in one
of the two regions of the transfer characteristics shown in Figure 5.13. The current
shift ratio of a single stage is given by,

Current shift ratioi =

Output currenti
.
input currenti

(5.8)

The output current from a stage is fed as an input to the subsequent stage, which
shifts the current based on its current shift ratio. The process is repeated over all the
stages and the current difference at the output (∆I = Ia − Ib as shown in Figure 5.14)
is sampled to get a single bit response.
In an arbiter PUF, the amount of delay introduced by a unit stage is fixed for
a given challenge bit, i.e, the delay contribution from stage i is dependent only on
the challenge bit Ci . However, in nlcPUF, the amount of current shift introduced
by a single stage is dependent on the input current itself. So, the current shift ratio
introduced by stage i is dependent on the challenge bit Ci , as well as the challenge
bits C1 ...Ci−1 . This property enhances the unpredictability and modeling attack
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Figure 5.14. Proposed PUF Architecture. Ia and Ib are the output currents that
are compared to generate the response bit.

resistance of the PUF circuit. The currents at the output Ia and Ib are compared
to generate a single bit response. For comparing the currents, a latch-based sense
amplifier shown in Figure 5.15(b) is used that generates the output bit based on the
relative strengths of the currents. Before response generation, the trigger signal in
the sense amplifier is pulled low which pre-charges the out and outb (not shown in
figure) nodes to Vdd . Once the trigger signal goes high, the challenge bits are applied.
Based on the strengths of the flowing currents, one of the output nodes discharges
quickly than the other node. This results in a positive feedback which settles the
output nodes. The process is repeated again for generating further response bits.
As it is highly difficult to express the transfer characteristic of the entire PUF
circuit in a closed from, the non-linearity injected by a single stage is shown in terms of
the current shift. The current shift introduced by stages {20,40,60,80} in an 80 stage
nlcPUF circuit is shown in Figure 5.16. The current shift distribution was obtained
by simulating the 80 stage nlcPUF circuit using the IBM 32nm transistor models over
20,000 CRPs. The impact of process variations can be observed from the uniformly
distributed current shift values. The varying means of the current shift distributions
for the different stages show the presence of non-linearity (i.e. stage 80 has a lower
mean than stage 40). Similar non-linear effects were observed for other stages as well.
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Figure 5.16. Mean and standard deviation of current shift ratios in an 80-stage
nlcPUF circuit

Please note that the delay introduced by a single stage in an arbiter PUF will be a
fixed value irrespective of the challenge bit, unlike the uniformly distributed current
shift introduced by a single stage in nlcPUF. The impact of non-linearity introduced
by individual stages on the unpredictability of responses is presented in section 5.3.6.
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5.3.4

Implementation Details

The nlcPUF circuits of different lengths were designed as an array containing 32
instances. Every unit stage of the nlcPUF has around 22 transistors. The entire array
containing 64-stage nlcPUFs was laid out in an area of 0.025mm2 , with each PUF
instance occupying an area of ∼790µm2 . The areas of the nlcPUF implementations
are shown in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5. Area details of a single instance of various nlcPUF circuits

# Stages
64
80
128

5.3.5

Area (µm2 )
790
986
1579

Post-silicon Validation of nlcPUF

The proposed nlcPUF circuit was fabricated using the IBM 32nm SOI process as
shown in chapter 7. Around 200 instances of the nlcPUF circuit (10 instance x 20 dies)
were evaluated across 3 Million CRPs. The validation was performed under nominal
conditions (0.9V and 25◦ C) and extreme conditions (Vdd ±0.1V and 75◦ C) for 5 times
and the results were averaged. For evaluating the performance metrics, the framework
described in chapter 2 was used. The various performance metrics analyzed include
uniqueness, reliability, uniformity and bit aliasing probability. The results of the postsilicon validation are shown in Figure 5.17 and summarized in Table 5.6. It can be
observed that the nlcPUF architecture exhibits excellent statistical properties upon
post-silicon validation. The analysis of security vulnerabilities of nlcPUF architecture
is presented in the next subsection.
5.3.6

Security Evaluation of nlcPUF architecture

In this section, we present the security evaluation results of nlcPUF architecture
presented in the previous section.
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Figure 5.17. PUF Performance metrics distributions. (a) Inter-class HD (b) Intraclass HD (c) Uniformity and (d) Bit-aliasing probability

5.3.6.1

Modeling attacks validation of nlcPUF

The fabricated nlcPUFs were tested for vulnerabilities using the different modeling
attacks presented in section 4.3. Like in Current-based PUFs, around 3 Million
CRPs were collected through post-silicon measurements under nominal and extreme
operating conditions. For simple modeling attacks using SVM and ES, the stable
CRPs collected under nominal operating contions were used in modeling attacks. For
this purpose, the experiments under nominal conditions were repeated 5 times and
the stable CRPs across all the iterations were separated.
Similar to attacks on Current-based PUFs, the SVM and ES classifiers were
trained using a random set of CRPs from the global pool. The challenges were
mapped from (0,1) to (-1,1) for modeling purposes. The feature vector for the attacks were obtained using the equation:
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Table 5.6. Performance validation of nlcPUF and comparison to other strong PUF
architectures
Type of
PUF

Tech
node

Arbiter [54]

45 nm

Current
based

32 nm

nlcPUF

32 nm

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128

# PUF
instances
80
-

dinter
0.38
0.39
0.4
0.39
0.41
0.405
0.42

pi =

n
Y

dintra
(intrinsic/extrinsic)
-/0.08
0.08
0.075
0.072
0.02/0.062
0.019/0.065
0.017/0.068

Cj

Uniformity
0.42
0.415
0.42
0.41
0.42
0.42

Bit-alias
HD
0.43
0.415
0.42
0.43
0.42
0.415

(5.9)

j=i+1

where (p0 , p1 ..pn ) represents the parity vector with pn = 1 and Cj refers to the j th
challenge bit. The prediction errors as a function of the training CRP size for nlcPUFs
against SVM and ES attacks are shown in Figures 5.18 and 5.19 respectively. It can
be observed that nlcPUF has almost 20% higher modeling attack resistance when
compared to Current-based PUFs. For a training set size of 200,000 nlcPUF exhibits
around 80% learnability, whereas the Current-based PUF exhibits 98% learnability.
The error-inflicted CRPs degrade the prediction accuracies obtained for nlcPUF
circuits as in Current-based PUFs. The impacts of intrinsic and extrinsic noise on
nlcPUF circuits can be found in Table 5.6. From intrinsic noise measurements, i.e.
measurements repeated under nominal operating conditions, around 2.1% bit-flips
were observed. On the other hand, around 6.5% bit-flips were observed under extreme
operating conditions. The ML attacks were repeated with a new random set of data
that include error-inflicted CRPs along with the stable CRPs. The impact of errorinflicted CRPs on the prediction accuracies of SVM and ES attacks on nlcPUF circuits
are shown in Figures 5.20 and 5.21. It can be observed that the prediction accuracies
degrade by 25% for 6% error-inflicted CRPs.
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Figure 5.18. Prediction errors from SVM attacks for 64, 80 and 128 stage nlcPUF
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Figure 5.19. Prediction errors from ES attacks for 64, 80 and 128 stage nlcPUF

5.3.7

Hybrid Attacks on nlcPUF

The nlcPUF circuits were also evaluated for vulnerabilities using the hybrid attack
methodology described in section 4.6. As the hybrid attacks require a vulnerable
threshold value, the current-difference ∆Imin was evaluated using Spice simulations.
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From 32nm statistical circuit simulations on 128 stage nlcPUF, ∆Imin was found to be
around 8nA. The value was more or less the same for 64, and 80 stage PUF circuits as
well. The threshold value was used to construct the hypothesis vector FH as described
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Figure 5.20. Impact of error-inflicted CRPs on SVM prediction rates for 64, 80 and
128 stage nlcPUF
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Figure 5.21. Impact of error-inflicted CRPs on ES prediction rates for 64, 80 and
128 stage nlcPUF
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Table 5.7. Security Validation of nlcPUF and comparison to other strong PUFs
Type of
PUF

Tech.
node

Arbiter [78]

45nm

Current
based

Type of
Attack
Logistic
Regression

# Stages

# Training
CRPs

Prediction
accuracy(%)

Training
time

64

18,050

99.9

0.6s

98
97.7
97.3
99.5
99.1
98.8
82
79.2
77.5
86.1
82.4
80.1

12:40min
16:20min
21:10min
74:10min
83:12min
112:40min
22:20min
29:10min
43:20min
78:20min
88:10min
119:10min

64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128

ES with
stable CRPs
32nm
Hybrid
ES with
stable CRPs

nlcPUF

32nm
Hybrid

75K

500K

200K

500K
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Figure 5.22. Prediction errors from hybrid attacks for 64, 80 and 128 stage Currentbased PUFs

in section 4.6. Experiments were conducted on 20 different PUF instances for 100
random sets of CRPs and the results were averaged. The performance of hybrid
attacks on nlcPUF circuits are shown in Figure 5.22. The nlcPUF circuit exhibits
around 15x higher resistance over Current-based PUFs. As ES achieves only moderate
prediction accuracies even under the presence of highly stable CRPs (∼80%), only
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a marginal improvement in prediction accuracy was observed from hybrid attack
framework which builds upon the ES attack.
Table 5.7 summarizes the attack results on nlcPUFs. The comparison results with
Arbiter and Current-based PUFs are also shown in Table 5.7. In general, nlcPUF
architecture exhibits excellent security properties measured in terms of information
leakage. Please note that the nlcPUF architecture can also be modified to incorporate Feed-forward [51] and XOR operations, which can further improve the security
properties.
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CHAPTER 6
DESIGN STRATEGIES FOR PUF CIRCUITS AND
SYSTEMS

In the previous chapter, the design and post-silicon validation results of a modeling
attack resistant PUF were presented. The techniques presented were used to improve
the unpredictability of PUF responses. Apart from unpredictability, uniqueness and
reliability are also some of the significant metrics to be considered in commercial applications involving PUF circuits. In this chapter, techniques to improve the uniqueness
of PUF based circuits are presented. In order to improve the uniqueness, fabrication/lithography aware techniques are presented1 . Delay- and current-based circuits
are used as the PUF targets to demonstrate the impacts of lithography aware design
techniques. Finally, a PUF based authentication system is also presented2 .

6.1

Lithography Aware Design of Physically Unclonable Functions

In sub-wavelength lithography, the polygons/structures in the mask are printed
onto a wafer using an imaging system [57]. Process variations are omnipresent during
the fabrication process. These variations can be classified into “systematic” and
“random” variations. It is often desirable for a PUF circuit to have random variations
dominant over systematic variations. In order to make a PUF circuit more “unique”,
systematic variations should be suppressed.
1

This work was published in [42, 46]

2

This work was published in [41]
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In this section, we present a generalized lithographic simulation framework adopted
for improving PUF design. The main objective of the lithographic simulation framework is to enhance the sensitivity of the PUF circuit to process variations and improve uniqueness when viewed across dies and wafers. It is well known that forbidden
pitches are more prominent in sub-wavelength lithography [50]. Forbidden pitches
are often undesirable, as the polygons/structures at these pitches will not be printed
to their maximum resolution. However, the sensitivity of critical dimension (CD) is
very high to the pitch variations near the forbidden zone. This is used constructively
to enhance the impact of process variations on PUF design. This is done by placing
gate structures of the transistors at pitches closer to forbidden zone. Such a technique
allows the circuit designers to amplify and effectively utilize various sources of lithographic variations including dose, resist thickness, lens imperfections, defocus, etc.
in PUF designs. Arbiter- and Current-based PUFs were chosen as the PUF targets
to demonstrate the impacts of lithography aware design technique. The PUFs were
also designed using a conventional approach and compared with lithography aware
designs.
We will address variations due to dose and defocus in this work. Dose variations
arise from fluctuations in the intensity and the duration of light source. Focus variations or defocus arise due to changes in the relative distance between the lens and the
resist. This can be due to misalignment (change in focus, wafer tilt, etc.) or changes
in resist thickness due to CMP. In this paper, the former is referred to as defocus
and the latter as resist variations. So, we will study the effect of dose, defocus and
resist variations on the structures and hence the circuit parameters across the dice
and wafers. Though all the structures suffer variations, gate or polysilicon structures
suffer the most as they represent the critical dimension of a technology node. Furthermore, the variations in gate structures translate to larger variations in electrical
parameters more than other structures. The focus of this work is to do physical de-
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sign of a PUF circuit in such a way that the impact of manufacturing variations on
the circuit is enhanced.

6.1.1

Related work

In [84], novel PUF circuits known as litho-PUFs were proposed that consider proximity effects, density effects and formation of non-rectangular gates printed during the
lithography process. Though the proposed scheme in [84] also uses forbidden pitches
to improve the uniqueness of PUFs, the evidence of improving inter-wafer uniqueness
was not presented. Also, the impacts of different lithographic variations on polygons
placed near the forbidden pitch were not evaluated in [84]. Traditionally, Optical
Proximity Correction (OPC) tries to reduce variations, both systematic & random
by using the geometric error between the simulated contour and the target as a cost
function. In [24], a PUF-aware OPC scheme was described, that tries to reduce the
systematic variations and increase random variations in the regions of the mask that
contain the PUF circuit. The scheme continues to work as a traditional OPC in nonPUF regions of the mask. The proposed scheme in [24] tries to maximize the variance
of the mean edge-placement error (EPE). An improvement in uniqueness of 5% and
reliability of 70% compared to conventional OPC was reported in [24]. Similar work
on enhancing random variations and suppressing systematic variations was presented
in [23]. In order to suppress systematic variations, several layout techniques have
been used. However, all the existing works in the literature focus only on improving
inter-die variations. Wafer-to-wafer variations are known to be more correlated [38].
This affects the uniqueness of PUFs and has not been extensively explored in the
literature.

6.1.2

Exploiting Forbidden Pitches for Improving Uniqueness

In this section, we describe the proposed scheme on improving the uniqueness
of delay-based PUFs by amplifying the effect of inherent manufacturing variations
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during the fabrication process. We use the arbiter and current-based PUFs shown in
Figures 4.1 and 5.1 respectively for validating the proposed scheme.
In sub-wavelength lithography, the wavelength of the light source used is larger
than the widths of printed structures (lines) leading to variations in printed structures.
Further, the destructive interference of light waves from slits near closely placed lines
leads to very small line widths, even zero line widths [84]. So, the spacing between
lines and hence the pitch has an impact on the printed line width. The pitches at
which the printed line width goes to zero are the so-called “forbidden pitches” [50].
The sensitivity of the critical dimension to the pitch variations is very high for the
pitches closer to the forbidden pitch zone.
The occurrence of forbidden pitches in 45nm and 32nm nodes is shown in Figure 6.1. The forbidden pitches have been determined for the polysilicon structures, as
they represent the critical dimension of a technology node. In order to compute forbidden pitches, the experimental methodology discussed in section 6.1.3.1 is adopted.
The forbidden pitch is found to be 190nm (155nm) in 45nm (32nm) node. The change
in printed line width (∆CD) when a change in line spacing (∆s) occurs as a result
of lithographic variations is given by,

∆CD =
Where,

dCD
ds

dCD
∆s
ds

(6.1)

is the sensitivity of line width (CD) to line spacing (s). It can

be clearly seen that the critical dimension is highly sensitive to pitches around the
forbidden pitch zone from Figure 6.1 and even a small distortion due to lithography
variations can lead to higher variations in critical dimension.
Given the above discussions, we propose our scheme of enhancing the manufacturing variations by placing the gate structures at pitches that are ”sensitive”. In
this scheme, the transistors are broken to multiple fingers such that the pitch between adjacent fingers is a ”sensitive pitch” near the forbidden pitch zone. This helps
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Figure 6.1. Forbidden pitches in 45nm and 32nm nodes

in improving the extent of inter-die and inter-wafer variations by leveraging various
sources of lithographic variations such as dose, defocus and resist thickness. This
leads to an increased variation in electrical parameters and further translates to an
improvement in uniqueness of a PUF as shown in the rest of this document. It is
essential to note that the proposed scheme helps to improve the uniqueness of PUFs
and does not contribute much towards security/unpredictability of PUF responses.
Security of a PUF circuit arises from the PUF construction itself and not from the
way it is designed. To improve security, the PUF construction has to be modified such
that the challenge-response behavior cannot be learned using modeling attacks [78].
Some of the examples for improving the modeling attack resistance include feedforward arbiter PUFs, XOR arbiter PUFs, etc. The techniques to improve the security
of a PUF are not an aspect of this work and we focus only on improving the uniqueness
of PUFs. However, our scheme can be used to improve the uniqueness of the modified
PUF constructions as well.
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6.1.2.1

Outline of the Proposed Scheme

Upon performing lithographic simulations on the fingered gate structures in the
presence of variations such as dose, defocus, resist thickness, etc., the changes in
the line width are computed and fitted within a distribution. Now this serves as a
Process Variation (PV) model for the channel length of the transistors in the circuit
simulations. So, the various steps in our scheme are:
• Enhance manufacturing variations by exploiting the high sensitivity of critical
dimension to pitches near forbidden zone.
• Map the lithographic variations to circuit parameters (PV model) and use in
circuit simulations.
• Validate the proposed scheme for inter-die and inter-wafer uniqueness.
6.1.3

Lithographic Simulation Results

In this section, we describe the lithographic simulations performed to obtain the
process variation model. We also describe in detail the PUF validation techniques
and results.

6.1.3.1

Manufacturing Aware Physical Design Framework

Lithographic simulations were performed by changing the pattern density to compute the changes in the critical dimension. Both 45nm and 32nm nodes were considered in this work. In order to obtain the image of the printed contour, a commercial
simulator (Calibre c WorkbenchTM ) was used. A dipole light source (193 nm) having
a radius of 0.35µm and sigma-center of 0.1µm was used for all the experiments as
shown in Figure 6.2. The numerical aperture (NA) of the imaging system is 1.35
(1.56) for 45nm (32 nm) node [75]. The critical dimension was obtained from the
coordinates of the printed contour using gate-slicing approach [83].
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Figure 6.2. Dipole light source

The overall experimental methodology to compute uniqueness is shown in Figure 6.3 and is explained below. For all the experiments, the models from the IBM
32nm SOI library were used.
1. Manufacturing Process (MP) models: These describe the extent of lithographic variations such as dose, defocus and resist thickness in the manufacturing process. The MP models have different extents of variations at fine
granularities.
2. Litho Simulation: The MP models were fed as an input to the litho-simulator
along with the layout. The lithographic simulations produce print-image contours which take into account the impact of neighboring cells (proximity effects)
along with the inherent variations in the cell itself.
3. Process Variation (PV) models: CD values were extracted from the printimage contours after an extensive set of lithographic simulations using the finegrained MP models. The CD values were then fitted within a Gaussian distribution to form a PV model. The mean (µCD ) and standard deviation (σCD ) of the
CD distribution are used to describe a PV model. We obtain separate inter-die
and inter-wafer PV models as the corresponding MP models are different.
4. SPICE simulation: The obtained PV models, along with a netlist of a PUF
circuit, were then simulated using a circuit simulator (HSPICE). An extensive
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Figure 6.3. Simulation methodology to compute uniqueness

set of challenges were simulated and responses were collected from different PUF
instances.
5. Performance metrics computation: The performance metrics of the lithoaware and conventional PUF designs were computed as per the framework described in chapter 2.
As explained earlier, the transistors in the PUF circuit were fractured into fingers
and the spacing between fingers is chosen near the forbidden pitch zone. Furthermore,
the pitch between the fingers in different stages was slightly varied to improve the
unpredictability of responses. However, the transistors in a particular stage of a PUF
circuit were replicas (designed with the same set of pitches) such that no bias is
introduced into the circuit. Now the PV models are generated as follows.
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6.1.3.2

Intra-die PV model

Lens aberrations are an important source of intra-die variations and are modeled
using Zernike’s coefficients [22]. This forms the intra-die MP model. The intra-die PV
model, obtained by litho-simulation (using the intra-die MP model) and extraction
of the statistics of CD distribution, is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Intra-die PV model

(µintra
CD )

Mean
intra
Std. Deviation (σCD
)

6.1.3.3

32nm
34.2nm
1.35nm

45nm
49.34nm
2.4nm

Inter-die PV model

Table 6.2 gives the bounds for the Inter-die MP models. Litho-simulations were
performed at various values of dose, defocus and resist thickness within the bounds
specified in Table 6.2. After litho-simulations, extraction of statistics of CD distribution yields the inter-die PV model. However, we need to determine a ”sensitive
pitch” before the design process. Figure 6.4 shows the mean and standard deviation
of CD for both 45 nm and 32 nm nodes at different gate spacing values. From Figure 6.4 , we can observe that CD is very sensitive to variations around a gate spacing
value of 110 nm (95 nm) for the 45 nm (32 nm) node. Choosing these values as the
gate spacing between transistor fingers, litho-simulations were performed using the
inter-die MP model. Statistics of CD distribution are shown in Table 6.3 and these
form the inter-die PV model.
Table 6.2. Inter-die MP model

Dose
Defocus
Resist thickness
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Figure 6.4. Sensitivity of CD to gate spacing

6.1.3.4

Inter-wafer PV model

The inter-wafer MP model has the following bounds: dose (±2%), defocus (±2%)
and resist thickness (±2nm). In addition, wafer-tilt of (±5nm) was also considered.
These values were assigned based on an observation that the amount of inter-wafer
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Table 6.3. Inter-die and Inter-wafer PV models

(µdie
CD )

Mean
die
Std. Deviation (σCD
)
waf er
Mean (µCD )
waf er
Std. Deviation (σCD
)

32nm
30.2nm
8.4nm
31.2nm
6.4nm

45nm
44.5nm
10.1nm
44.8nm
8.5nm

variations is typically one-third of inter-die variations [38]. The CD distribution at
the sensitive gate spacing of 110 nm (95 nm) is obtained for 45 nm (32 nm) node
through litho-simulations and the statistics are shown in Table 6.3. This constitutes
the inter-wafer PV model.

6.1.3.5

Performance metrics computation

The models obtained from lithographic simulations (die- and wafer models) were
used along with the PUF netlists and statistical circuit simulations were performed.
For all the experiments, 128 stage PUF circuits were used. The parameters obtained
from lithographic simulations (critical dimension variations) correspond to the transistor length variations. Apart from gate-length variations, threshold voltage variations were also assigned from a Gaussian distribution with 3σ deviations of 150mV
and 90mV for 45nm and 32nm technology nodes, respectively. As the main objective of the proposed framework is to improve the uniqueness of PUF circuits, the
inter-class HD was analyzed through circuit simulations and post-silicon measurements from sugarloaf. Around 100,000 CRPs were collected from 200 different PUF
instances for inter-class HD computation. The results from circuit simulations and
post-silicon measurements are shown in Table 6.4 and 6.5. It can be observed that the
litho-aware design techniques have improved the inter-die and inter-wafer distances
by almost 6% and 16% respectively for 45nm node. For 32nm, the improvements in
inter-die and inter-wafer uniqueness are around 6% and 15% respectively. Post-silicon
measurements also agree well with simulation results. For post-silicon measurements,
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only inter-die distances are shown, as the fabricated dies were from the same wafer.
Similar results were obtained for the current-based PUF circuits as well. Thus, by
careful physical design, more unique signatures can be generated without making any
additional changes to the PUF layout.
Table 6.4. Uniqueness validation results for litho-aware and conventional arbiter
PUFs
Type of experiment

Type of
variations

Technology
node
32nm

inter-die
45nm

Statistical
circuit
simulations

32nm
inter-wafer
45nm

Post-silicon
measurements

inter-die

32nm

inter-wafer

Type of PUF
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
-

Inter-class
HD
0.46
0.485
0.46
0.49
0.31
0.37
0.33
0.39
0.38
0.43

Apart from uniqueness analysis, the impacts of litho-aware techniques on the
other performance metrics such as reliability, uniformity and bit-aliasing were observed. The results are summarized in Tables 6.6 and 6.7. The reliability of the
litho-aware circuits were almost identical to the conventional designs. Only marginal
improvements were observed. The marginal improvements can be attributed to the
increased transistor sizes due to fracturing, which slightly minimizes the impacts of
noise and environmental condition fluctuations. In case of uniformity, the litho-aware
design fared better than conventional designs by as much as 7%. In case of bit-aliasing
probability, improvements of around 8% were observed. These results indicate that
litho-aware design helps to extract maximum process variations for better PUF designs without adding any additional structures to the layout.
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Table 6.5. Uniqueness validation results for litho-aware and conventional currentbased PUFs
Type of experiment

Type of
variations

Technology
node
32nm

inter-die
45nm

Statistical
circuit
simulations

32nm
inter-wafer
45nm

Post-silicon
measurements

inter-die

32nm

inter-wafer

Type of PUF
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
-

Inter-class
HD
0.45
0.48
0.46
0.485
0.32
0.37
0.34
0.39
0.39
0.445

As explained in the earlier sections, security of a PUF circuit is determined by
the architecture rather than design strategies. In ideal scenario, no differences in
modeling attack resistance will be observed for litho-aware designs. Modeling attacks using support vector machines were performed over the 128-stage arbiter and
current-based PUF circuits using the methodology described in earlier chapters. The
prediction errors for arbiter and current-based PUF circuits are shown in Figures 6.5
and 6.6 respectively. It can be observed that the litho-aware design technique does
not improve the modeling attack resistance of PUF circuits. The litho-aware PUFs
Table 6.6. Impact of litho-aware design on other performance metrics for arbiter
PUFs
Type of experiment

Technology
node

Statistical
circuit
simulations

32nm

Post-silicon
measurements

32nm

45nm

Type of PUF
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design

45nm
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Intra-class
HD
0.05
0.048
0.055
0.052
0.059
0.055
-

Uniformity
0.48
0.49
0.47
0.49
0.43
0.46

Bit-aliasing
HD
0.47
0.485
0.46
0.49
0.42
0.455

Table 6.7. Impact of litho-aware design on other performance metrics for currentbased PUFs
Type of experiment

Technology
node

Statistical
circuit
simulations

32nm

Post-silicon
measurements

32nm

Type of PUF
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design
Reference PUF
Litho-aware design

45nm

45nm

Intra-class
HD
0.06
0.057
0.063
0.06
0.072
0.068
-

Uniformity
0.47
0.485
0.48
0.49
0.42
0.46

Bit-aliasing
HD
0.46
0.48
0.45
0.48
0.42
0.45
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Figure 6.5. Prediction errors from SVM attacks on Litho-aware arbiter PUFs

can be broken using almost the same number of training CRPs as conventional PUF
designs.

6.2

PHAP: Password based Authentication System using PUFs

In the previous section, we presented circuit design strategies for improving the
performance metrics of PUFs. In this section, we present an authentication system/protocol employing PUF based circuits. One of the most promising applications
of PUFs is the verification of identity of hardware devices. This is generally done by

137

1

Prediction error

0.5
0.25
0.125
0.0625
0.03125
0.015625
100

Reference PUF
Litho PUF
1000

10000 100000 1e+06
No. of CRPs

Figure 6.6. Prediction errors from SVM attacks on Litho-aware current-based PUFs

a Trusted Authority (T A), which has a database of CRPs of various PUF instances.
The database will be created during the enrollment process by applying challenges to
a PUF and storing the corresponding response(s). During the authentication process,
T A sends a particular challenge from its database to the hardware and compares the
obtained response with the one in the database [86]. If the responses match, the
device will be authenticated. However, one of the setbacks in the protocol is that T A
will not be able to distinguish whether the hardware is with a trusted party or an
adversary.
In this section, we present Password based Hardware Authentication using PUFs
(PHAP), a system in which T A will be able to determine the possession of the trusted
hardware using a simple user password. A separate one-time shared key (also called
as session password further in the document) between T A and the user will be mixed
with the initial PUF response corresponding to the challenge sent by T A and be used
as a seed for a pseudo-random number generator such as a Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR). The output of LFSR then serves as a new challenge for the PUF
block. This challenge will be completely different from the initial challenge and ex-
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tremely difficult for an adversary to predict by random guessing, thereby providing
an additional layer of security. We also leverage the time difference between real time
execution by a trusted party and simulation time of the system (by an adversary) for
authentication purposes. In this work, we show that the time difference for an adversary can be amplified using the one-time session password, as only the trusted party
can obtain the correct response within the stipulated time (tmax ). This is a crucial
property used in Simulation Possible but Laborious (SIMPL) systems [77]. However,
an adversary can predict the one-time session password using a brute-force attack
only to end up providing the correct response well beyond the stipulated time. Also,
the usage of one-time session password helps to alleviate the need of an enrollment
process, as T A will be able to compute the response after the authentication process
is initiated.

6.2.1

Background and Related Work for PHAP

A very common problem in computing is secure authentication [28,36,70,71], and
the existing protocols have certain flaws associated with them. The problems of storing secret keys for performing cryptographic operations were discussed in the earlier
chapters. To counterattack the problems involved in key storage, PUFs have been introduced in the literature in which the hardware decides the mapping of challenge Ci
to response Ri . Various protocols for authentication using PUFs have been proposed
in the literature [25, 72, 86]. The authentication protocol proposed in [86] focuses on
comparing the response obtained from a device with the response generated during
enrollment process. However, the protocol proposed in [86] fails to determine the
possession of the trusted hardware. An adversary possessing the trusted hardware
will be able to authenticate himself along with the hardware. A lightweight challenge
response protocol proposed in [72] utilizes noisy PUFs for authentication. Various
robust authentication protocol schemes have been proposed in [25], where PUFs have
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been used to improve the resilience of authentication protocols. Some of the schemes
employ user’s password for authentication and they tend to be more resilient towards
security attacks such as modeling. However, hardware level implementation and the
associated issues have not been analyzed. In this work, we tend to improve the authentication protocol proposed in [25] for hardware employing a PUF as a source of
security by tightly integrating an one-time session password into the authentication
protocol. A closer version to the proposed work is PEAR [36], where PUFs have been
used for user password maintenance. However, the scheme requires initial enrollment
process, where the CRPs of PUFs are stored in a database for future authentication
purposes. We tend to alleviate this problem by publishing a public description of the
system and a public simulation algorithm such that the T A can compute the response
once an authentication request is initiated similar to SIMPL systems.

6.2.2

SIMPL Systems

SIMPL system [77] is a public key version of Physically Unclonable Functions.
They possess a certain binary description to facilitate public simulation and prediction
in a slower fashion than real time execution by the hardware. Since CRPs have to be
stored prior to authentication, they must be maintained secretly over the entire course
of time (multiple authentication processes). SIMPL tends to overcome this problem
by publishing a public algorithm Sim along with a publicly available description D(S)
of the hardware system S, that allows public emulation of the system. However, the
public emulation takes sufficiently longer duration beyond the stipulated time (tmax ),
within which the response must arrive for authentication. The parameter tmax is
predefined before the authentication process. According to [77], a system S can be
called as a SIMPL system, if it meets the following requirements:
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Table 6.8. Description of Notations
Signal
Cuser

Description
Challenge from T A

Length (bits)
64

Rinter

Intermediate response from PUF block

32

Rpadded

Intermediate response padded with shared secret key

64

CLF SR

LFSR Output - New challenge to the PUF Block

64

Ruser

Response sent to T A for authentication

32

1. A partially disordered system S upon excitement with a challenge Ci , produces
a response Ri . The mapping function FS is decided by the disorder present in
the system.
2. It is possible to obtain the response Ri for a particular challenge Ci by simulating
a public simulation algorithm Sim using description D(S) of the system.
3. Any possible emulation or algorithm that simulates the response of S should be
considerably slower than the real time behavior of system S.
4. The system S must be physically unclonable.
There exists a subtle difference between a SIMPL and PHAP system. In SIMPL,
anyone with the public description D(S) and Sim can simulate the system, but
considerably slower than S. However, in PHAP, only an adversary simulates the
system S considerably slower than the real time execution of S by a trusted party.
Hence, the difficulty in simulation of PHAP is due to one-time session password
prediction rather than the nature of hardware as in SIMPL systems. Moreover, the
terms S, Sim and D(S) have been used in the paper to maintain consistency.

6.2.3

PHAP Architecture

The architecture of the proposed authentication system is shown in Figure 6.7.
Before describing the components, the notations used in the system are shown in
Table 6.8.
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Cuser

Ruser
PUF Block

MUX

Decoder

CLFSR
Si

S0

Rinter

LCD (Logic
Completion
Detector)
shared secret
key

Rpadded
LFSR

interweave

64 bit bus
CLOCK

32 bit bus

Figure 6.7. PHAP Architecture

1. MUX:The MUX chooses the challenge to be applied to the PUF block (Si = 0
applies the user challenge Cuser and Si = 1 applies the LFSR output as a new
challenge to the PUF block or vice versa).
2. PUF Block: PUF block can be a delay based PUF (Arbiter or Ring oscillator
PUF) and the block contains 32 individual PUF units so as to produce a 32 bit
response for a given 64 bit challenge. Other lengths can also be used. Feedforward arbiter PUF architecture has been used in order to increase the attack
resistance to modeling attacks (95 % predictability after 50000 rounds [88]). In
a feed-forward arbiter PUF, some of the challenge bits are determined internally
as a result of a race.
3. DECODER/DEMUX: This is used in order to forward the response either
as an output (Ruser ) or as an input to the LFSR. The decision is based on the
state of the select bit (So ).
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4. LFSR:Linear Feedback Shift Register is used in order to shift the seed by certain
number of clock cycles (few ten thousands) so as to produce a new challenge
for the PUF block. The seed is obtained after interleaving the response with
the shared secret key (session password). Here, the interleaving positions can
be made public and included in the description of the system S to allow public
simulation.
5. Logic Completion Detector (LCD) - LCD is used to generate the select
bit signals for MUX and DECODER. Once the LFSR computation is complete,
LCD output will go to logic high, which will set Si and So such that CLF SR is
applied to the PUF block and Ruser is generated respectively.
6.2.4

Authentication protocol

In this section, the details of the operation of the system is presented. This, in
turn represents the authentication protocol being used. Let hash(.) represents oneway collision resistant hash function and ID represents the unique identifier for a
PHAP system. We also make an assumption that the description of PHAP system
D(S) and a simulation algorithm Sim to simulate the system S are made public.
Moreover, user password refers to the password being used for user authentication
and session password refers to the shared secret key used for LFSR computation.
1. Enrollment: Even though we call the initial process as enrollment, it does not
involve the collection of CRP pairs as in traditional enrollment process. Here,
T A is responsible for generating IDs (identifier) unique for multiple instances
of the system S and a set of one-time user and session passwords in the form
of a password card. A sample one-time password card is shown in Table 6.9.
The size of this card can be changed in accordance with user discretion. The
user can opt to use a password apart from the passwords given by the trusted
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Table 6.9. Password Card (either session or user password)
Pointer / Password

1

2

..

n

1

11 / P assword11

12 / P assword12

1.. / P assword1..

1n / P assword1n

2

21 / P assword21

22 / P assword22

2.. / P assword2..

2n / P assword2n

..

..1 / P assword..1

..2 / P assword..2

.... / P assword....

..n / P assword..n

n

n1 / P asswordn1

n2 / P asswordn2

n.. / P asswordn..

nn / P asswordnn

authority after first authentication. In case of usage in embedded systems, the
password can be entered through a keypad, so as to allow external interface.
2. Authentication
• Once the user/device raises an authentication initiation to T A, a pointer
is sent to the user, which corresponds to the location of the one-time user
and session passwords in the password card shown in Table 6.9. User
sends back the tuple <ID,hash(user password)>, with which the user can
be authenticated as T A has a copy of the user password. The collision
resistant hash(.) ensures that no other user password has the same hash
value as that of the required password. The ID is needed by T A to surf
through the database, if it has to maintain a large number of devices in
the database. A sample database of trusted authority is shown in Table
6.10.
• The user is then presented with a challenge Cuser , whom upon evaluation
of the system sends back the response Ruser to T A. Internally, the onetime session password is interleaved with Rinter to obtain Rpadded , which
will be used as a seed for LFSR computation. Here, it is necessary to note
that the session password is not transmitted over the network to T A.
• In the mean time, T A also computes the response RT A for the challenge
Cuser using the algorithm Sim and the one-time session password.
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Figure 6.8. Timing diagram for PHAP
Table 6.10. Trusted Authority’s Database

<(ID1 , hash(user password1 ..user passwordk )>
<(ID2 , hash(user password1 ..user passwordk )>
...
<(IDn , hash(user password1 ..user passwordk )>

Challenge
C1 ......Ck
C1 ......Ck
...
C1 ......Ck

Response
R1 .....Rk
R1 .....Rk
...
R1 .....Rk

• The user is authenticated if
(a) The response Ruser matches RT A .
(b) The time taken for the user to compute and send the response Ruser
is at most tmax , where tmax is pre-defined and is the maximum time
within which the user must send the response to be authenticated.
A timing diagram to illustrate the operation of PHAP system is shown in Figure
6.8. Here logic ’high’ represents the action being undertaken at that particular time
instance. A formal definition of the authentication protocol being used is defined in
Table 6.11.
It is known from previous chapters that delay-based PUFs can be modeled using
machine learning algorithms to very high accuracies. Hence, there is a strong pressing
need for better design of delay-based PUFs that are inherently resistant to modeling
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Table 6.11. Authentication Protocol
Authenticate - User and Device S authentication to trusted authority
- S initiates the authentication request to T A
- T A sends back the pointer to the user
- User sends back the tuple <(ID,hash(user password))> to T A
- T A sends back user authentication acknowledgment if user password is corrrect along with Cuser
- User sends back Ruser after computation
- T A computes RT A using D(S) and Sim
- Hardware is authenticated if RT A = Ruser and time taken for Ruser computation is ≤ tmax

attacks. PHAP helps to overcome this issue by using an easy-to-model delay-based
PUF and adding an external password that partly determines the final challenge.
Here, some or all of the bits in challenge will be unknown to the adversary. This makes
the modeling attack extremely difficult, as some of the challenge bits are masked from
an adversary. Also, PHAP helps to mask the session password from being transmitted
directly through the network. This property can be useful in applications in which a
password (typically hash(password)) is solely used for authentication purposes.

6.2.5

Simulation Results

In this section, we present some simulation results of the proposed system. To
simulate the PUF block, statistical circuit simulations have been used as shown in
Figure 4.6 and threshold voltage variations were assigned from a normal distribution
with a 3σ deviation of 90mV, to be consistent with ITRS specifications [1]. The other
tools used in the work include Synopsys DC Compiler, Perl and Matlab.

6.2.5.1

PUF Block

Some of the significant performance metrics of a PUF include uniqueness and
reliability. Since uniqueness directly affects the security of the system, it was analyzed
by computing the hamming distance distribution. In order to compute the hamming
distance distribution, 64 challenges were applied over 32 PUF instances (32 bit output
considered) and Monte Carlo simulations were run. The distribution is shown in
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Figure 6.9. Hamming Distance distribution of the PUF block

Figure 6.9. It can be observed that the mean of the distribution is around 16, which
corresponds to a uniqueness of 50%.

6.2.5.2

PHAP System

LFSR is one of the integral components in PHAP system. Fibonacci LFSR implementation was used and 50,000 cycles was set as the rounds by which the seed will be
shifted. However, the number of rounds can be changed during runtime. The hamming distance distribution of the LFSR output after 50,000 shifts for around 10,000
seeds is shown in Figure 6.10. The distribution shows that the successive LFSR outputs typically have a significant hamming distance, thereby providing higher degree
of randomness to the whole system.
In order to observe the uniqueness of Ruser which corresponds to the final response
used in authentication, several experiments were performed to capture various possible scenarios and hamming distance distributions were obtained. In experiment 1,
around 50 random session passwords were chosen and interleaved with 40 different
initial PUF responses Rinter corresponding to Cuser . The corresponding hamming

147

80000
70000

Frequency of Occurence

60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
0

10

20

30

40

50

60

Hamming Distance
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distance distribution is shown in Figure 6.11. It can be inferred that PHAP has a
uniqueness of about 41 %.
In experiment 2, the scenario in which the seed to LFSR (Rpadded ) varying from 1
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Figure 6.11. Hamming distance distribution for various session passwords experiment
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Figure 6.12. Hamming distance vs Rpadded varying from 1 to 40 bits

session password, such that Rpadded varied from 1 to 40 bits in succession. The plot
showing the variation in hamming distance with respect to various seeds to LFSR
(Rpadded ) is shown in Figure 6.12. It can be inferred that the system responds to
Rpadded varying by 1 bit in succession by producing a hamming distance of 12 bits in
average over the responses (Ruser ).
In experiment 3, the scenario in which the LFSR seed Rpadded varying by 1 bit
was analysed. 32 different Rpadded varying by 1 bit were created by manipulating
Cuser and session passwords.The hamming distance was computed for various Ruser
corresponding to CLF SR and is shown in Figure 6.13. It can be inferred that for a
single bit change in Rpadded , the system responds by producing a response with a
hamming distance of 13.5 in average.
These experiments provide an insight that PHAP is unique in its responses under
varying conditions. The presence of LFSR helps to mask the session password by
shifting it through a certain number of clock cycles, which helps in maintaining the
uniqueness as well as security of the system.
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6.2.6

Security Analysis of PHAP

In this section, we present a formal description and analysis of the security of
PHAP system. Several lemmas are presented along with proofs by considering threats
from an adversary A. The security of PHAP is compromised, if A is able to obtain or
predict the user and session passwords and simulate the system within tmax to obtain
a correct response. Some of the possible threats that PHAP faces are identical to
that of PEAR [36], given the similarity in the authentication protocol used.

Lemma 1
An adversary A can attack PHAP by random session password prediction with negligible probability.
Proof: Since the session password is not transmitted over the network, an adversary
A can attack the system by random session password prediction. If an attacker can
predict the session password correctly, the system can be simulated using Sim and
D(S) to compute the response within tmax . However, the session password is 32 bits
long and it is sufficiently difficult enough to predict the correct session password,
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Figure 6.13. Hamming distance vs Rpadded varying by 1 bit
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due to the size of password space (232 ). The attacker can continue to predict the
session password randomly by omitting the previously tried wrong password until the
correct session password is attained. However, the simulation time corresponding to
this action will be extremely high and authentication will be interrupted once tmax is
elapsed. Hence, the adversary A will never be able to realize the instant at which the
correct session password is predicted. The simulation time (tsim ) is computed using

tsim = time to compute initial PUF response(Rinter )
+ time for LFSR computation + time to compute Ruser

The plot showing the probability of correct password prediction by an attacker
in the nth round with the corresponding simulation time tsim is shown in Figure
6.14. The Figure 6.14 also shows the variation in simulation time for various LFSR
operation frequencies (50 MHz and 1 GHz) and different LFSR shift cycles (10,000
and 50,000 cycles) by which the seed will be shifted.
It can be inferred that the prediction probability is very low for a given tmax =
10 ms and that the attacker can predict the correct session password only with a
probability of ≤ 10−6 %. Hence, PHAP can leverage the time difference between real
time execution of S and simulation time by an adversary for authentication, even
though the description of system S and a public simulation algorithm Sim is made
public.

Lemma 2
An adversary A cannot obtain any useful information from the data transmitted between the hardware and trusted authority.
Proof: In case of passive eavesdropping, the attacker cannot recover any useful data
communicated between the hardware device and T A. The only data transmitted by
the device to T A for authentication is the tuple <ID,hash(user password)>. Even if
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A has extensive computational and storage capabilities such that the hash values of
all the user passwords are stored (typically takes about 80 GB, if SHA-0 is used), the
usage of one-time user password makes user authentication by A extremely difficult.
This is mainly due to the absence of user password ordering based on the pointer
generated by T A during enrollment process.

Lemma 3
An adversary A cannot recover any useful data from the information transmitted between T A and hardware.
Proof: The only data transmitted from T A to the hardware is the tuple <pointer,
Cuser >, once an authentication request is initiated by the user. Since A has no clue
about the order of user passwords in the password card, the pointer is of no use for A.
Moreover, the presence of shared key (session password) makes the correct simulation
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of responses for Cuser by A extremely difficult.

Lemma 4
Given physical access to the device,an adversary A can impersonate a truster user to
the trusted authority with a lower probability.
Proof: Since PHAP helps to determine the possession of the trusted hardware using
one-time user password, A would be required to predict the correct user password
based on the pointer. Even if we assume that A succeeds in predicting the user
password,the attacker would have to undergo extensive execution of S by random
session password prediction explained in Lemma 1 for hardware authentication. It is
important to note that authentication will be interrupted once tmax elapses and the
instant at which correct session password is attained will be unknown to A.

Lemma 5
A trusted user can authenticate himself along with the hardware to the trusted authority with higher probability.
Proof: Since a trusted user would have access to the password card issued by T A,
user and hardware authentication is guaranteed with high probability. However, authentication can fail due to additional delays in the network, such that the response
Ruser reaches T A after tmax . In such cases, the user can initiate the authentication
again and continue until the user and hardware authentication process is complete.
From the trusted authority side, tmax can be increased a little higher if additional
delays in the network are noticed.

Lemma 6
Using the previously utilized ID and user password, A can authenticate himself to the
trusted authority with negligible probability.
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Proof: In case of passive eavesdropping, an attacker can capture the tuple <ID,hash(user
password)> during trusted user’s authentication. During subsequent authentication,
T A will search for the incoming hash(user password) in the database to identify if
the user password has been used already. If a match is found, user authentication
will be interrupted. This prevents A from using the captured hash(user password) to
authenticate himself to the trusted authority.

Theorem 1
PHAP based authentication protocol provides a secure means of trusted user and hardware authentication.
Proof: By Lemma 1, we can be sure that an attacker will be able to predict the
response with negligible probability. Lemmas 2 and 3 ensure that data transmitted
between the hardware and T A does not leak any information required to compute
the response within the stipulated time. Moreover, Lemma 4 helps to ensure that
an adversary A can impersonate the trusted user even while possessing the system
S with lower probability. Lemma 5 shows trusted user and hardware authentication.
Lemma 6 shows that the previously utilized information is of no use for an attacker
and also shows how the system can protect itself against an adversary authentication. Hence, we can conclude based on the lemmas that PHAP based authentication
protocol helps for secure hardware authentication by a trusted user.
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CHAPTER 7
SILICON PROTOTYPING

The different PUF circuits described in the earlier chapters were fabricated in
a prototype chip, named sugarloaf using IBM 32nm SOI technology. The implemented PUF circuits are shown in Table 7.1. Different circuits on chip include arbiter,
current-based PUFs, nlcPUFs and reliability monitor for delay-based PUFs. Arbiter,
feed-forward and current-based PUFs were implemented using conventional and lithoaware techniques. The unpackaged and packaged dies are shown in Figure 7.1. The
packaged versions of the dies were used for post-silicon validation. Around 32 instances of each circuit were implemented on chip and the total die count was 40. The
architecture of the test chip containing PUF circuits is shown in Figure 7.2. The
configuration bits are used to select a particular PUF instance from the available
PUF banks. The bits are loaded using a scan chain setup. The controller logic, apart
from selecting a particular PUF instance, also helps to clock gate the unused PUF
instances. The scan chain is 141 bits wide, which accepts the 1-bit serial data per
clock cycle. The description of the configuration bits is shown in Table 7.2. The
configuration bits b12 ..b10 selects a PUF bank from the available banks. The bits b9 b8
and b7 ..b3 are used to select a particular PUF configuration (64, 80 or 128-stage) and
a particular PUF instance from the selected configuration in the PUF bank respectively. The go signal acts as a scan-enable signal when asserted low. Once go is
asserted high, the PUF computation is initiated.
The challenges for the PUF circuit are generated using a Linear Feedback Shift
Register (LFSR). Fibonacci type LFSR of different lengths (64, 80 and 128) were
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Table 7.1. Available PUF circuits in sugarloaf

Type of PUF
Arbiter PUF
Feed-forward
arbiter PUF
Current-based PUF
nlcPUF
Litho-aware arbiter
PUF
Litho-aware feed-forward
PUF
Litho-aware current PUF
Reliability monitor for
delay-based PUF

No. of
instances
32

Available configurations
64, 80 and 128 stages

32

64, 80 and 128 stages

32
32

64, 80 and 128 stages
64, 80 and 128 stages

32

64, 80 and 128 stages

32

64, 80 and 128 stages

32

64, 80 and 128 stages

32

64 and 128 stages

implemented in order to generate random challenge bits for the available PUF configurations. The seeds are loaded into the LFSR registers using the scan chain. Apart
from LFSR challenge generation, user specified challenges can also be applied to the
PUF circuits through bypassing the LFSR logic. This is particularly useful for the
benchmarking work proposed in the dissertation. The architecture of challenge gen-

Figure 7.1. Unpackaged and Packaged sugarloaf die photos
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Figure 7.2. Architecture of PUF portion in sugarloaf

eration logic, which is a part of the controller logic is shown in Figure 7.3. The
fabricated chip is 2mmx2mm in area. The area number of a single instance of different PUF circuits are shown in Table 7.3. The area numbers are shown only for the
PUF circuits and the details of the controller logic are omitted. The layout snapshot
of the PUF banks with controller logic is shown in Figure 7.4.
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Table 7.2. Configuration bits description

Bits
b140 ..b13
b12 ..b10
b9 , b8
b7 ..b3
b2
b1
b0

Function
User specified challenge/LFSR feed
PUF bank selection
PUF configuration selection
PUF instance selection
Enable computation
Challenge selection
Read output

chal select (b1)
b140..b13

128

LFSR (64/80/128)
clk

128

b12..b0

b140..b13

lfsr en

13

Scan chain
datain
go

b140

b139

b2

b138

b1

b0

clk

Figure 7.3. Challenge generation for PUF circuits in sugarloaf

7.1

Measurement setup

As explained above, the packaged versions of the dies were used for post-silicon
validation. To perform post-silicon validation, an FPGA based testing environment
was setup and synchronized with the test chip. The block diagram of the testing
setup is shown in Figure 7.5. A standard QFN56 test socket was used to mount the
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Table 7.3. Area details of a single instance of various PUF circuits

Type of PUF

# Stages
64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128
64
80
128

Arbiter

Feed-forward

Current PUF

nlcPUF

Area (µm2 )
1250
1560
2496
1870
2340
3750
650
810
1290
790
986
1579

Arbiter PUF

1.07mm

Feed-forward Arbiter PUF

nlcPUF

Current PUF

Controller Logic
Reliability monitor

Arbiter PUF
Scan chain

1.18mm

Figure 7.4. Layout snapshot of the PUF banks with controller logic

packaged die. Spartan-3E FPGA which operates at a voltage of 2.5V was used for
post-silicon validation setup. An off-chip bi-directional voltage converter (TXB0104)
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Figure 7.5. Post-silicon validation setup

between 2.5V and 1.8V was used for interfacing the FPGA and ASIC. I/O cells were
available on the test chip for bi-directional voltage level translation between 1.8V and
0.9V for the signals (clock, configuration bits and output). Tekpower TP3010D DC
power supply was used for generating 0.9V for the test chip. The FPGA helps in
loading the configuration bits into the chip and reading out the response bits from
the chip. The configuration bits are used to select the type of PUF among the other
PUF implementations and also to choose a particular instance of the selected PUF
circuit. Once the responses are available, the FPGA dumps the data into the host
computer via UART communication.
The post-silicon validation results of the performance metrics of PUF instances
can be found in the corresponding chapters.
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CHAPTER 8
STATISTICAL BENCHMARKING FOR PUFS

8.1
1

Introduction
In the earlier chapters, we presented the security vulnerabilities of cryptographic

hardware blocks. We also explored the vulnerabilities of PUF circuits to various
modeling and side-channel based attacks. To enhance the modeling attack resistance,
we presented a novel PUF circuit based on non-linear current mirrors. To enhance
the performance metrics of PUF circuits, we presented novel solutions from the perspectives of IC fabrication and protocol design. Although the PUFs are vulnerable to
modeling attacks, it takes an immense effort to completely understand the vulnerability of the circuit and build a parametric model that can be scaled for various attacks.
The parametric modeling requires non-trivial level understanding of machine learning
algorithms. The “conceptualization phase” of a new PUF design involves substantial
effort and time from the PUF designer to build the parametric model and evaluate it
against possible modeling attacks. In such a scenario, the existence of a benchmark
suite for ”strong PUFs” may reduce the effort and time overheads involved in the security evaluation phase for new PUF designs. Such a benchmark suite can also help
in fine-tuning the PUF architecture to harness maximum randomness and security
from the PUF circuit. In this chapter, we present a statistical NIST based benchmark
suite for characterization of “strong PUFs”. In particular, we present an analysis of
the impacts of varying methods of challenge generation on the performance of PUF
1

This is a joint collaborative work with Dr.-Ing.Ulrich Rührmair, Technische Universität
München.
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designs. Such an analysis helps the users for choosing an optimum challenge generation method for improving the randomness of PUF designs. As the benchmark suite
is based on the existing NIST suite, the security analysis does not involve effort and
time-consuming parametric modeling involved in machine learning based attacks.

8.1.1

Need for Benchmarks

The enormous potential of modeling techniques makes the design of efficient
“strong PUFs” with improved ML-resilience an interesting research problem. However, it is non-trivial to judge the exact ML-resilience of PUFs. The question whether
a PUF can be broken efficiently by ML based attacks often depends on whether numeric “models” with certain properties exist for this PUF 2 . As described earlier in
this chapter, the identification of ML algorithms and suited models is time consuming
and requires a strong ML background. Furthermore, the practical failure to identify
suitable ML algorithms, or a model with certain properties, is no guarantee or “proof”
that such an algorithm or model indeed does not exist.
These constraints call for easily scalable and applicable benchmarks. The benchmarks, in ideal scenario, should satisfy the following properties:
1. No in-depth knowledge of ML algorithms is required.
2. Easily scalable to various “strong” PUF architectures.
3. Simple parametric models without additional properties should be used.
2

A “model” of a PUF is a function F that describes the mapping of challenges to their corresponding responses. F usually takes as inputs the challenge C and the PUFs individual, random
internal parameters P (for example the runtime delays in an arbiter PUF), and outputs the corresponding response R, i.e., R = F (C;P ). This is often referred to as a parametric model of the PUF.
ML based attacks often require the parametric model to satisfy certain properties. For example, F
must be linearly separable in order to make support vector machines applicable, or differentiable
in order to allow the use of logistic regression, etc. For some PUF architectures, it might be really
difficult to construct such parametric models that satisfy the desired properties required by ML
algorithms.
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4. Fine-grained security evaluation should be possible. For example, the suite
should be able to distinguish varying PUF bit-lengths and other architectural
parameters.

8.1.2

Contributions

Our major contributions include:
1. We present a statistical benchmark suite to evaluate the security levels of
“strong” PUFs.
2. We evaluate the impacts of varying challenge generation methods on the performance of PUFs.
3. We present a brief analysis of response compressibility from “strong” PUFs and
their correlations to the benchmark suite.

8.2

Statistical Benchmarking

As described earlier, we base our benchmarks based on NIST suite. First, the
PUF target is chosen and a large sample of challenge-response pairs from the PUFs
is collected. The CRPs may be from a software PUF model, statistical circuit simulations or post-silicon measurements. The PUF responses are then fed to the NIST
suite to obtain their scores for various tests.
Although we tested various PUF architectures, we will present the results from
XOR arbiter PUFs in this section for the sake of brevity. For the analysis, we collected
a large sample of responses (around 1 Million) from software PUF model of XOR
arbiter PUF structure. The PUF model is based on linear additive delay model for
arbiter PUFs and was obtained from TU Munich. The model generates n arbiter
PUFs and obtains the XOR value of the n bit response for each challenge. If n
is set to ’1’, the model generated is equivalent to a simple arbiter PUF structure.
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Figure 8.1. Proportion of 0’s and 1’s in XOR arbiter PUFs for Mersenne Twister
based challenges

Varying PUF bit-lengths are used for security evaluation purposes. For this work, we
evaluate up to n = 16. We use 64, 128 and 256 stage XOR arbiter PUFs for security
evaluations using the benchmarks. For generating random challenges, we used a
pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) known as Mersenne Twister (MT). Unless
mentioned otherwise, the depicted results correspond to average results obtained from
5 random iterations.
One of the straightforward, albeit less effective way to evaluate randomness is
measuring the number of 0’s and 1’s in the response streams. We evaluated the
proportion of 0’s and 1’s in the XOR arbiter PUFs for MT based challenges and the
results are shown in Figure 8.1. It can be observed that the PUF structure produces
a fairly equal number of 0’s and 1’s across a large number of evaluations and varying
XOR lengths. So, the randomness metric based on binary proportions does not yield
any useful observation.
We therefore evaluated the responses for their NIST scores. NIST suite evaluates
the bitstream across different tests and interested readers are referred to [7] for details
on different tests. We collected the sum of different test scores and highly random
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Figure 8.2. NIST scores for XOR arbiter PUFs for Mersenne Twister based challenges

stream produces the minimum score. The results from NIST suite based evaluation
of XOR arbiter PUFs for MT based challenges are shown in Figure 8.2. Again we
can infer that the results saturate beyond certain number of XORs and are not distinguishable for the given challenge generator. For example, 8- and 16-XOR arbiter
PUFs have almost the same scores and the fine-grain randomness is not noticed by the
NIST suite. One potential reason could be the randomness induced by the challenge
generation mechanism itself. In such cases, the randomness induced by the challenge
generator overrides the randomness in the PUF circuit. So, new methods of challenge
generation have to be identified to enable fine-grain security evaluation of “strong”
PUF circuits.

8.2.1

Impact of varying challenge generation methods

As the MT based challenges suppress the randomness of PUF circuits, it is essential to identify suitable challenge generation methods. The identification of suitable
challenge generators with reduced entropy, but statistically random enough is an interesting research problem. Moreover, delay-based PUFs have an additional concern
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that the maximum entropy is concentrated around the delay stages toward the arbiter.
In other words, a single bit change in challenge’s LSB bits have higher impact on the
output bit when compared to a single bit change in the MSB bits. So, it is important
to identify a suitable challenge generator with minimal change in LSB bits across the
challenges. Upon investigating various statistically random generators, quasi-random
(QR) sequences seemed to be promising enough. A quasi-random or low discrepancy sequence is “less random” than a pseudorandom number sequence, but more
useful for tasks such as Monte Carlo applications and in global optimizations. This
is because low discrepancy sequences tend to sample space “more uniformly” than
random numbers. We used two popular QR sequences, namely Halton and Sobol.
The Matlab implementations of Halton and Sobol (haltonset and sobolset respectively) support interesting options such as scramble, leap and skip. More details
can be found in [67].
Initially, we conducted experiments using the scramble setting turned on for generating QR sequences. Haltonset supports reverse-radix scrambling and sobolset
supports random linear scrambling. Similar to the experiments using MT generators,
the XOR arbiter PUFs up to n = 16 were evaluated for binary proportions. The
results for scrambled halton and sobol based challenge generators are shown in Figures 8.3(a) and 8.3(b) respectively. We can infer that the binary proportions do not
yield any useful observations for the PUF’s entropy similar to MT generators. So,
we carried out experiments to evaluate the NIST sum of scores for XOR arbiter PUF
responses obtained for QR sequences. The sum of scores against varying number of
XORs for Halton and Sobol sequences with scrambling are shown in Figures 8.4(a)
and 8.4(b) respectively. We can infer that the scores saturate beyond n = 6 and the
scrambled sequences suppress the entropy of the PUF circuit. Upon careful observation, we observed that the scrambled generators still have considerable amount of bit
flips towards LSB bits.
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Sobol(right) based generators with scrambling
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Figure 8.4. NIST sum of scores for XOR arbiter PUFs for Halton(left) and
Sobol(right) based generators with scrambling

This motivated us to explore the impacts of using QR sequences without any
scrambling applied during challenge generation. We set the scramble setting to
’off’ and generated the challenges. Similar to previous experiments, we collected the
binary proportions for the response streams and the results are shown in Figures 8.5(a)
and 8.5(b). Similar effects to MT and scrambled QR sequences were observed with
the binary proportions experiment.
As binary proportions experiment didn’t yield positive results even without scrambling, we evaluated the responses obtained from QR unscrambled sequences using the
NIST suite. The sum of scores against the varying number of XORs are shown in
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Figure 8.5. Proportion of 0’s and 1’s in XOR arbiter PUFs for Halton(left) and
Sobol(right) based generators without scrambling

Figures 8.6(a) and 8.6(b) respectively. We can infer from the figures that Sobol unscrambled generator performs similar to the other generators explained above with the
scores saturating beyond certain number of XORs. However, Halton based generator
has the minimal number of bit-flips towards LSB bits and yields expected results as
shown in Figure 8.6(a). The NIST based suite captures the entropy of the PUF circuit
as the entropy of Halton unscrambled generator is very less. Moreover, the different
versions of PUF circuits (64, 128 and 256 stages) and varying number of XORs can
be clearly identified as seen in Figure 8.6(a). For example, increasing the number of
XORs makes the response highly random as noted by decreasing sum of scores. The
results agree well with the modeling attack results trend usually observed in PUFs.
The modeling attack resistance increases exponentially with increasing number of
XORs similar to the trend shown in Figure 8.6(a). This analysis shows that Halton unscrambled generator could be highly useful for predicting the modeling attack
resistance of PUFs using simple NIST suite. The benchmark suite using Halton unscrambled generator also enables fine-grained security assessment such as the impacts
of varying XORs, bit-lengths, etc.
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8.3

Response Compressibility Analysis

In addition to the benchmark suite analyses, we also evaluated the PUFs against
response compression algorithms. If the outputs are highly random, the compression
ratio should be lower and if the outputs are not random enough, the responses will be
highly compressible. We used two compression algorithms with very high compression
rations:
1. 7z [2]: Lempel-Ziv-Markov chain algorithm (LZMA2) method of 7-zip compression algorithm
2. AdvanceCOMP: Huffman based compression algorithm. We refer to it as “Advcomp” further in the document.
Both the compression algorithms support varying levels of compression ranging from
“nominal” to “extreme”. Although we achieved similar result trends using both the
settings, we present the results obtained using the “extreme” setting for the sake of
brevity.
Initially we evaluated the XOR arbiter PUFs for data compressibilities using the
response streams obtained from MT based challenge generator. The results are shown
in Figures 8.7(a) and 8.7(b). We can infer that the compression ratios are almost
169

16

16
64stage
128stage
256stage

14

64stage
128stage
256stage

15

Comp. ratio

Comp. ratio

15
13
12
11
10
9

14
13
12
11
10
9

8

8
2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

2

# XORs

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

# XORs

Figure 8.7. Compression ratios for MT generator based XOR arbiter PUFs using
7z(left) and Advcomp(right) algorithms

identical for varying number of XORs. This is due to the fact that the challenge
generator’s entropy dominates the entropy of the PUF circuit. As the challenge set
is same for all the XOR PUF structures, the compression ratios are almost identical.
These results agree well with the benchmark suite results obtained for MT based
challenge generators.
As MT based challenge generators didn’t yield satisfactory results, we evaluated
the XOR arbiter PUFs for data compressibilities using QR sequences. We initially
used scrambled QR generators to generate response bitstreams. The compression
ratios of the response bitstreams from 7z and Advcomp algorithms are shown in Figure 8.8. We can infer that both the halton and sobol scrambled generators produce
identical compression ratios against the varying number of XORs, thereby not providing an opportunity to perform fine-grained security assessments. Again, the results
agree well with the benchmark suite results.
Similar to the benchmark suite experiments, a breakthrough was obtained using
the unscrambled versions of QR generators. We set the scramble setting to “off”
and generated the challenge streams. The response bitstreams obtained using the
challenge streams were then evaluated against 7z and Advcomp algorithms. The
compression ratios against varying number of XORs are shown in Figure 8.9. It can
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Figure 8.8. Compression ratios for scrambled halton(top) and sobol(bottom) generators based XOR arbiter PUFs using 7z(left) and Advcomp(right) algorithms

be inferred that the data compression algorithms were able to distinguish the varying
number of XORs upto certain extent(n = 5) for unscrambled QR based response
streams. The compression ratios were higher for lower number of XORs and starts
reducing with increasing number of XORs. This is obviously due to the fact that
increasing number of XORs also increases the entropy of PUF responses. Even better results were observed for halton unscrambled generators as seen from Figure 8.9.
The data compression algorithms were able to distinguish varying number of XORs
and bitlengths to extents better than the unscrambled sobol generator. In particular,
Advcomp yields significantly better results for unscrambled Halton generator than
the sobol counterpart. The fine-grained security evaluations agree quite well with the
benchmark suite results. However, the fine-grained security assessments are still not
accurate enough when compared to the results obtained from benchmark suites. One
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generators based XOR arbiter PUFs using 7z(left) and Advcomp(right) algorithms

potential reason could be the limited data compression resolutions of the compression algorithms employed. As part of our future work, we will be exploring several
other data compression algorithms that enable highly accurate fine-grained security
assessments.
In general, we were able to verify the authenticity of the NIST based benchmark
suite using our analysis on data compressibilities. The results from compressibility
analysis follow the same trend as the results from benchmark suite to certain extent.
We were able to verify that the unscrambled Halton generator yields the optimum
results to enable fine-grained security assessments of the XOR arbiter PUFs.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

Moore’s law has continuously driven the semiconductor industry over the past
few decades. The semiconductor technology has certainly had a major impact on
significant improvements in various things ranging from day-to-day human lives to
rocket-science. With the continuous improvements in wireless and mobile computing
thanks to semiconductor technology and in turn Moore’s law, people tend to rely
on pocket-size devices for executing a gamut of day-to-day activities. Some of these
activities often involve storage and processing of sensitive data, which puts security
and privacy protection at forefront position. As the data is often transmitted over
untrusted wireless medium, the devices are equipped with means to provide cryptographic protection to the transmitted data. As the devices are getting smaller in
size and power with technology scaling, it has provided an excellent platform for
advancements of lightweight cryptographic algorithms. However, the advancements
in lightweight crypto- blocks face challenges from ever-increasing process variations
and various forms of hardware and software level threats. In this work, we have
demonstrated the vulnerabilities of lightweight cryptographic blocks to different forms
of fault-injection attacks. In particular, we have presented novel hardware Trojans
based techniques to inject transient faults into a cryptographic circuit. The Trojan
insertion techniques are based on altering the voltage transfer characteristic (VTC)
of the target gate through the manipulation of doping concentration and/or dopant
area of a transistor. We demonstrated that the proposed fault-injection methods
are suited for attacks on cryptographic circuits requiring high precision by mounting
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attacks on state-of-art lightweight cryptographic block ciphers such as LED-64 and
PRINCE. This holds for the rather simple attack on LED-64, which needs one exploitable fault in most cases, as well as for a more sophisticated two-stage attack on
PRINCE where fault locations in both stages interfere with each other. Conventional
tamper-resistance techniques, such as shielding or voltage-drop sensors, are largely
ineffective against attacks presented in this work but may still be required to protect
the circuit against other threats. It appears that effective countermeasures against
parametric fault injection are on protocol level (frequent key regeneration) or information level (concurrent error detection). The MAPLE Trojans can substantially
bias the fault injection towards the locations desired by the attacker, and they are
nearly undetectable by all known test methods. In summary, our results suggest
that the right mix of countermeasures on different abstraction levels is essential for
comprehensive protection.
Although process variations are detrimental to a circuit’s operation, PUFs have
been proposed as a viable solution to harness the unpredictable nature of process
variations for security applications. Initially, PUFs were assumed to be inherently
tolerant to various attacks and threats. To analyze the vulnerabilities of PUF circuits,
we designed and fabricated different PUF architectures such as arbiter, feed-forward
arbiter, current-based PUFs in 32nm SOI technology available from IBM. The various modeling attacks mounted on these different PUF architectures suggest that the
existing PUFs are highly vulnerable to machine learning based modeling attacks. The
prediction accuracies for these PUF circuits reach more than 98% for a limited set of
training CRPs. However, the performance of modeling attacks are highly impacted
by the presence of error-prone CRPs in the learning and training set CRPs. To that
extent, we have proposed a technique that exploits data-dependent information from
the PUF target and use it in conjunction with a machine learning algorithm in order
to improve the performance of modeling attack. The data-dependent information is
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extracted through the use of a fault-injection attack on the PUF target. We demonstrated the effectiveness of the technique by mounting hybrid attacks on all the PUF
targets mentioned above. The vulnerabilities of existing PUF circuits impose a strong
pressing need on design of efficient and secure PUF designs. To that extent, we presented the design and analysis of a modeling attack resistant PUF design based on
non-linear circuit elements. The circuit relies on current switching using non-linear
current mirrors, where the amount of current switch is dependent on the challenge
bit and the input current itself. The post-silicon validation of the circuit using IBM
32nm SOI process indicates that the PUF circuit has excellent statistical and security properties. The non-linear PUF exhibits around 10x and 20-25x improvements
in modeling and hybrid attack tolerances respectively. Moreover, the silicon area
numbers of the proposed PUF are at par with other strong PUF architectures.
Apart from security levels, there are other important performance metrics to be
satisfied for commercial deployments. This thesis explored techniques to improve the
performance of PUFs from various circuit and system level perspectives. Fabrication
aware design technique that exploits forbidden pitches in sub-wavelength lithography
has been proposed to improve the performance of PUF. The proposed design framework is highly generic and can be applied with minimal effort to any silicon based
PUF implementation that relies on process variations. We also presented a system
level technique/protocol for enhancing the performance of PUF based systems by
extending the concept of trusted user and device authentication. Finally, we presented a statistical method to evaluate PUF circuits and also to predict the security
levels of strong PUF architecture during the conceptualization phase. As mounting
modeling attacks involve time and effort-consuming parametric modeling and deep
knowledge of machine learning algorithms, the process of conceptualizing new PUF
architectures is often cumbersome. However, the proposed benchmark suite builds
upon the existing NIST test suite and requires a basic parametric model without ad-
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ditional properties to be satisfied unlike the parametric models involved in machine
learning based attacks. We also presented data compression analyses to validate the
performance of statistical benchmark suite against fine-grained security assessments.
In general, secure computation in nanometer CMOS regime is highly complicated
and the desire to build efficient cryptographic systems will be hard to quench. The
ever-increasing process variations provide both an excellent platform and also a stumble block for varying levels of hardware security applications. Further, the evolving
styles of computation logic present an excellent opportunity to identify different types
of implementation strategies for hardware security blocks in order to address various
forms of possible threats. Overall, the field of hardware security in nanometer CMOS
promise an exciting future for commercial and research fields.

9.1

Future Work

This dissertation has touched the fields of hardware Trojans, fault-injection attacks, modeling attacks and PUFs and the common observation is that the results can
be extended in the future. Some of the possible avenues for extension are provided
in this section.
• Hardware Trojans: This work touched upon manipulation of manufacturing
process parameters to insert hardware Trojans. As the Trojan gates are identical to normal gates in metal and polysilicon layers, it is extremely hard to
detect them through optical inspection. Recent work shows that dopant-area
manipulation can be detected through scanning electron microscopy, albeit at
an increased cost when compared to metal layer detection [85]. However, no
existing work shows that doping concentration based manipulation can be detected through optical inspection. The identification of detection strategies and
possible countermeasures for manufacturing process Trojans is extremely im-
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portant for secure computation logic. Design of cross-level protective schemes
which balance security against efficiency and cost is a challenge for the future.
• PUFs: The last decade or so has seen an enormous amount of work put forth
to make and break PUF circuits. Majority of the work are based on identifying
suitable parametric models for analysis and attack purposes. Due to cost and
effort constraints, majority of the work report results from simulations instead
of post-silicon measurements. In such cases, extreme care must be taken to
identify suitable process variation models to enable accurate characterization of
PUFs. Although process variations are random enough, the presence of spatial
correlations degrade the performance of PUFs. So, the process variation models should be built to incorporate the correlation component. This also paves
opportunity to exploit various lithographic sources of variations in order to suppress the correlation component in process variations. This work touched upon
the concept of forbidden pitches to suppress spatial correlations in process variations. However, there exist a wide-range of opportunities in sub-wavelength
lithography that can be exploited for improving the performance of PUF circuits. Moreover, the most common technique to improve the reliability of PUF
circuits is to employ error-correction codes (ECC). Depending on the amount
of unreliability in PUFs, the size of ECC may increase and pose additional constraints for commercial deployments. As reliability of a PUF is directly related
to security levels, novel techniques from circuit- and system-level perspectives
are needed to improve the reliability of PUFs in order to reduce the workload on
ECCs. The proposed hybrid attacks that exploit unreliable CRPs also indicate
that reliability issues in PUFs should be addressed in the near future. Finally,
various forms of attacks indicate that novel and efficient “strong” PUF architectures that are inherently tolerant to modeling attacks present a challenge to
the future.
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• Benchmarking PUFs: This work presented a brief description and analysis of
extending NIST suite to develop benchmarks for early-stage analysis of PUF architectures. While QR sequences seem appropriate for statistical benchmarks,
the results indicate that a comprehensive analysis of the impacts of various
statistically random sequences on NIST based benchmark suite are needed. Although an architecture independent sequence would reduce the time and effort,
it is important to identify the different sensitivity levels of the PUF target to
varying random sequences. This would enable the designers to perform security
assessments at extreme fine-grained levels. The identification of suitable data
compression algorithms for performing fine-grained security assessments is also
an exciting venue for research in PUF benchmarking field.
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[72] Öztürk, Erdinç, Hammouri, Ghaith, and Sunar, Berk. Towards robust low cost
authentication for pervasive devices. In Proceedings of the 2008 Sixth Annual
IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications
(Washington, DC, USA, 2008), PERCOM ’08, IEEE Computer Society, pp. 170–
178.
184

[73] Pappu, R.S. Physical one-way functions. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, March 2001.
[74] Polian, I. Power Supply Noise: Causes, Effects, and Testing. ASP Jour. LowPower Electronics 6, 2 (2010), 326–338.
[75] Ronse, K., Jansen, P., Gronheid, R., Hendrickx, E., Maenhoudt, M., Goethals,
M., and Vandenberghe, G. Lithography options for the 32nm half pitch node
and beyond. In Custom Integrated Circuits Conference, 2008. CICC 2008. IEEE
(sept. 2008), pp. 371 –378.
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